Seeing is believing: A common sense theory of the adoption of perception-based beliefs

Author(s):  
JOHN BELL ◽  
ZHISHENG HUANG

In this paper we present a formal common sense theory of the adoption of perception-based beliefs. We begin with a logical analysis of perception and then consider when perception should lead to belief change. Our theory is intended to apply to perception in humans and to perception in artificial agents at the level of the symbolic interface between a vision system and a belief system. In order to provide a context for our work we relate it to the emerging field of cognitive robotics, give an abstract architecture for an agent which is both embodied and capable of reasoning, and relate this to the concrete architectures of two vision-based surveillance systems.

2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 298-321 ◽  
Author(s):  
Romy Sauvayre

This article is based on a question that is already present in the work of Festinger et al.: Why is the unequivocal disproof of a given belief an insufficient reason for abandoning that belief? We will first outline the cognitive dissonance theory and then discuss how, in a seemingly counterintuitive way, beliefs that are contradicted by facts—that is, factual contradictions—lead only to minimal belief changes, whereas beliefs that are in contradiction with some fundamental value held by an individual—that is, axiological contradictions—represent a challenge to the individual’s entire belief system and may lead to disaffiliation. The objective of this article is to propose an alternative explanatory hypothesis to that of Festinger—which is now disputed—and thus provide new answers to help understand the process by which beliefs are abandoned. This article has epistemological ambitions insofar as it aims to demonstrate that by means of a paradigm based on reasons and abduction—the Boudon-Peirce Paradigm—it is possible to propose an alternative, explanatory hypothesis to that of Festinger’s and to provide new answers to facilitate understanding the process of abandonment of beliefs. This comprehensive paradigm has allowed the discovery that conflicts of values—axiological contradictions—can cause disaffiliation.


Author(s):  
RADOSLAW P. KATARZYNIAK ◽  
GRZEGORZ POPEK

To enable artificial systems to meaningfully use a semantic language of communication is one of the long-term and key targets not only in the field of artificial cognitive agents, but also of AI research in general. Given existing solutions for grounding of modal statements of a language of communication and an idea to model internal concepts of the agent as zadehian fuzzy-linguistic concepts, this paper shows how to meaningfully combine the two within a single framework. An accomplished goal is a model for grounding of modal and non-modal statements of a language of communication based on concepts modelled internally as fuzzy sets spanned over the domain of observation. This paper describes a way in which fuzzy-linguistic concepts are activated by perceptual inputs and how an agents grounds respective non-modal statements. Further, an agent supposed to describe an unobserved part of the environment can use autoepistemic operators of possibility, belief, and knowledge to describe its cognitive attitude toward it. It is discussed how the modal extensions of statements with fuzzy-linguistic concepts should be grounded in order to preserve the common-sense. The resulting constraints put on the model of grounding are formally represented in a form of analytical restrictions put on the so-called relation of epistemic satisfaction.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emiliano Lorini ◽  
Giovanni Sartor

We present a logical analysis of influence and control over the actions of others, and address consequential causal and normative responsibilities. We first account for the way in which influence can be exercised over the behaviour of autonomous agents. On this basis we determine the conditions under which influence leads to control on the implementation of positive and negative values. We finally define notions of causal and normative responsibility for the action of others. Our logical framework is based on STIT logic and is complemented with a series of examples illustrating the application. Our analysis applies to interactions between humans as well as to those involving autonomous artificial agents.


2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (5) ◽  
pp. 225-238 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruno Lara ◽  
Dadai Astorga ◽  
Emmanuel Mendoza-Bock ◽  
Manuel Pardo ◽  
Esaú Escobar ◽  
...  

Embodied Cognitive Robotics focuses its attention on the design of artificial agents capable of performing cognitive tasks autonomously. A central issue in this consists in studying process by which agents learn through interaction with their environment. Embodied Cognitive Robotics aims to implement models of cognitive processes coming from Cognitive Sciences. The guidelines in this research area are a direct response to the shortcomings of Classical Artificial Intelligence, where high-level tasks and behaviors were studied. This article describes the work carried out in the Cognitive Robotics Laboratory at the Universidad Autónoma del Estado de Morelos (UAEM). Our work is based on the concept of low-level sensorimotor schemes coded by Internal Models, thus falling as a matter of course within the tenets of Embodied Cognition, particularly with the idea that cognition must be understood as occurring in agents that have a body with which they interact in a specific environment. It is through this interaction that learning emerges laying the ground for cognitive processes. Our research includes theoretical work laying the foundations of Embodied Cognitive Robotics, as well as work with artificial and with natural agents.


2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luciano R. Coutinho ◽  
Victor M. Galvão ◽  
Antônio de Abreu Batista ◽  
Bruno Roberto S. Moraes ◽  
Márcio Regis M. Fraga

Looking at the ways in which players interact with computer games (thegameplays), we perceive predominance of character-centered and/or microcontrolled modes of interaction. Despite being well established, these gameplays tend to structure the games in terms of challenges to be fulfilled on an individual basis, or by thinking collectively but having to microcontrol several characters at the same time. From this observation, the paper presents a complementary gameplay in which the player is urged to face collective challenges by designingcharacter organizations. The basic idea is to make the player structure and control group of characters by definingorganizational specifications(i.e., definitions of roles, collective strategies, and social norms). During the game, commanded by the player, artificial agents are then instantiated to play the roles and to follow the strategies and norms as defined in the organizational specification. To turn the idea into practice, the paper proposes an abstract architecture comprising three components or layers. This architecture is materialized in a proof of concept prototype that combines the Minecraft game server, JADE agent platform, and MOISE+ organizational model. Variations and possibilities are discussed and the proposal is compared to related work in the literature.


Diametros ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Michał Barcz ◽  
Jarek Gryz ◽  
Adam Wierzbicki

It has been noticed by several authors that the colloquial understanding of anonymity as mere unknownness is insufficient. This common sense notion of anonymity does not recognize the role of the goal for which the anonymity is sought. Starting with the distinction between intentional and unintentional anonymity (which are usually taken to be the same) and the general concept of the non-coordinatability of traits, we offer a logical analysis of anonymity and identification (understood as de-anonymization). In our enquiry, we focus on the intentional aspect of anonymity and develop a metaphor of an “anonymity game” between “perpetrator” and “detective”. Starting from common sense intuitions, we provide a formalized, critical notion of anonymity.


2018 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 289-304 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shazia Akhtar ◽  
Lucy V Justice ◽  
Lauren Knott ◽  
Fraenze Kibowski ◽  
Martin A Conway

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 20-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
K.R. Shylaja ◽  
M.V. Vijayakumar ◽  
E. Vani Prasad ◽  
Darryl N. Davis

The research work presented in this article investigates and explains the conceptual mechanisms of consciousness and common-sense thinking of animates. These mechanisms are computationally simulated on artificial agents as strategic rules to analyze and compare the performance of agents in critical and dynamic environments. Awareness and attention to specific parameters that affect the performance of agents specify the consciousness level in agents. Common sense is a set of beliefs that are accepted to be true among a group of agents that are engaged in a common purpose, with or without self-experience. The common sense agents are a kind of conscious agents that are given with few common sense assumptions. The so-created environment has attackers with dependency on agents in the survival-food chain. These attackers create a threat mental state in agents that can affect their conscious and common sense behaviors. The agents are built with a multi-layer cognitive architecture COCOCA (Consciousness and Common sense Cognitive Architecture) with five columns and six layers of cognitive processing of each precept of an agent. The conscious agents self-learn strategies for threat management and energy level maintenance. Experimentation conducted in this research work demonstrates animate-level intelligence in their problem-solving capabilities, decision making and reasoning in critical situations.


1971 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 953-957
Author(s):  
Michael D. Wallace ◽  
J. David Singer

It has often been observed that recent converts to any belief system tend to be among its most zealous adherents, and science (despite its emphasis on objectivity and detachment) has proved no exception. As the canons of scientific inquiry begin to take hold in each field of human knowledge, there have appeared those who seem, as it were, more royalist than the king. For these scholars the rules of scientific inference are not guidelines to be used with care but dogmas to be pursued unswervingly; to them science is not, as someone once expressed it, “attenuated common sense” but a totally different and rather severe regimen of thought.


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