Well-being and Despair: Dante's Ugolino

Utilitas ◽  
1997 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-240 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mozaffar Qizilabash

This paper considers three sorts of account of the quality of life. These are (1) capability views, due to Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, (2) desire accounts and (3) the prudential value list theory of James Griffin. Each approach is evaluated in the context of a tale of cannibalism and moral decay: the story of Count Ugolino in Dante's The Divine Comedy. It is argued that the example causes difficulties for Sen's version of the capability approach, as well as for desire accounts. Nussbaum's version of the capability approach deals withthe example better than Sen's. However, it fails adequately to accommodate pluralism. I suggest that James Griffin's account of well-being deals well with this example and accommodates pluralism. I suggest that, of the views considered, Griffin's is the best account of the quality of life.

2006 ◽  
Vol 59 ◽  
pp. 83-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mozaffar Qizilbash

Philosophical accounts of human well-being face a number of significant challenges. In this paper, I shall be primarily concerned with one of these. It relates to the possibility, noted by Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen amongst others, that people’s desires and attitudes are malleable and can ‘adapt’ in various ways to the straitened circumstances in which they live. If attitudes or desires adapt in this way it can be argued that the relevant desires or attitudes fail to provide a reliable basis for evaluating well-being. This is, what I shall call the ‘adaptation problem’. Nussbaum and Sen have—in different ways used this argument to motivate their versions of the ‘capability approach’. However, questions remain about the implications of adaptation for philosophical accounts of well-being.


2013 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 393-419 ◽  
Author(s):  
Milena I. Kremakova

AbstractThe capability approach has been developed by Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum and others as a human-centred normative framework for the evaluation of individual and group well-being, quality of life and social justice. Sen and Nussbaum’s ideas have influenced global, national and local policy and have been further developed in a number of academic disciplines, but so far have remained largely unnoticed in sociology. This article examines recent capability-informed theories and empirical applications in the sociology of human rights and other academic fields adjacent to sociology, focussing on examples of social policy studies in the fields of welfare, the labour market, health and disability, and education. The article outlines several potential areas in which capability-informed frameworks are relevant for critical social theory, public sociology and global sociology.


2006 ◽  
Vol 59 ◽  
pp. 83-109
Author(s):  
Mozaffar Qizilbash

Philosophical accounts of human well-being face a number of significant challenges. In this paper, I shall be primarily concerned with one of these. It relates to the possibility, noted by Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen amongst others, that people's desires and attitudes are malleable and can ‘adapt’ in various ways to the straitened circumstances in which they live. If attitudes or desires adapt in this way it can be argued that the relevant desires or attitudes fail to provide a reliable basis for evaluating well-being. This is, what I shall call the ‘adaptation problem’. Nussbaum and Sen have—in different ways used this argument to motivate their versions of the ‘capability approach’. However, questions remain about the implications of adaptation for philosophical accounts of well-being.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Jean-Michel Bonvin ◽  
Francesco Laruffa

In this article we explore the potential of the capability approach as a normative basis for eco-social policies. While the capability approach is often interpreted as a productivist or maximalist perspective, assuming the desirability of economic growth, we suggest another understanding, which explicitly problematises the suitability of economic growth and productive employment as means for enhancing capabilities. We argue that the capability approach allows rejecting the identification of social progress with economic growth and that it calls for democratically debating the meaning of wellbeing and quality of life. We analyse the implications of this conceptualisation for the design of welfare states.


Author(s):  
Richard Kraut

The Quality of Life: Aristotle Revised presents a philosophical theory about the constituents of human well-being. It begins with Aristotle’s thoughts about this topic, but often modifies and sometimes rejects them. The principal idea is that what Aristotle calls “external goods” (wealth, reputation, power) have at most an indirect bearing on the quality of our lives. A good internal life—the way in which we experience the world—is what well-being consists in. Pleasure is one aspect of this experience, but only a small part of it. Far more valuable is the quality of our emotional, intellectual, social, and perceptual experiences. These aspects of our existence make it potentially richer and deeper than the quality of life available to many other animals. A good human life is immeasurably better than that of a simple creature that feels only the pleasures of nourishment. Even if it felt pleasure for millions of years, human life would be superior. Contemporary discussions of well-being often appeal to a thought experiment devised by Robert Nozick, which holds that we should not attach ourselves to an “experience machine”—a device that manipulates our brains and gives us any illusory experiences of our choosing. This is thought to show that one’s interior life has little or no value on its own; that we must live in “the real world” to live well. In fact, however, this thought experiment supports the opposite conclusion: the quality of our lives consists in the quality of our experiences.


2018 ◽  
Vol 212 (1) ◽  
pp. 42-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anju Devianee Keetharuth ◽  
John Brazier ◽  
Janice Connell ◽  
Jakob Bue Bjorner ◽  
Jill Carlton ◽  
...  

BackgroundOutcome measures for mental health services need to adopt a service-user recovery focus.AimsTo develop and validate a 10- and 20-item self-report recovery-focused quality of life outcome measure named Recovering Quality of Life (ReQoL).MethodQualitative methods for item development and initial testing, and quantitative methods for item reduction and scale construction were used. Data from >6500 service users were factor analysed and item response theory models employed to inform item selection. The measures were tested for reliability, validity and responsiveness.ResultsReQoL-10 and ReQoL-20 contain positively and negatively worded items covering seven themes: activity, hope, belonging and relationships, self-perception, well-being, autonomy, and physical health. Both versions achieved acceptable internal consistency, test–retest reliability (>0.85), known-group differences, convergence with related measures, and were responsive over time (standardised response mean (SRM) > 0.4). They performed marginally better than the Short Warwick-Edinburgh Mental Well-being Scale and markedly better than the EQ-5D.ConclusionsBoth versions are appropriate for measuring service-user recovery-focused quality of life outcomes.Declaration of interestM.B. and J.Co. were members of the research group that developed the Clinical Outcomes in Routine Evaluation (CORE) outcome measures.


2017 ◽  
Vol 27 (5) ◽  
pp. 1181-1189 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. S. van Loon ◽  
K. M. van Leeuwen ◽  
R. W. J. G. Ostelo ◽  
J. E. Bosmans ◽  
G. A. M. Widdershoven

2005 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Giuseppina D’Addelfio

Nel presente articolo viene affrontato il tema della qualità della vita. Dopo una breve ricostruzione dell’origine di questa espressione e un esame dei contesti in cui più frequentemente essa ricorre, viene presentato l’Approccio che Amartya Sen e Martha Nussbaum hanno elaborato e su cui continuano a lavorare per misurare la qualità della vita in differenti nazioni: l’approccio delle Capacità. In particolare viene presentata l’elaborazione di Martha Nussbaum con la sua lista delle capacità. Sulla base della sua radice aristotelica, questa lista lascia intravedere un’immagine dell’essere umano come un animale razionale fragile e dipendente, in più momenti della sua vita bisognoso di cure. Dunque per quanto l’autonomia sia considerata una meta significativa da raggiungere e proteggere, essa non diventa l’unico fondamento della dignità dell’uomo. Quest’idea, insieme al tema della deformazione dei desideri e delle aspettative in situazioni di difficoltà, offre interessanti spunti alla riflessione bioetica, configurando l’esigenza di qualità della vita come strettamente legata al riconoscimento del suo intrinseco valore e della sua sacralità. ---------- In this article the author deals with the “Quality of Life” issue. After a brief history of the origin of this expression and an exam of the main contexts in which it is used, the approach that Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum have been shaping, in order to mesure the Quality of Life in different nations - the Capabilities Approach -, is presented. In particular the author focuses on Nussbaum’s account and on her list of capabilities. On the basis of its Aristotelian root, the list shows an idea of human being as a vulnerable and dependent rational animal - so that he/she needs care, in different moments of his/her life. Hence, autonomy is recognized as a valuable thing to pursue and preserve, but it is not considered as the only ground of human dignity. This issue, with the one of the deformation of preferences and expectations due to difficult situations, gives precious suggestions to bioethics. Namely, the istance of the “Quality of Life” is stressed as closely linked with the recognition of its intrinsic value and sacredness.


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