scholarly journals The Future of Amicus Participation at the WTO: Implications of the Sardines Decision and Suggestions for Further Developments

2005 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 449-470 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Keller
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
International Institutions ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Public Access ◽  
Democratic Participation ◽  
Global Society ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
The World ◽  
The Future

In today's increasingly interdependent global society, international institutions formerly committed to operating as insular systems recognizing only states as legitimate participants have come under pressure to open their processes to public view and participation. The World Trade Organization (WTO) in particular has been widely criticized for its lack of transparency and democratic participation. Nowhere has this criticism been more prevalent than in the arena of dispute settlement. The controversy over the acceptance of amicus briefs at the WTO reflects the tensions among WTO members and non-members concerning greater public access to dispute settlement proceedings. This battle has been fought primarily through the Appellate Body and its important series of decisions on amicus briefs.

The Politics of Judicial Economy at the World Trade Organization

2010 ◽  
Vol 64 (2) ◽  
pp. 257-279 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc L. Busch ◽  
Krzysztof J. Pelc
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
International Institutions ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Legal Decisions ◽  
The World ◽  
The Future ◽  
Future Consequences ◽  
Judicial Economy

AbstractInternational institutions often moderate the legal decisions they render. World Trade Organization (WTO) panels do this by exercising judicial economy. This practice, which is evident in 41 percent of all rulings, involves the decision not to rule on some of the litigants' arguments. The constraint is that it can be appealed. We argue that panels exercise judicial economy when the wider membership is ambivalent about the future consequences of a broader ruling. This is proxied by the “mixed” (that is, nonpartisan) third-party submissions, which are informative because they are costly, jeopardizing a more decisive legal victory that would benefit these governments too. We empirically test this hypothesis, and find that mixed third-party submissions increase the odds of judicial economy by upwards of 68 percent. This suggests that panels invoke judicial economy to politically appease the wider WTO membership, and not just to gain the litigants' compliance in the case at hand.

scholarly journals THE SEPARATION OF POWERS IN THE WTO: HOW TO AVOID JUDICIAL ACTIVISM

2004 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 861-895 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lorand Bartels
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Amicus Curiae ◽  
The Public ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The World ◽  
The Right

As with other legal systems based on a separation of powers, the World Trade Organization is marked by a degree of tension between its political organs and its quasi-judicial organs, in particular the Appellate Body. In late 2000 this tension spilled out into the public domain, when the Appellate Body announced a procedure for the filing ofamicus curiaebriefs in theEC-Asbestoscase.1The question of public participation in WTO dispute settlement proceedings is sensitive to many WTO Members, and in expressly encouraging the submission ofamicusbriefs in this way the Appellate Body was felt to be overstepping its functions.2In the end, this dispute settled with a draw, the Appellate Body deciding that it had no need to consider any of theamicusbriefs submitted in that particular case, and yet still maintaining that panels and the Appellate Body have the right to take unsolicitedamicusbriefs into account, should they so choose.

WTO Dispute Settlement: Praise and Suggestions for Reform

1998 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 647-658 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas J. Schoenbaum
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Uruguay Round ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Objective Standard ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The World ◽  
Appeal Process

We have now had three years' experience with the dispute-settlement process of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which came into existence as a result of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations on 1 January 1995. By any objective standard, this system of dispute settlement is a resounding success. Well over 100 cases have been brought to the WTO, and, as at the end of 1997,25cases had been settled at the consultation stage, 61 were under consultations and 36 were in or beyond the panel-appeal process. The newly created Appellate Body has decided nine cases, the quality of its opinions as well as those of the dispute-settlement panels is generally excellent. Member States of the WTO are complying with the rulings and recommendations adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO.

scholarly journals The Impending Dejudicialization of the WTO Dispute Settlement System?

2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 316-321
Author(s):  
Richard H. Steinberg
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The United States ◽  
Settlement System ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The World ◽  
Dispute Settlement System

The Appellate Body (AB) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is facing a crisis. Appointment of AB members requires a consensus of the Dispute Settlement Body (comprised of all WTO members), and the United States has been blocking a consensus on further appointments since Donald J. Trump became the president. Without new appointments, the ranks of the AB have been diminishing as AB members’ terms have been expiring. If this continues (and many expect the United States to continue blocking a consensus on appointments), then in December 2019, through attrition, the number of AB members will fall below the threshold necessary to render decisions, at which point the AB will cease to function.

scholarly journals U.S. Refusal to Appoint Members Renders WTO Appellate Body Unable to Hear New Appeals

2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (3) ◽  
pp. 518-525
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The United States ◽  
Appellate Body Report ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
The World ◽  
Bona Fide ◽  
Wto Appellate Body

Over the last few years, the United States has been pressuring the World Trade Organization (WTO) to reform the Appellate Body by refusing proposals to fill vacancies. On December 10, 2019, the terms of two Appellate Body members expired, leaving one member left for the seven-member body. This has brought new appeals to a standstill, as an appeal from a panel established by the Dispute Settlement Body must be heard by three Appellate Body members. In February of 2020, the United States elaborated on its complaints about the Appellate Body in a report published by the Office of the United States Trade Representative. In the spring of 2020, in response to the continued U.S. resistance to filling vacancies on the Appellate Body, a group of WTO members established an interim arrangement to handle appeals through arbitration. Also in the spring of 2020, the United States described as invalid a recent Appellate Body report regarding a dispute between Canada and the United States, asserting that none of the three persons who issued the report were in fact bona fide Appellate Body members.

Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints

2004 ◽  
Vol 98 (2) ◽  
pp. 247-275 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard H. Steinberg
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Panel Report ◽  
Political Constraints ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
The World ◽  
Judicial Lawmaking ◽  
Rule Breaking ◽  
Legal Force

Since the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO), commentators have debated the wisdom of replacing the model of political-diplomatic dispute settlement under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) with a model of legalized dispute settlement. Under the GATT model, a dispute settlement panel report could be given full legal force only if adopted by a consensus of GATT Contracting Parties, including the party that lost the case. Under the WTO model, a report of the panel or the Appellate Body is adopted automatically unless WTO members, including the prevailing member, decide by consensus to block it, which is sometimes referred to as “negative consensus.” Many analysts whose work has focused on the politics of dispute settlement have emphasized the success, political flexibility, and apparent sustainability of the older model and cautioned that the legalized approach might be too cumbersome in various political contexts. Those favoring the legalized approach have emphasized its legitimizing capacity and potential to constrain more powerful WTO members from engaging in unilateral or rule-breaking behavior.

scholarly journals WHAT ARE THE THREATS TO THE FUTURE OF THE WTO?

2021 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 133-150
Author(s):  
Montej Abida ◽  
◽  
Ilhem Gargouri ◽  
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The United States ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
The World ◽  
The Future ◽  
Trade War ◽  
Regulatory Functions

Today we are witnessing a serious crisis that could lead to the collapse of the World Trade Organization (WTO). This crisis is the consequence of the uncooperative behavior of the triad: the United States, the European Union and East Asia. When there is a confrontation between these three most powerful regional blocs, there is inevitably a blockage and a destructive trade war similar to that of the 1930s. In these times of crisis, each country tries to save its economy by relying on the strategy of protectionism. The negotiation and regulatory functions of the WTO are paralyzed: the Dispute Settlement Body is seriously affected by the refusal of the United States, since 2016, to renew the members of the Appellate Body (AB) whose mandates were expiring. This jeopardizes international rules negotiated since 1947, when the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was created. The existence of liberalization fatigue and a growing rejection of globalization raises questions about the future of the WTO.

scholarly journals China Perspective in Reforming of the World Trade Organization

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 104
Author(s):  
Asif khan ◽  
Ahmad Arafa Abd Elrhim ◽  
Nishan-E-Hyder Soomro ◽  
Muhammad Abid Hussain Shah Jillani
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The United States ◽  
Reform Process ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Primary Position ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
The World ◽  
Negotiation Mechanism

In recent years, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the multilateral trading system, has faced many difficulties and challenges due to the great vows of anti-globalisation and trade protectionism. The appellate body, as a significant portion of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSU) of the WTO, has been suffering from an unprecedented crisis of suspension because the United States continues to prevent the appointment of vacant members. Now to save the World Trade Organization from an unprecedented crisis of survival reform has become a consensus. However, each member has a different opinion concerning the basic principle and specific contents of WTO reforms. In general, it is proposed to increase the flexibility of the negotiation mechanism and break the deadlock in multilateral negotiations caused by "consensus" and advocate the system in terms of substantive rules. It is proposed to establish new trade regulations, strengthen trade fairness, and eliminate investment Obstacles; in terms of disciplinary constraints, it advocates better use of the WTO's review and supervision functions and strengthens the constraints on members' compliance with transparency and notification obligations. In dispute settlement, it proposes to amend the relevant agreements as soon as possible To break the deadlock in the selection of judges of the Appellate Body and ensure the regular operation of the World Trade Organization. China clarifies its primary position and fundamental concerns, based on the existing paper, and introducing specific reform programs to participate more effectively in the WTO reform process. Qualitative research methodology has been applied to the following article.

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