scholarly journals Democracies and the Power to Revoke Citizenship

2016 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patti Tamara Lenard
Keyword(s):  
National Security ◽  
Legal Status ◽  
The State ◽  
Democratic Citizenship ◽  
Shared Responsibility ◽  
Global Community ◽  
Policy Goal ◽  
Citizenship Status ◽  
The Right

Citizenship status is meant to be secure, that is, inviolable. Recently, however, several democratic states have adopted or are considering adopting laws that allow them the power to revoke citizenship. This claimed right forces us to consider whether citizenship can be treated as a “conditional” status, in particular whether it can be treated as conditional on the right sort of behavior. Those who defend such a view argue that citizenship is a privilege rather than a right, and thus in principle is revocable. Participating in a foreign state's military, treason, spying, or committing acts that otherwise threaten the national security of one's state may all warrant revocation. This article assesses the justifications given for the claimed power to revoke citizenship in democratic states and concludes that, ultimately, such a power is incompatible with democracy.I begin with a brief account of the claims given by contemporary democratic states for the “right to revoke.” Democratic citizenship is today commonly understood to beegalitarian, that is, it protects an equal basic package of rights for all citizens; and to be “the highest and most secure legal status,” that is, it is meant to be secure from unilateral withdrawal by the state. Formally, many democratic states have revocation laws on the books, but most of these have long been in disuse. Although I argue in this article that all revocation laws are inconsistent with democratic citizenship, I focus on the recent surge in proposed and implemented revocation laws, which are justified as essential to protecting national security.In the second section I outline three reasons to object to revocation laws. First, revocation laws discriminate between citizens based on their citizenship status. Second, since they single out those who are eligible for revocation, they apply unequal penalties for the same crime. Third, they are inadequately justified, in general, but also particularly to those who may be subject to them, because they are not adequately connected to the policy goal they are said to fulfill. I conclude with some brief observations concerning the ways in which revocation permits states to abrogate their shared responsibility for protecting the global community from dangerous individuals.

scholarly journals Democratic Citizenship and Denationalization

2017 ◽  
Vol 112 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-111 ◽  
Author(s):  
PATTI TAMARA LENARD
Keyword(s):  
National Security ◽  
Democratic Citizenship ◽  
Citizenship Status ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
Democratic State ◽  
The Right ◽  
Terrorist Events

Are democratic states permitted to denationalize citizens, in particular those whom they believe pose dangers to the physical safety of others? In this article, I argue that they are not. The power to denationalize citizens—that is, to revoke citizenship—is one that many states have historically claimed for themselves, but which has largely been in disuse in the last several decades. Recent terrorist events have, however, prompted scholars and political actors to reconsider the role that denationalization can and perhaps should play in democratic states, in particular with respect to its role in protecting national security and in supporting the global fight against terror more generally. In this article, my objective is to show that denationalization laws have no place in democratic states. To understand why, I propose examining the foundations of the right of citizenship, which lie, I shall argue, in the very strong interests that individuals have in security of residence. I use this formulation of the right to respond to two broad clusters of arguments: (1) those that claim that it is justifiable to denationalize citizens who threaten to undermine the safety of citizens in a democratic state or the ability of a democratic state to function as a democratic state, and (2) those that claim that it is justifiable to denationalize dual citizens because they possess citizenship status in a second country that is also able to protect their rights.

scholarly journals Advocacy as a tool for the realization of the fundamental right of a person to professional legal assistance

2021 ◽  
Vol 66 ◽  
pp. 240-243
Author(s):  
P. Badzeliuk
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Civil Society ◽  
Legal Status ◽  
Legal Profession ◽  
The State ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Access To Justice ◽  
Legal Assistance ◽  
The Right ◽  
Legal Entities

This article is devoted to the study of the implementation of the fundamental right of a person to professional legal assistance through the vectors of influence of the bar, the role of the human rights institution in the mechanism of such a right and its place in public life.An effective justice system provides not only an independent and impartial judiciary, but also an independent legal profession. Lawyers play an important role in ensuring access to justice. They facilitate the interaction between individuals and legal entities and the judiciary by providing legal advice to their clients and presenting them to the courts. Without the assistance of a lawyer, the right to a fair trial and the right to an effective remedy would be irrevocably violated.Thus, the bar in the mechanism of protection of human and civil rights and freedoms is one of the means of self-limitation of state power through the creation and active functioning of an independent human rights institution, which is an active subject in the process of fundamental rights. The main constitutional function of the state is to implement and protect the rights and freedoms of man and citizen, and the constitutional and legal status of the legal profession allows it to actively ensure the rights of civil society as a whole and not just the individual. Effectively implement the human rights function of the state by ensuring proper interaction between the authorities and civil society, while being an active participant in the law enforcement mechanism and occupying an independent place in the justice system.Thus, the activities of lawyers are a complex manifestation of both state and public interest. After all, it is through advocacy and thanks to it that the rule of law realizes the possibility of ensuring the rights and freedoms of its citizens. Advocacy, on the one hand, has a constitutionally defined state character, and on the other hand, lawyers should be as independent as possible from the state in order to effectively protect citizens and legal entities from administrative arbitrariness. Thus, the bar is a unique legal phenomenon that performs a state (public-law) function, while remaining an independent, non-governmental self-governing institution.

LEGAL STATUS NON-MUSLIM COMMUNITIES IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE IN THE XVI-XIX CENTURIES

2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 102-110
Author(s):  
Александр Сквозников ◽  
Aleksandr Skvoznikov
Keyword(s):  
Ottoman Empire ◽  
Military Service ◽  
Legal Status ◽  
Islamic Law ◽  
Religious Affiliation ◽  
The State ◽  
Legal Doctrine ◽  
Muslim Communities ◽  
The Right ◽  
Judicial Protection

The aim of the article is to investigate the legal status of non-Muslim communities in the Ottoman Empire. The author concluded that the sources of Islamic law, including the Koran and Islamic legal doctrine, formed the basis of the legal system of the Ottoman Empire, recognized the equality of people regardless of their racial, ethnic or religious affiliation. Non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire guaranteed the right to life, security of person and property, freedom of religion, freedom of economic activity, the right to judicial protection and protection against external enemies. However, the scope of rights and duties of citizens depend on their religious affiliation. The Ottoman Empire was essentially theocratic state, where Islam is the state religion and regularly held a dominant position among the other denominations. Served non-Muslim were somewhat limited in their rights: they could not come to the state, including military service, which does not allow us to talk about full equality of all subjects of the Ottoman Empire, regardless of religion.

scholarly journals Bosniaks and Bosnia: A Study in the Philosophy of Politics (1)

Illuminatio ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 102-135
Author(s):  
Ferid Muhić
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
National Culture ◽  
Subjective Experience ◽  
The State ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Global Community ◽  
Basic Premise ◽  
Philosophical Thought ◽  
The World ◽  
The Right

In this article, the author suggestively points to the importance of understanding the concept of nation and the state in the context of the European philosophical thought and practice regarding the nation and the state. Although the occasion is about the Bosniak/Bosnian nation and the Bosnian state, the author’s reflections are applicable to all groups similar to the Bosniak/Bosnain nation, as well as to all the states similar to the Bosnian state. The basic premise of this article is that the idea of a universal nationality, culture and civilisation does not oppose or negate the particular feeling or the subjective experience of either the nationality or the state. The membership of European Union does not detract the right for any nation in Europe of the right to cultivate and develop its national culture as well as its particular state consciousness. In fact, in the extent of which every nation and every state in Europe has an active awareness of its national and cultural specific value, gives Europe, indeed – the European Union strong and important role in the global community. Hence, the Bosniaks/Bosnians, both as a nation and a state (nation) have no need to withdraw, but rather have the historical opportunity to feature their specific Bosnian culture and Bosnian state as a richness worthy of appreciation, not only in Europe, but also in the world. 

scholarly journals Characteristic aspects of the state as the central institution of political system (from the perspective of the guarantor of national security)

Moldoscopie ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ludmila Oleinic ◽  
Keyword(s):  
National Security ◽  
The State ◽  
Main Role ◽  
Public Power ◽  
Political Processes ◽  
Security Issues ◽  
Democratic State ◽  
Complex Process ◽  
European Standards ◽  
The Right

The establishment of a democratic state, an open society in which the citizen is the subject of social-political processes and feels safe, represent in essence a complex process. The main role in achieving these objectives largely depends by the state, by the public power, which is essentially obliged to create the right conditions and mechanisms for the involvement of all progressive forces in the construction of the new edifice. In this vein, the factor of awareness of the state’s correlation with national security is very important in order to make proposed objectives work. As a result, in order to increase the effectiveness the state focuses on reporting and accommodating to modern European standards and principles on the activity, organization and functioning of political processes and institutions in society as a whole in correlation with assuring national security issues.

scholarly journals Political ideology in the legislation of the UkrSSR 1950–1960: anthropological aspect

2020 ◽  
pp. 128-137
Author(s):  
Muzyka Iryna
Keyword(s):  
Political Ideology ◽  
Legal Status ◽  
Decisive Role ◽  
Central Committee ◽  
The State ◽  
Entire Population ◽  
The Status ◽  
Post War ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Masses

In modern legal science, the anthropological approach that makes it possible to investigate, in particular, the orientation of the right to the human problem in law becomes of great relevance. In the perspective of legal anthropology, an important issue is the status of a person in the state mechanism (the place of the person in the hierarchy of values, the scope and guarantees of his rights and freedoms, the duties of the person) within the relation of state-centrism and anthropocentrism in the normative acts of the UkrSSR authorities of the post-war period. The draft Constitution of the UkrSSR in 1964 provided for a change in the legal status of the inpidual in the UkrSSR. For the first time in the history of "Soviet constitutional law" the concept of "freedom of the inpidual" was introduced, the whole complex of citizens' rights was revised, some new categories of rights were introduced, such as the supreme and fundamental human rights, the mechanism of their guarantees by society and the state was first laid. It was envisaged to consolidate various forms of direct exercise of political power by citizens, to create new forms of influence of citizens on the state power in general. Thus, in the early 1960s, the Soviet state had the potential to change qualitatively if the new UkrSSR Constitution was adopted. Therefore, the dismissal of MS Khrushchev from the duties of the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR appears to be conditioned, including, by the radical significance of the Constitutional project, which has never been adopted. It is possible to draw the following conclusion: in the period under study in the UkrSSR (as well as the USSR), the center of legal reality was not the person, but the norms of legal prescriptions of the state, formulated on the basis of political and ideological doctrine developed by the leadership of the CPSU – Communist Party. It is possible to characterize the status of a person under the legislation of 1950–1960 as a result of the implementation in the normative acts of political and ideological guidelines of the leadership of the CPSU – CPU. According to the communist ideology of that time, the life of society was regarded as the existence of the entire population of inpiduals, masses of people, and therefore the decisive role in the life of society belongs not to inpidual inpiduals, but to their entire population. This meant a significant overriding of the "necessary" relative to the "freedom" of man, that is, the interests of party-state leadership, collective interests over the interests of the inpidual; the non-recognition of the inpidual sovereignty of a person who was largely considered part of the collective subject – the "masses"; lack of reconciliation of interests of inpiduals and the state, which in many cases gave rise to conflict situations.

Tribunal of the Teharje Kosezi Community

2015 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 117-127
Author(s):  
Željko Oset
Keyword(s):  
Legal Status ◽  
The State ◽  
Civil Cases ◽  
The Right

Teharje kosezi community enjoyed a particular legal status which it successfully preserved until the abolishment of feudalism in 1848. Thus the community had its own first-instance judiciary for civil cases, performed its obligations, corvee exempt, to the lord and the state collectively, kosezi could sell their land without hindrance, had the right to bear arms, freely elect the sodin and the mayors of their župas. Such legal status, obtained through manorial service under the margraviate of Celje, was founded on the privilege issued by the lord. The oldest privilege preserved, issued by Ferdinand I. of Habsburg, dates to 1537. Tribunal had its sub judicial area that included, aside from Teharje settlement, sixteen kosezi settlements in Savinjska valley. Representatives of all settlements gathered once a year around St. George’s Day (April 23rd) on the day of sodin elections that had to be confirmed by either the vidame in Celje or the leaser of Forhtenek manor. The function of the tribunal itself can be made out from its preserved tribunal register for the period from 1715 to 1849 where most entries date between 1715 and 1718. During this time, the register lists 68 cases, predominantly unsettled debts, whereas handled by the tribunal were verbal injuries (verbal iniuri), corporal injuries, and disputes on inheritance. As a rule, proceedings took place monthly in the center of Teharje settlement or, in case of poor weather, the nearby church of St. Stephen.

Treatment of Enemy Aliens

1918 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
James W. Garner
Keyword(s):  
National Security ◽  
International Law ◽  
The State ◽  
Alexander Hamilton ◽  
Substantial Agreement ◽  
Government Grants ◽  
German Authority ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Jay Treaty ◽  
The Right

Writers on international law are now in substantial agreement that a belligerent ought not to detain enemy subjects, confiscate their property, or subject them to any disabilities, further than such as the protection of the national security and defense may require. Vattel, in 1758, appears to have been the first writer to adopt the view that had come to be generally held by publicists at the time the present war broke out. “The sovereign,” he said, “who declares war has not the right to detain the subjects of the enemy who are found within his state, nor their effects. They have come to his country in public faith; in permitting them to enter and live in the territory, he has tacitly promised them all liberty and surety for their return. A suitable time should be given them to withdraw with their goods; and if they stay beyond the time prescribed, it is lawful that they should be treated as enemies, though as disarmed enemies.” Alexander Hamilton, in defending the Jay Treaty of 1794, declared that the right of holding property in a country always implies a duty on the part of its government to protect that property and to secure to the owner full enjoyment of it. “Whenever, therefore,” he added, “a government grants permission to foreigners to acquire property within its territories, or to bring and deposit it there, it tacitly promises protection and security — the property of a foreigner placed in another country, by permission of its laws, may be justly regarded as a deposit of which the society is the trustee.” Westlake, in 1907, adverting to the numerous treaty stipulations on the subject, remarked that they might be deemed to amount to “a general agreement, on the part of governments, that modern international law forbids making prisoners the persons of enemy subjects in the territory at the outbreak of war, or, saving the right of expulsion in case of apprehended danger to the state, refusing them the right of continuous residence during good behavior.” Referring to the right of expulsion, Ullmann, a respectable German authority, remarks that expulsion can be resorted to against the subjects of the enemy state, but only after a suitable delay has been offered in order to enable those affected to wind up their affairs.

scholarly journals The State Responsibilities Relating to Human Rights Violations to The People with Stateless Persons Status in Rohingnya Crisis

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 154
Author(s):  
I Putu Dwika Ariestu
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
The State ◽  
Human Rights Violations ◽  
International Human Rights Law ◽  
Human Rights Law ◽  
Conceptual Approach ◽  
Citizenship Status ◽  
The People ◽  
The Right ◽  
Legal Consequences

Human Rights and the State could not be separated from one another. Both are interconnected in terms of how to ensure internal stability in a country. With the existence of human rights, it is hoped that state is not arbitrary to treat its people and is obliged to protect everyone in its territory including in this case Stateless persons mentioned in Article 7 paragraph 1 of the Convention relating Status of Stateless Persons in 1954. This study aims to analyze the obligations the State must take in relation to the protection of persons with stateless persons status, and to recognize the legal consequences and responsibilities of States in the event of omitting acts of human rights violations against people with stateless persons status. This paper using normative research methods with statute approach and conceptual approach. The study shows that in relation to the obligation of the state that each State shall be obliged to provide protection to persons with stateless persons status as stipulated in the 1954 Convention and the provisions of the International Human Rights Law, the obligations of state protection include the protection of the right to life, the right to employment and even the right to obtain citizenship status. The international legal consequences accepted by the state are listed in Article 39, Article 41, and 42 of the UN Charter. Then for state responsibility are listed under Article 35, Article 36, and Article 37 of UNGA 56/83 of 2001.   Hak Asasi Manusia dan Negara tidak bisa dipisahkan satu sama lain. Keduanya saling terkait dalam hal bagaimana menjamin stabilitas internal di suatu negara. Dengan adanya hak asasi manusia, diharapkan negara tidak sewenang-wenang memperlakukan rakyatnya dan berkewajiban melindungi semua orang di wilayahnya termasuk dalam hal ini para warga negara yang disebutkan dalam Pasal 7 ayat 1 Konvensi terkait Status Orang Tanpa Negara di tahun 1954. Tulisan ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis kewajiban yang harus diambil Negara sehubungan dengan perlindungan orang-orang dengan status orang tanpa kewarganegaraan, dan untuk mengakui konsekuensi hukum serta tanggung jawab negara dalam hal melakukan  tindakan pelanggaran hak asasi manusia terhadap orang-orang dengan status  tanpa kewarganegaraan. Tulisan ini menggunakan metode penelitian normatif dengan pendekatan perundang-undangan dan pendekatan konseptual. Hasil studi menunjukkan bahwa sehubungan dengan kewajiban negara bahwa setiap Negara wajib memberikan perlindungan kepada orang-orang dengan status orang tanpa kewarganegaraan sebagaimana diatur dalam Konvensi 1954 dan ketentuan-ketentuan Hukum Hak Asasi Manusia Internasional, kewajiban perlindungan negara termasuk perlindungan hak untuk hidup, hak untuk bekerja dan bahkan hak untuk mendapatkan status kewarganegaraan. Konsekuensi hukum internasional yang diterima oleh negara tercantum dalam Pasal 39, Pasal 41, dan 42 Piagam PBB. Kemudian untuk tanggung jawab negara tercantum di bawah Pasal 35, Pasal 36, dan Pasal 37 UNGA 56/83 tahun 2001.

The American Colonial Environment and Religious Liberty

1935 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-56
Author(s):  
W. W. Sweet
Keyword(s):  
Legal Status ◽  
Church And State ◽  
Complete Separation ◽  
The State ◽  
Religious Liberty ◽  
State Control ◽  
Close Relationship ◽  
The Right ◽  
High Degree ◽  
The Church

There is nothing inherent in Christianity itself which calls for a close relationship with the state. Primitive Christianity “demanded the complete separation of church and state,” asserting that each must be recognized as having its own distinct and independent mission to perform. For the first three hundred years of Christian history the church existed entirely apart from the state, and indeed had not even a legal status. Then came a time during which the church became little more than a branch of the state, and in this period it lost practically all independence of development, and was largely diverted from its proper work to serve political ends. It was as a result of this danger that the church developed, during the next period in its history, the doctrine of its independence of state control, and in the great investiture struggle, maintained it with success, against Roman emperors and German kings. Then the church having secured its independence of state control, and having perfected its organization to a high degree, and having grown strong and aggressive, it went a long step further and asserted the right of the church to control the state. But it needs no argument to prove that both the control of the church by the state and the control of the state by the church are equally foreign to the teaching of Christianity as such.

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