scholarly journals The Question To Be Faced Is One of Fact: H.L.A. Hart’s Legal Theory Through His View of International Law

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Giovanni Bisogni
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
Borderline Case ◽  
Borderline Cases ◽  
Central Case ◽  
The Concept Of Law ◽  
Domestic Law ◽  
Concept Of Law

H.L.A. Hart says that The Concept of Law is focused on municipal or domestic law because that is the “central case”1 for the usage of the word ‘law.’ At the beginning of the book he states that “at various points in this book the reader will find discussions of the borderline cases where legal theorists have felt doubts about the application of the expression ‘law’ or ‘legal system,’ but the suggested resolution of these doubts, which he will also find here, is only a secondary concern of the book.”2 Yet among those borderline cases there is one that is rather intriguing, since Hart closely discusses a particular instance of them: it is international law, to which he devotes an entire chapter—the final one—of The Concept of Law. My goal in this article is therefore to make clear why the ‘resolution’ of the borderline case of international law is not entirely ‘secondary’ to Hart’s overall project in The Concept of Law and, in so doing, to show that Chapter X is not as unhappy as many think it is.

IS AUSTIN'S THEORY INCONGRUENT WITH EXISTING CONCEPTS OF SOVEREIGN AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN TREATIES AND INDIAN LEGISLATION?

2021 ◽  
pp. 47-49
Author(s):  
Sanjith Chandrashekar
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Legal Issues ◽  
Legal Systems ◽  
Treaty Law ◽  
The Concept Of Law ◽  
John Austin ◽  
Concept Of Law

For his bold declaration that international law is not "true law" since there is no sovereign, John Austin has been extensively attacked and praised in equal measure. According to Austin, the concept of law is, “Law is a command of the sovereign backed by a sanction.” This study investigates Austin's viewpoint and evaluates it in light of current legal systems, present international law, modern Indian laws, and the analysis of legal issues in the treaty law. While Austin's viewpoint was correct in terms of the legal systems of his day, it cannot be applied to the current international, and Indian legal system

“Be Karbala Miravim!”

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anicée Van Engeland
Keyword(s):  
At Risk ◽  
International Law ◽  
Hybrid System ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Iraq War ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Legal Standards ◽  
Domestic Law

This chapter considers the extent to which Islamic governance can integrate international humanitarian law (IHL) into its own legal system by examining the case of Iran. It addresses the consequences of the emergence of an Islamic-universal hybrid legal system. The stakes are high because IHL’s efficiency and necessity have been questioned: The existence of the Iranian hybrid system of law can be perceived as a threat by scholars arguing that international law is at risk of fragmentation due to the variety of domestic and regional approaches to fundamental legal standards. The importance of those stakes is illustrated by the Iran-Iraq War: The process of mixing a universal secular legal system with a religious domestic law occurred at a crucial time when Iran was at war with Iraq, with clear effects on the protection of civilians and the conduct of hostilities.

scholarly journals The legal consequences of jus cogens and the individuation of norms

2020 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 893-909
Author(s):  
Ulf Linderfalk
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
General Assumption ◽  
Legal Decisions ◽  
International Crimes ◽  
Judicial Proceedings ◽  
Legal Positivist ◽  
The Concept Of Law ◽  
Jus Cogens ◽  
Legal Consequences ◽  
Concept Of Law

AbstractInternational law ascribes to the conferral of a jus cogens status on a norm a particular legal significance. Bluntly put, jus cogens norms have legal consequences that norms of ordinary international law do not. International lawyers have a great many different ideas of what these legal consequences are more precisely. As of yet, the reason for this divide has not been fully clarified. This void tends to confuse jus cogens discourse on several issues such as the immunity of states and state officials in judicial proceedings originating in the violation of jus cogens norms, or the extradition of alleged perpetrators of international crimes, or again the non-applicability of amnesty laws concerning such crimes. It also impedes the justification of judicial and other legal decisions.As this article argues, contrary to the general assumption, a lawyer’s conception of the legal consequences of jus cogens is not theory-neutral but dependent on his or her preferred understanding of the concept of law. The argument goes briefly as follows: (i) What causes international lawyers to disagree is the issue of whether or not jus cogens norms entail obligations concerned with their own enforcement; (ii) this is essentially an issue concerning the individuation of norms; (iii) depending on whether a lawyer takes the position of a legal positivist or a legal idealist, he or she uses different criteria for the individuation of jus cogens norms; and (iv) this is why, for legal idealists, jus cogens norms entail obligations concerned with their own enforcement, whereas for legal positivists they do not.

scholarly journals What is Offered to the Modern Science by Leon Petrażycki? (Following Three Descriptions of Legal Principles)

Studia Humana ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 5-10
Author(s):  
Sławomir Tkacz
Keyword(s):  
Legal Theory ◽  
Modern Science ◽  
Theoretical Knowledge ◽  
Legal Principles ◽  
Current State ◽  
The Concept Of Law ◽  
Concept Of Law

Abstract The aim of this paper is to outline the general oversight of the concept of law in Leon Petrażycki’s legal theory. On the example of the principles of law, an attempt was made to answer the question, what Petrażycki’s theory proposes to modern science. In the first part of the presentation, the Author presented the current state of theoretical knowledge in the field of principles of law. The attention was paid to the problem of various characteristics of legal principles. In further considerations, an attempt was made to answer the question about adoption of models proposed by Petrażycki in the contemporary theoretical discourse. The summary presents general conclusions of the paper.

Diritto e natura a Oxford: il caso di H.L.A. Hart

2009 ◽  
pp. 181-192
Author(s):  
Carolina Gasparoli
Keyword(s):  
Natural Law ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
Ronald Dworkin ◽  
Oxford University ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Philosophical Background ◽  
The Concept Of Law ◽  
Concept Of Law

- Hart is one of the most prominent philosophers of law of the last century. Published in 1961, his book The Concept of Law has influenced many of the leading figures in contemporary legal theory. Hart held the Chair of Jurisprudence at Oxford University from 1952 until 1968 and he chose Ronald Dworkin as his successor. In his last book Diritto e natura. H.L.A. e la filosofia di Oxford, Mario Ricciardi takes the uneasy relationship between the two philosophers as the starting point of his inquiry and claims that Dworkin's critique of Hart's legal theory has misinterpreted many relevant aspects of Hart's approach to law. As a result, many scholars have paid little attention to the cultural and philosophical background of Hart's work. In particular, Ricciardi suggests that, in this work, Hart uses a specific notion of analysis, namely connective analysis, which Gilbert Ryle and Peter F. Strawson had opposed to the decompositive one. Such a reading of The Concept of Law generates a new understanding of the role played by the minimum content of natural law in Hart's legal theory.

Problems of Interaction Between the International and Domestic Legal Orders

2014 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 246-278 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hisashi OWADA
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
International Law ◽  
Security Council ◽  
Legal System ◽  
International Institutions ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
International Treaties ◽  
International Courts ◽  
Municipal Law ◽  
Domestic Law

With the rapid advent of globalization, international law has come to expand into new areas which had traditionally been under the exclusive domain of municipal law. As a result, problems concerning interaction between the international and domestic legal orders have become increasingly common. Specifically, difficulties have arisen concerning the implementation of international law decisions into the domestic legal order. This paper examines this problem in three different areas: the process of incorporation of international treaties into the domestic legal order; the issue of giving effect to Security Council resolutions in domestic law; and the issue of the implementation within the domestic legal system of judgments of international courts and tribunals. The paper concludes that, in an age of the emergence of a global community as a matter of socioeconomic reality, the two legal orders should work together to promote common public policy, paying due respect to the decisions of international institutions.

scholarly journals IS FINNIS WRONG?

Legal Theory ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 13 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 257-283 ◽  
Author(s):  
Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Third Reich ◽  
Customary Law ◽  
Theoretical Research ◽  
Ethical Perspective ◽  
Central Case ◽  
The Third Reich ◽  
The Concept Of Law ◽  
Functional Argument ◽  
Concept Of Law

Judges and lawyers believe that international law, customary law, and legal systems such as the Third Reich or apartheid law in South Africa are law. But how do we explain the fact that there is one concept of law when there are different conceptions of law with a variety of different features? Finnis, inspired by the Aristotelian notion of central case, adumbrates the idea that the concept of law might be unified by a primary concept which is the concept of “law as practical reason”; that is, law conceived from an ethical perspective. He advances two arguments to defend his methodology: the conceptual and the functional. Contra Finnis, the paper shows that neither the conceptual nor the functional argument can successfully support the view that “law as practical reason” is the central case of the concept of law. The study clarifies the Aristotelian notion of central case and illustrates the mistaken application of this notion to the concept of law. However, we also argue that Finnis's insight–the idea that all the different conceptions of law might be unified for the purposes of theoretical research–is fundamental and appealing. This paper aims to reconstruct Finnis's insight through the model of core resemblance. The result is that the different conceptions of law can be unified by resemblance to the concept of “law as practical reason,” though there is no identity among the different conceptions of law.

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