Anatolian Peasants in the Great Depression 1929–1933

2000 ◽  
Vol 23 ◽  
pp. 79-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elif Akçetin

The effects of the Great Depression of 1929 on peasants in Turkey is an area of study that has remained neglected, despite the fact that peasants then constituted 75 percent of the population. The reason why the condition of peasants has not attracted much attention is the dramatic change between the economic policies of the 1920s and those of the 1930s. The immediate consequence of the stock-market crash and the sudden drop in prices was the shrinkage of international trade. Governments dealt with the depression by implementing quotas on imports, and liberal economic policies were no longer considered successful. Protectionism became the most popular policy for the management of economies in difficulty. The change in economic policies during this period constituted a break with the past and therefore has been the principal focus of studies on the Great Depression.

Author(s):  
William E. Ellis

In the late 1920s Cobb’s popularity declined, due to the changing times. Although he continued to add books to his repertoire, they failed to receive critical acclaim. Other elements of Cobb’s life were still satisfying, such as his wanderlust and his love of spending time with friends. The stock market crash and the Great Depression took a toll on the Cobb family’s finances. While Cobb’s writing career was slowing down, Buff had become an accomplished writer. Cobb delved into work in radio and ventures in Hollywood.


Author(s):  
Corinne Crawford

<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; line-height: normal; margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt; mso-pagination: none;"><span style="font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;; color: black; font-size: 10pt; mso-themecolor: text1;">The Glass-Steagall Act was passed in 1933 in response to the failure of the banks following the Great Depression.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>One out of every five banks failed in the aftermath of the stock market crash. Legislators and regulators questioned the role the underwriting of securities played in the financial collapse. Many believed these investment banking activities caused a conflict of interest in that banks often suggested that their customers purchase securities the banks had underwritten.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>They believed that this conflict of interest contributed significantly to the stock market crash and the bank failures.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>The Glass-Steagall Act forced banks to choose between being a commercial bank or an investment bank, in effect constructing a wall between commercial banking and investing banking activities.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>The Glass- Steagall Act was the first law signed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt upon taking the oath of office.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Almost immediately upon enactment, the financial community lobbied to have the Act repealed.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Over the years, this persistent lobbying led to a continual reinterpretation and liberalization of the Glass-Steagall Act, until the Act was repealed in 1999.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>On the dawn of repeal, the late Senator Paul Wellstone made an impassioned plea on the Senate floor. He said the repeal of Glass-Steagall would enable the creation of financial conglomerates which would be too big to fail.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Furthermore, he believed that the regulatory structure would not be able to monitor the activities of these financial conglomerates and they would eventually fail due to engaging in excessively risky financial transactions.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Ultimately, he said, prophetically, that the taxpayers would be forced to bail out these too-big-to-fail financial institutions.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Clearly, Senator Wellstone was in the minority as the legislation repealing the Glass-Steagall Act was passed in both the House and the Senate with large majorities.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>President Bill Clinton signed the legislation into law in late November, 1999.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>It has now been over ten years since the repeal of Glass-Steagall and the United States is in the grip of the largest financial crisis since the Great Depression.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Legislators and regulators are again questioning the role that the investment banking activities of commercial banks have played in a financial crisis.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Some believe the repeal of Glass-Steagall contributed significantly to the current financial crisis.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Others believe that if Glass-Steagall had still been in place, the financial crisis would be much worse.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>This paper examines the role that the repeal of Glass-Steagall played in the current financial crisis.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span><span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</span></span></p>


2019 ◽  
pp. 79-94
Author(s):  
Saul Levmore

John Dos Passos’ The Big Money (1936) is hardly the only important American work to see greed as a cause of the stock market crash and then the Great Depression. It is packed with the problem of distinguishing greed from ambition, and it raises the question of the right social response to unattractive impulses. Prior to losing his idealistic fervor, or exchanging it for conservative passion, Dos Passos freely associated ambition with corruption, and acquisitiveness with antisocial self-interest. His deployment and biographical sketches of industrialists and other notable Americans suggest the difficulty of distinguishing avarice from ambition. Dos Passos’ treatment of ambition presupposes an economy where one person’s gain is at the expense of another; artistic accomplishment is, however, freed from this assumption. The novel speaks more to individual excesses than to their regulation, but it offers an opportunity to think about both.


2011 ◽  
Vol 80 (3) ◽  
pp. 590-599
Author(s):  
Jonathan H. Ebel

If the past decade has taught Americans anything, it is the danger of treating Wall Street as the sole indicator of the nation's economic health. Those who lived through the Great Depression learned this lesson also. Because so many more Americans and American institutions are investors in 2011 than in 1929, the stock market is a better measure today than it was eighty years ago, but as we relearned in 2008, 2002, and 1987, it is still possible to be blinded to significant systemic problems within and beyond the equity markets if all one does is follow the ticker. To be sure, a focus on Wall Street does not condemn an economic policy or history to failure or irrelevance. But the limits of such works, defined by their urban gaze, have a way of echoing across professions and disciplines that rely in various ways on the work of economists.


Author(s):  
John Kenneth Galbraith

This chapter examines the impact of the Great Depression on classical economic ideas. When the Great Depression struck after the stock market crash of October 1929, economists in the classical tradition such as Joseph Schumpeter and Lionel Robbins chose to do nothing. They argued that the depression must be allowed to run its course. The chapter first considers U.S. economic policy under Franklin D. Roosevelt, focusing on how he addressed three visible features of the depression: deflation in prices, unemployment, and the hardship depression suffered by especially vulnerable groups. It also discusses the views of two scholars who belonged to the group known as the Roosevelt Brains Trust (later the Brain Trust), Rexford Guy Tugwell and Adolf A. Berle Jr. Finally, it explores how depression and price deflation led to two efforts to raise prices, one through the National Recovery Act and the other through agriculture.


2017 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 147-166 ◽  
Author(s):  
GIULIANO CONTENTO DE OLIVEIRA ◽  
PAULO JOSÉ WHITAKER WOLF

ABSTRACT The paper aims to establish interfaces between the Great Depression of the 1930s under the Gold Standard and the recent European Crisis under the Euro. It is argued that, despite their specificities, both crises revealed the potentially harmful effects, in economic and social terms, of institutional arrangements that considerably reduce the autonomy of monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies of participating countries, without being accompanied by increased cooperation between them, which should be led by a global (in the case of the Great Depression) or regional (in the case of the European Crisis) hegemonic power, which is not only capable of, but is also willing to act as a buyer and lender of last resort, especially in circumstances characterized by increased uncertainty, the deterioration of the general state of expectations and increased liquidity preference. In fact, central European countries in the past and peripheral European countries nowadays were effectively pushed toward deflationary adjustments in which a reduction of prices and wages was accompanied by a reduction of output and employment levels. Thus, in the absence of the possibility of restoring the autonomy of economic policy, the overcome of the crisis necessarily requires, both before - under the Gold Standard - and nowadays - under the Euro -, joint actions aimed to assure that the responsibility for the adjustment will be equally distributed among all the economies, in order to avoid that some of them benefit at the expense of the others in this process.


1987 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 375-402 ◽  
Author(s):  
William O. Jones

Agricultural marketing boards in tropical Africa are heirlooms of the Great Depression and World War II, when colonial governments found their principal sources of revenue severely reduced and both European and African populations financially distressed. Marketing boards are of British origin, but similar efforts were made in French and Belgian Africa. The rationale for intervention is clouded; some of the principal reasons have faded into the past or were never openly expressed.1


2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 1005
Author(s):  
Ognjen Radonjić

The purpose of this paper is to explain not only why the Euro Area debt crisis does not subside, but also, why it deepens. We believe that the experience of the Great Depression can help economic theorists and officials to look at the problem from a different perspective since it is apparent that the economic orthodoxy and economic policies supported by its conventional wisdom do not provide desired results. Roosevelt’s fiscal activism and Keynes’ revolutionary theory deliver an answer to the question of why is, in crisis periods, vigorous reaction of economic authorities needed and why the free market is not able by itself to find way out of the fog, which, as time passes, becomes more and more dense.


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