scholarly journals Has Economic Competition Improved China’s Provincial Energy Ecological Efficiency under Fiscal Decentralization?

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (7) ◽  
pp. 2483 ◽  
Author(s):  
Min Zhou ◽  
Teng Wang ◽  
Liang Yan ◽  
Xiong-Biao Xie
Keyword(s):  
Energy Efficiency ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Fiscal Decentralization ◽  
Measure Data ◽  
Chinese Government ◽  
Ecological Efficiency ◽  
Economic Competition ◽  
The Social

The study of environmental-oriented total factor energy efficiency considering pollutants as a non-expected output has attracted wide attention, but few studies have included social welfare into the above framework for analyzing China’s provincial energy ecological efficiency (EEE). In addition, China’s fiscal decentralization and economic competition have created tremendous momentum for economic growth; however, research has been lacking on whether they have improved China’s energy utilization, pollution control and social welfare level. To fill these gaps, by applying the 2000–2016 panel data from 30 provinces and considering the social welfare condition, we use the slacks-based measure data envelopment analysis (SBM-DEA) method to calculate EEE and build empirical model to test the relation between EEE, fiscal decentralization and economic competition. The results reveal that, firstly, in the last 16 years EEE has been getting worse and the situation of the middle and western areas of China are poorer than in the eastern area, with the middle area still deteriorating further. Secondly, economic competition among local governments aggravates the provincial EEE in China, while the high degree of fiscal decentralization in state governments significantly contributes to improve the EEE; and the co-impact of economic competition on EEE has been negatively strengthened against the background of fiscal decentralization. Thirdly, the influence of economic competition on EEE presents a regional difference; economic competition makes the degree of EEE go down in the east and middle regions, while by contrast, economic competition has helped the EEE level in western regions. The conclusions point out that the temporal trend of EEE in various regions of China, and the economic competition actions adopted by most Chinese local governments to enhance their own financial strength, have not improved energy efficiency and pollution control capability, and has reduced the social welfare of the region. Accordingly, policy proposals are that the Chinese government can adjust the fiscal and tax revenue system and preferential tax system of the central government and local governments and curb competition between provincial jurisdictions.

scholarly journals Game Theory-Based Analysis of Local Governments’ Behavioral Dissimilation in the Third-Party Soil Pollution Control under Chinese-Style Fiscal Decentralization

Land ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 389
Author(s):  
Caihua Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Local Government ◽  
Soil Pollution ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Fiscal Decentralization ◽  
Third Party ◽  
The Third ◽  
Party Control ◽  
The Third Party

The participation of a third party of the environmental service enterprise theoretically increases the level and efficiency of soil pollution control in China. However, Chinese-style fiscal decentralization may have a negative impact on the behaviors of participants, especially the local government. First, this paper conducts a positioning analysis on participants of the third-party soil pollution control in China and discusses the behavioral dissimilation of the local government under fiscal decentralization. Second, taking the government’s third-party soil pollution control as a case, a two-party game model of the central government and the local government is established around the principal-agent relationship, and a tripartite game model of the central government, the local government, and the third-party enterprise is designed around the collusion between the local government and the third-party enterprise. The results show that Chinese-style fiscal decentralization may lead to the behavioral dissimilation of local governments, that is, they may choose not to implement or passively implement the third-party control, and choose to conspire with third-party enterprises. Improving the benefits from implementing the third-party control of local governments and third-party enterprises, enhancing the central government’s supervision probability and capacity, and strengthening the central government’s punishment for behavioral dissimilation are conducive to the implementation of the third-party soil pollution control. Finally, this study puts forward policy suggestions on dividing the administrative powers between the central and local government in third-party control, building appraisal systems for the local government’s environmental protection performance, constructing environmental regulation mechanisms involving the government, market and society, and formulating the incentive and restraint policies for the participants in the third-party soil pollution control.

The Quest for Sustainable Livelihoods: Social Development Challenges and Social Policy Responses in Guangzhou, China

2014 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-250 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ka Ho Mok ◽  
Maggie Lau
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Social Services ◽  
Social Protection ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Mainland China ◽  
Capital City ◽  
Chinese Government ◽  
Role Of The State ◽  
The Social ◽  
Financial Burdens

China's welfare system has been a typical ‘residual welfare regime’, but the economic reform and market-oriented transformations in recent decades have weakened the original well-balanced ‘residual’ and ‘needs’ pattern. Marketisation of social welfare has intensified social inequality as those who are less competitive in the market-oriented economy have encountered tremendous financial burdens in meeting their welfare needs. In order to rectify the social problems and tensions generated from the process of marketisation of social welfare, the Chinese government has adopted different policy measures to address the pressing welfare demands from the citizens. This article examines how a local government in Guangzhou, capital city of Guangdong province, has responded to the call of the central government in promoting social harmony in the context of growing welfare regionalism emerging in mainland China. More specifically, with reference to a case study of Guangzhou, this article discusses how Guangzhou residents assess their social welfare needs and expectations, and how they evaluate the municipal government's major welfare strategies. It also reflects upon the role of the state in welfare provision and social protection, especially when many social welfare and social services have been marketised in the last few decades in China.

Distributional Consequences of Reforming Local Public Finance in China

1996 ◽  
Vol 147 ◽  
pp. 751-778 ◽  
Author(s):  
Albert Park ◽  
Scott Rozelle ◽  
Christine Wong ◽  
Changqing Ren
Keyword(s):  
Public Finance ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Fiscal Decentralization ◽  
Planning System ◽  
Chinese Government ◽  
Fiscal Discipline ◽  
Rural Industry ◽  
Local Public Finance ◽  
Entrepreneurial Spirit ◽  
The 1960S

Central-local budgetary arrangements have undergone numerous changes since the 1960s as the Chinese government in its quest for modernization has sought to balance the needs of central control and local autonomy. During the reform period, the falling tax share of GNP and a commitment to greater decentralization of the planning system led to major changes in the public finance system that have devolved expenditure responsibilities and financial authority to local governments. Fiscal decentralization has been credited with hardening budget constraints for local publicly controlled enterprises and government agencies. New budgetary relations have instilled fiscal discipline, allowing local governments to disburse more expenditures only if they generated more revenues. These reforms have helped unleash the entrepreneurial spirit of local bureaucrats, fuelling the rapid growth of rural industry.

Regional Cooperative Pollution Control and Residents’ Health Expenditures: Empirical Evidence from China

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuhui DAI ◽  
Zhidong TAN ◽  
Jianhua TAN ◽  
Lina YAN
Keyword(s):  
Air Pollution ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Control Policy ◽  
Health Expenditures ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Pilot Project ◽  
Chinese Government ◽  
Pollution Control Policy ◽  
The Impact

Background: Environmental pollution seriously damages not only the ecosystem but also the well-being of residents. There is an association between air pollution and residential health expenditures. The aim of this study was to identify the association between pollution control and residents’ health expenditures. Methods: Using the pilot project of the regional cooperative pollution control in 28 cities required by the Chinese government as the quasi-natural experiment setting and the panel data of residents’ health expenditures in China from 2014 to 2017, the impact of pollution control on residents’ health expenditures was systematically explored through difference-in-difference approach. Results: Air quality of the 28 cities that adopted the regional cooperative pollution control policy improves significantly, thus indicating that this policy effectively solves the self-interest issue of local governments in pollution control, and residents’ health expenditures consequently decrease. Conclusion: This study enriches the paradigm that analyzes the relationship between air pollution and residents’ health expenditures and reveals the mechanism through which the regional cooperative pollution control reduces residents’ health expenditures.

scholarly journals The Dilemma and solution of Water pollution Control from the Perspective of Environmental Regulation

2019 ◽  
Vol 136 ◽  
pp. 06007
Author(s):  
Chu Yijing ◽  
Wang Jue
Keyword(s):  
Water Pollution ◽  
Local Government ◽  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Environmental Regulation ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Regulatory Capture ◽  
Water Pollution Control ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Government

With the development of the economy in China，water pollution problems have become increasingly prominent and have received extensive attention in academic circles. At present,the environmental regulation on water pollution is still confronted with several dilemmas,for instance,the externalities triggered by "race to the bottom" of local governments，the spillover of water pollution governance and the uncertainty of water pollution control. By combing the mechanism of government environmental regulation, we found that the government environmental regulation still faces such major difficulties as the local government departmentalism is difficult to eliminate, the problem of information asymmetry and the regulatory capture are still not, iceable then puts forward that these plights can be effectively solved through implementing the river chief system,improving the social supervision of water pollution control.

Increasing Government Social Expenditure and Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in China

2017 ◽  
Vol 09 (04) ◽  
pp. 101-111
Author(s):  
Jiwei QIAN
Keyword(s):  
Social Policy ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Government Expenditure ◽  
Chinese Government ◽  
Social Expenditure ◽  
Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations ◽  
Policy Initiatives ◽  
The Social ◽  
Recent Policy ◽  
Total Government Expenditure

In 2016, the Chinese government spent about 37% of total government expenditure on social policy areas. With demographic changes and new government initiatives, this spending is likely to increase further. Local fiscal capacity is insufficient to fulfil this responsibility. To remedy, two recent policy initiatives have been introduced including reallocating expenditure responsibility between central and local governments and encouraging the entry of the private sector to share some outlays of the social programmes.

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