H.L.A. Hart’s Hermeneutic Positivism: On Some Methodological Difficulties in The Concept of Law

1990 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 113-128 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. Hamner Hill

Despite the tremendous literature that has sprung up concerning Hart’s The Concept of Law, one very important feature of the work has been somewhat overlooked: its methodological underpinnings. While Hart himself says The Concept of Law may “be regarded as an essay in descriptive sociology”, this claim has not received adequate philosophical examination. Though a dedicated philosophical positivist, the distinctive feature of Hart’s legal philosophy – the internal aspect of rules – requires a social science methodology that moves him in the direction of hermeneutics. In defending the importance of the internal aspect of rules against the predictive theory of Scandinavian Legal Realist Alf Ross, Hart argues that without the internal aspect, onejettisons something vital not only to the understanding of law but of any form of normative social structure. For the understanding of this the methodology of the empirical sciences is useless; what is needed is a ‘hermeneutic’ method which involves portraying rule-governed behaviour as it appears to its participants, who see it as conforming or failing to conform to certain standards.

Acta Politica ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 472-474
Author(s):  
Adrie Dassen ◽  
Kostas Gemenis

2016 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 136-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Nicholson ◽  
Sean Mccusker

This paper is a response to Gorard's article, ‘Damaging real lives through obstinacy: re-emphasising why significance testing is wrong’ in Sociological Research Online 21(1). For many years Gorard has criticised the way hypothesis tests are used in social science, but recently he has gone much further and argued that the logical basis for hypothesis testing is flawed: that hypothesis testing does not work, even when used properly. We have sympathy with the view that hypothesis testing is often carried out in social science contexts when it should not be, and that outcomes are often described in inappropriate terms, but this does not mean the theory of hypothesis testing, or its use, is flawed per se. There needs to be evidence to support such a contention. Gorard claims that: ‘Anyone knowing the problems, as described over one hundred years, who continues to teach, use or publish significance tests is acting unethically, and knowingly risking the damage that ensues.’ This is a very strong statement which impugns the integrity, not just the competence, of a large number of highly respected academics. We argue that the evidence he puts forward in this paper does not stand up to scrutiny: that the paper misrepresents what hypothesis tests claim to do, and uses a sample size which is far too small to discriminate properly a 10% difference in means in a simulation he constructs. He then claims that this simulates emotive contexts in which a 10% difference would be important to detect, implicitly misrepresenting the simulation as a reasonable model of those contexts.


2017 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 285-285

In 2016 and 2017, Sociological Research Online published the following article and two subsequent responses: Gorard S (2016) Damaging Real Lives Through Obstinacy: Re-emphasising Why Significance Testing is Wrong. Sociological Research Online 21(1): 1–14. DOI: 10.5153/sro.3857 Nicholson J and McCusker S (2016) Damaging the Case for Improving Social Science Methodology Through Misrepresentation: Re-asserting Confidence in Hypothesis Testing as a Valid Scientific Process. Sociological Research Online 21(2): 1–12. DOI: 10.5153/sro.3985 Gorard (2017) Significance Testing is Still Wrong, and Damages Real Lives: A Brief Reply to Spreckelsen and Van Der Horst, and Nicholson and McCusker. Sociological Research Online 22(2): 1–7. DOI: 10.5153/sro.4281 An erratum has been published in the journal to clarify some corrections that had inadvertently been missed ahead of publication of the first article: Erratum to Gorard (2016) Damaging Real lives Through Obstinacy: Re-emphasising Why Significance Testing is Wrong. Sociological Research Online 21(1): 1–14. DOI: 10.1177/1360780417731066 Readers are advised to read the responses to the original article, particularly paragraph 4.7 in Nicholson and McCusker (2016) and paragraphs 3.1 and 3.2 in Gorard (2017) in light of the recently published Erratum. The journal apologises for any inconvenience or misunderstanding this may have caused.


2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 338-344 ◽  
Author(s):  
David A. M. Peterson

In this comment on Dion, Sumner, and Mitchell’s article “Gendered Citation Patterns across Political Science and Social Science Methodology Fields,” I explore the role of changes in the disparities of citations to work written by women over time. Breaking down their citation data by era, I find that some of the patterns in citations are the result of the legacy of disparity in the field. Citations to more recent work come closer to matching the distribution of the gender of authors of published work. Although the need for more equitable practices of citation remains, the overall patterns are not quite as bad as Dion, Sumner, and Mitchell conclude.


Author(s):  
Alex Langlinais ◽  
Brian Leiter

This article examines methodological debates in legal philosophy by focusing on two (related) methodological claims in H. L. A. Hart’s 1961 book, The Concept of Law: that Hart’s theory is both general and descriptive, and an exercise in both linguistic analysis and descriptive sociology. It considers what these claims reveal about Hart’s theoretical ambitions and methodological commitments, and what light they shed on debates in legal philosophy since then. In particular, it discusses the most important elements of Hart’s theory, such as the union of primary and secondary rules in law, the “rule of recognition” as a social rule, and the relationship between legal and moral norms. It also explores several objections to Hart’s approach to the problems of legal philosophy, including one that questions the fruitfulness of the methodology of conceptual analysis. Finally, it analyzes the argument of Hart and all legal positivists that legal systems are social constructs.


Author(s):  
Johann Wolfschwenger ◽  
Kevin L. Young

This chapter evaluates multicausality and equifinality, which refer to a research situation whereby an outcome is explained by more than one causal factor. The term ‘equifinality’ stems from systems analysis, and refers to a situation in which ‘the same final state may be reached from different initial conditions and in different ways’. ‘Equifinality’ also appears in related disciplines such as psychology, archaeology, or environmental studies, while ‘multicausality’ is often used in literature on social science methodology. Ultimately, multicausality and equifinality are important reasons why social phenomena are particularly challenging to study. Multicausality and equifinality are often explored by research traditions and methods of social inquiry that approach causal processes through a ‘causes-of-effects’ approach, rather than an ‘effect-of-causes’ approach.


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