The Scattergun and the Owl: Brian Simpson on Herbert Hart

2013 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 491-513 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Mullender

While recognizing that H.L.A. Hart’s The Concept of Law has exerted a powerful and continuing influence on general jurisprudence, Brian Simpson finds it wanting. Simpson argues that Hart’s determination to make broad generalizations about the nature of a legal system deflected him from the important task of attending to the particularities of actually-existing law. Moreover, he identifies Hart as a ‘hedgehog’ in Isaiah Berlin’s sense: a thinker whose work gives expression to a ‘single central vision’ (in Hart’s case, law as a system of rules). This critique of Hart leads Simpson to argue for an approach to legal philosophy that is more attentive to the details of existing legal systems. But Simpson fails to present his readers with the theoretical approach for which he argues. This essay seeks to make good this deficiency in his response to The Concept of Law. To this end, it uses the writings of two philosophers on whom Simpson draws (Berlin and Michael Oakeshott) with the aim of enriching Hart’s contribution to general jurisprudence. Moreover, it finds in this Hart-Oakeshott-Berlin-based interdisciplinary theory (HOBBIT) a basis on which to throw much light on Britain as a distinctive form of politico-legal life.

Author(s):  
Alex Langlinais ◽  
Brian Leiter

This article examines methodological debates in legal philosophy by focusing on two (related) methodological claims in H. L. A. Hart’s 1961 book, The Concept of Law: that Hart’s theory is both general and descriptive, and an exercise in both linguistic analysis and descriptive sociology. It considers what these claims reveal about Hart’s theoretical ambitions and methodological commitments, and what light they shed on debates in legal philosophy since then. In particular, it discusses the most important elements of Hart’s theory, such as the union of primary and secondary rules in law, the “rule of recognition” as a social rule, and the relationship between legal and moral norms. It also explores several objections to Hart’s approach to the problems of legal philosophy, including one that questions the fruitfulness of the methodology of conceptual analysis. Finally, it analyzes the argument of Hart and all legal positivists that legal systems are social constructs.


2021 ◽  
pp. 47-49
Author(s):  
Sanjith Chandrashekar

For his bold declaration that international law is not "true law" since there is no sovereign, John Austin has been extensively attacked and praised in equal measure. According to Austin, the concept of law is, “Law is a command of the sovereign backed by a sanction.” This study investigates Austin's viewpoint and evaluates it in light of current legal systems, present international law, modern Indian laws, and the analysis of legal issues in the treaty law. While Austin's viewpoint was correct in terms of the legal systems of his day, it cannot be applied to the current international, and Indian legal system


Author(s):  
Виктор Момотов ◽  
Viktor Momotov

In Russian legal science there is a wide-spread belief according to which legal precedents are not sources of Russian law, because Russian legal system forms a part of continental legal system. Various researchers believe that judicial practice does not contain legal norms and consequently case law is not a component of Russian legal framework. The present paper contains the theoretical and historical legal research of the place and role of case law in Anglo-American and continental legal systems. It’s shown that for long historical periods legal precedents were recognized as sources of law not only in Great Britain and the USA, but also in major European legal systems, while at the present time differentiation of legal systems with respect to their attitude towards case law is becoming outdated. Furthermore, based on the research of various legal scholars’ traditions (principally of the positivistic and the sociological traditions) this article demonstrates that negative attitude towards case law is largely determined by the formalistic and obsolete understanding of the term ”source of law”, coming from the misinterpretation of positivism. The paper also presents the current development trends of case law as a source of law. In particular the article outlines the proactive interpretations of new statutory provisions issued by the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, the global uniqueness of such interpretations and the influence of scientific–technological progress and public needs on the highest court’s interpretations. The mutual interference of case law and statutory law is shown.


Author(s):  
Jarosław Kola ◽  
Przemysław Pest

The article is an attempt to look at the development of Polish tax law through the prism of the concept of law development proposed by Ph. Selznick and Ph. Nonet. In the study Law and Society in Transition. Towards Responsive Law they distinguished three stages of evolution of legal systems: repressive, autonomous and responsive. The focus of the article is on the institution of the official interpretation of tax law, because an analysis of the transformation of the legal system allows to capture trends that are present in the development of its individual institutions as well as social relationships among its recipients. By indicating the evolution of official in terpretations of tax law in its two basic functions – those of informing and those of guaranteeing (protective) – the authors point to a wider context of the development of tax law to show whether and how changes in the normative regulation of official interpretations of tax law may affect the shape of the relationship between a tax payer and tax administration, where the perspective of the analysis of demand is the responsiveness of law. An analysis of the regulation of an official interpretation of tax law leads to the conclusion that due to the assigned ratio legis this interpretation must characterise them as corresponding mainly to the autonomous model. At the same time a responsive model of law does not undermine the autonomous model attributes. Thus if we were to accept that the provision of interpretation corresponds to the autonomous model, it would not be possible to note that it also has attributes that make it a responsive model. Irrespective of the fact that there is no element of negotiation, it is based on the interaction between the taxpayer and the tax administration. As part of this interaction, tax administration responds to the reported social need in terms of the ambiguity of law, which de iure – not least because of the possibility of bringing an action against the content of interpretation – takes place in the framework of a communication situation that is free from external coercion.


1975 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 192-206 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Friedmann

This series of articles is intended to deal with one aspect of the sources of Israel law, namely the influence of foreign legal systems and principles derived therefrom on Israel law and on the attempt in recent years to independent creation of local law.Foreign law constitutes on occasion an actual legal source for the law of Israel. This occurs when a local enactment refers to foreign law and makes it applicable in certain situations. In such case the foreign law which we are to apply constitutes an obligatory legal norm in Israel and is, in fact, part of the Israel legal system. In other cases foreign law influences the process of creation of local law but does not constitute a formal source of law in the Israel system. This happens, for example, when Israel case law relies for authority upon some rule established in an American decision (which is, of course, not binding in Israel) or when the Israel legislator is influenced by a principle of law derived from another legal system. We might say there that the foreign law is an historical source for the Israel rule.


1998 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Magdalini Karagiannakis

Should state immunity from jurisdiction be denied to states that violate fundamental human rights in breach of international law? This article critically discusses three analytical approaches which can be used to answer the question at the level of international law. These approaches are derived from a review of principles of state immunity and fundamental human rights, including ius cogens. The article goes on to examine why the results dictated by these approaches at the level ot international law may not be reflected by municipal legal systems, using US domestic statutes and case law as an example of how a domestic legal system has dealt with this question.


2018 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 157
Author(s):  
Antonio-Luis Martínez Pujalte
Keyword(s):  
Case Law ◽  

Author(s):  
Giovanni Bisogni

H.L.A. Hart says that The Concept of Law is focused on municipal or domestic law because that is the “central case”1 for the usage of the word ‘law.’ At the beginning of the book he states that “at various points in this book the reader will find discussions of the borderline cases where legal theorists have felt doubts about the application of the expression ‘law’ or ‘legal system,’ but the suggested resolution of these doubts, which he will also find here, is only a secondary concern of the book.”2 Yet among those borderline cases there is one that is rather intriguing, since Hart closely discusses a particular instance of them: it is international law, to which he devotes an entire chapter—the final one—of The Concept of Law. My goal in this article is therefore to make clear why the ‘resolution’ of the borderline case of international law is not entirely ‘secondary’ to Hart’s overall project in The Concept of Law and, in so doing, to show that Chapter X is not as unhappy as many think it is.


Author(s):  
Matthew H. Kramer

H. L. A. Hartʼs The Concept of Law is, of course, primarily a work of legal philosophy. It is indeed the most influential work of legal philosophy in the English language (and perhaps in any language) published during the twentieth century. However, the immense importance of the book for philosophers of law should not prevent readers from discerning its importance for political and moral philosophers as well. Hartʼs insights into the nature of law and sovereignty are themselves of great significance for political philosophy, and the second half of The Concept of Law contains ruminations on justice and on the relationships between law and morality that deserve attention from anyone who aspires to think clearly about the problems of political philosophy.


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