Integration of Navigational Information in Aircraft

1981 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 240-246
Author(s):  
V. David Hopkin

Mr Hopkin, Senior Principal Psychologist at the Royal Air Force Institute of Aviation Medicine, discusses the human implications of recent advances in the automation of data processing and display as affecting both the role of the navigator and the safety of navigation. This paper was presented in London on 11 December 1980 at a joint meeting of the Institute and the Nautical Institute.

2015 ◽  
Vol 101 (2) ◽  
pp. 186-187
Author(s):  
A Wrigley

AbstractHypoxia training at the Royal Air Force Centre of Aviation Medicine (RAF CAM) has traditionally involved the use of a hypobaric chamber to induce hypoxia. While giving the student experience of both hypoxia and decompression, hypobaric chamber training is not without risks such as decompression sickness and barotrauma. This article describes the new system for hypoxia training known as Scenario-Based Hypoxia Training (SBHT), which involves the subject sitting in an aircraft simulator and wearing a mask linked by hose to a Reduced Oxygen Breathing Device (ROBD). The occupational requirements to be declared fit for this new training method are also discussed.


Author(s):  
Frank Ledwidge

‘The Second World War: air operations in the West’ considers the air capabilities of the main actors of the Second World War including the Polish air force, the German Luftwaffe, the Soviet air force, Britain’s Royal Air Force, and the US Army Air Corps. It discusses the strategies employed by the different forces during the various stages of the war, including securing the control of the air during the Battle of Britain in 1940, which demonstrated that a defensive air campaign could have strategic and political effect. The improving technology throughout the war is discussed along with role of air power at sea, and the results and controversy of the bombing war in Europe.


Despite terrorist bombs and structural failures, human error on the flight deck continues to account for the majority of aircraft accidents. The Royal Air Force (RAF) Institute of Aviation Medicine (IAM) has investigated the psychology of such error since the early 1970s, and to this end has used two principal techniques. The first has involved assisting in the official inquiries into both RAF and civil flying accidents, and the second has involved setting up a reporting system that permits any commercial pilot to report his own everyday errors, in complete confidence, to the RAF IAM. The latter system possesses the clear benefit of gathering error data untainted by considerations of culpability, and sometimes permits system rectification before the occurrence of accidents. This paper examines selected examples of errors associated with the design of equipment and with the social psychology of crews, and suggests that some consideration of the psychology of organizations may be necessary to ensure that the problems of human error are given the degree of consideration they require.


The Royal Air Force Institute of Aviation Medicine is located within the perimeter of the Royal Aircraft Establishment, Farnborough as a lodger unit of the Air Ministry. It was first established in 1939, under the direction of Professor Sir Bryan Matthews, and its aim today is exactly that of early war years, namely, to investigate those factors which impair the efficiency of flying personnel in flight, and impair their chances of safety or survival in emergencies in flight or thereafter on the sea or land. In the United Kingdom it is the main laboratory carrying out such work, and thus has come to be the chief source of biological knowledge to the aircraft industry. With regard to giving advice to the Royal Air Force, the Institute is a part of the entire medical branch, but works closely through Flying Personnel Medical Officers, who are responsible for carrying out investigations at the operational squadrons. These officers can interpret directly the biological advice which results from studies in the Institute, but there are no comparable links in industry in this country.


2017 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 188
Author(s):  
Nor Ibrahim Sulaiman

Helicopter as an instrument of war in counter insurgency warfare in Malaysia had its origin during the Malayan emergency 1948-1960. Three helicopters, the Dragonfly, made an entry into Malaya in March 1950 at the request of the Commander-in-Chiefs Committee of the Far East Land Forces on 8 March 1949. The primary role of these helicopters then was for casualty evacuation of wounded troops sustained during operations against the communist terrorists (CTs). Their ability to operate from unprepared areas expanded their roles as an ideal platform for air mobility of troops, supplies, and search and rescue. The flexibility of transporting the troops made the CTs no longer invincible in their own safe havens. More importantly, the morale of the troops was kept high knowing that they would be evacuated fast for medical treatment in the event they were wounded. This article discusses the roles of helicopter during the Malayan emergency. Most of the references are records from the Royal Air Force (RAF), books, and online information. This paper highlights the contributions of helicopters towards the successful ending of the emergency. Keywords: Counter insurgency, Commander-in-Chief of Far East Land Forces, communist terrorists, Malayan emergency, Royal Air Force helicopter squadronsCite as: Sulaiman, N.I. (2017). Helicopters as an instrument of war during the Malayan emergency 1948-1960. Journal of Nusantara Studies, 2(2), 188-197.


2010 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 298-306
Author(s):  
Di Lamb

The Royal Air Force (RAF) Critical Care Air Support Teams (CCASTs) aeromedically evacuate seriously injured service personnel. Long casualty evacuation chains create logistical constraints that must be considered when aeromedically evacuating patients. One constraint is the length of a CCAST mission and its potential effect on team member performance. Despite no evidence of patient care compromise, the RAF has commissioned a study to investigate whether CCAST mission length influences performance. Describing and understanding the role of a CCAST enabled fatigue to be defined. Factors essential to studying fatigue were then identified that were used to develop a theoretical model for designing a study to measure the effects of fatigue on CCAST performance. Relevant factors include the patient’s clinical condition, team members’ cognition and vigilance levels, and the occupational aviation environment. Further factors influencing overall performance include the duration and complexity of patient interventions, mission length, circadian influences, and fatigue countermeasures.


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