The Distinctive Unity of the Human Being in Aquinas

This chapter explores the fundamental vision of the human being at the core of Aquinas’ anthropology. Aquinas has typically been construed as defending a fundamentally ‘Aristotelian’ vision of the human being. I show that this label has generated a skewed reading of Aquinas. Accordingly, this chapter does not lay claim to identify what it would take for an anthropology to be authentically ‘Thomistic’. Instead, it makes a proposal concerning what I argue is the ‘guiding vision’ of Aquinas’ anthropology: namely the ‘distinctive unity of the human’. Aquinas prioritizes this notion of distinctive unity in the different areas of his anthropology. I explore how this distinctive unity is expressed (a) in Aquinas’ account of the human soul as the ‘horizon’ of the bodily and spiritual worlds, and (b) in his definition of the human being as ‘rational animal’.

SICHÜBERLIEFERUNG: RE-MOVING THE HISTORY OF BEING AS PRESENCE

How are we to responsively belong to tradition? This paper retrieves the concept of self-tradition (Sichüberlieferung) in Heidegger’s magnum opus Being and Time (1927). We will take as a guiding light Heidegger’s designation of a mode of his phenomenology as “phenomenology of the inapparent” expressed in the 1973 Zähringen Seminar. We will pay special heed to the function of the middle voice, neutrality of Da-sein, and tautology in the question of Being and history and bring to light the relation between authentic temporality and authentic historicity in a tautological turning of the selfsame. We will make a remark on the delay of Da-sein’s authentic historicity in the light of the “self-tradition” which marks Heidegger’s non-metaphysical response to the heritage of metaphysics of presence. In the wake of the phenomenology of the inapparent, we will turn to Derrida’s 2008 text The Animal that Therefore I Am to explore Derrida’s different approach to free the “I am” from that of Heidegger’s Dasein whose being is set in Jeweilig-Jemeinigkeit. We will show how Derrida’s invention of animot enables him and us to speak with the voices of our non-human animal others and enables us to free ourselves from the fixities of presence of the present in our thought, language, and sensitivity. In a relay of the two philosophers’ reading of us and their ways of self-overcoming of man as rational animal, we will learn to be in question and to learn to relate to one another without reducing one to the other and other to the one.

Scientific Certitude

I’ve been both fascinated and distressed by the arguments raging over how best to respond to the covid-19 pandemic. In particular, I’ve been struck by the way people claim scientific authority for their confident assurances of what needs to be done. And I’m especially intrigued by the scorn they often lavish on those who hold differing views on what science is telling us. The heat generated by the resulting debates is strikingly similar to the heat generated by debates over the science connected with human-caused climate change. And in both cases, the disputants too often presuppose indefensibly naïve views about scientific authority and certitude, apparently unaware that even the allegedly most obvious logical truths lack the certainty attributed to scientific authority in these debates. As a rule, I dislike re-circulating my Editorials, but I think it’s time to resurrect one (modestly tweaked) from a few years ago, addressing precisely this issue (Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 379–386, 2017). …………………………………… “Man is a rational animal who always loses his temper when he is called upon to act in accordance with the dictates of reason.” --Oscar Wilde I’ve often noticed how debates within the SSE community sometimes parallel debates in the political arena, perhaps especially with respect to the passion they elicit and the intolerance and condescension sometimes lavished on members of the “opposition.” Occasionally, of course, the debates in the SSE are nearly indistinguishable from those in the political arena—say, over the evidence for human-caused climate change. But what I find most striking is how the passion, intolerance, etc.—perhaps most often displayed by those defending whatever the “received” view happens to be—betrays either a surprising ignorance or else a seemingly convenient lapse of memory, one that probably wouldn’t appear in less emotionally-charged contexts. What impassioned partisans tend to ignore or forget concerns (a) the tentative nature of both scientific pronouncements and knowledge claims generally (including matters ostensibly much more secure than those under debate), as well as (b) the extensive network of assumptions on which every knowledge claim rests. So I’d like to offer what I hope will be a perspective-enhancer, concerning how even our allegedly most secure and fundamental pieces of a priori knowledge are themselves open to reasonable debate. A widespread, but naïve, view of logic is that no rational person could doubt its elementary laws. But that bit of popular “wisdom” is demonstrably false. And if that’s the case, then so much the worse for the degree of certitude we can expect in more controversial arenas. Let me illustrate with a few examples.[1] [1] I’m indebted to Aune, 1970 for much of what follows.

The Importance and Necessity of Dialogue of Civilizations: Increasing of human crisis around the world

The importance and necessity of dialogue among civilizations, is revealing as an undeniable need of 21th century, from one perspective, the unlimited competitions for producing ultra-advanced weapons, seriously threaten the global peace, but fortunately from other viewpoint, the modern technology could prepare unprecedented opportunities for launching and continuity of dialogue in different levels. The biggest steps toward a better and more peaceful world will be taken up, when the rationality be the supporter of important decisions and the argument replace the violent emotions. In ancient theology and philosophy, human being has known as the rational animal, who has the ability of thinking and expression of what he/she thinks, this distinctive characteristic has recognized as the main character of human which shows the mentality of human being basically different and transcendental, comparing to other animals on the earth.

Introduction

Bazin’s work explores a key question: What is a human, in contrast to an animal, a plant, an object or a machine? A human is simultaneously a rational animal and an irrational being. Human irrationality can lead to cruelty and madness unless it becomes creativity through art, or it turns into spirituality through irrational belief. Well aware that a human being can reduce the Other to an animal or an object, Bazin’s anti-anthropocentric ethos upholds empathy and coexistence. At the same time, Bazin approves of the anthropomorphic nature of human perception. For him, anthropomorphism is an automatic response that taps into the unavoidable contiguity of humans, animals, and things. Notorious for his dislike of Soviet montage, Bazin’s essays on children’s fairy tales, animal documentaries, and Robert Montgomery’s Lady in The Lake (1947) prove that, in his film theory, editing is as important as camera movement in filmmaking.

Defining Man as Animal Religiosum in English Religious Writing ca. 1650–ca. 1700

This article surveys the emergence and usage of the redefinition of man not as animal rationale (rational animal) but as animal religiosum (religious animal) by numerous English theologians between 1650 and 1700. Across the continuum of English Protestant thought, human nature was being redescribed as unique due to its religious, not primarily its rational, capabilities. This article charts said appearance as a contribution to debates over man's relationship with God; then its subsequent incorporation into the discussion over the theological consequences of arguments in favor of animal rationality, as well as its uses in anti-atheist apologetics; and then the sudden disappearance of the definition of man as animal religiosum at the beginning of the eighteenth century. In doing so, the article hopes to make a useful contribution to our understanding of changing early modern understandings of human nature by reasserting the significance of theological writing in the dispute over the relationship between humans and beasts. As a consequence, it offers a more wide-ranging account of man as animal religiosum than the current focus on “Cambridge Platonism” and “Latitudinarianism” allows.

Introduction

I start with what for me is a puzzle. An analytic sentence is a sentence one can see to be true simply by understanding it (and, perhaps, using a little logic). The hoary example is the sentence ‘all bachelors are unmarried’: to understand the sentence one must understand the word ‘bachelor’, knowing that it means unmarried man; so to understand the sentence is not just to know that it says that all bachelors are unmarried but to know that it says something that comes to no more and no less than that all unmarried men are unmarried. But any rational animal who can think the thought that all unmarried men are unmarried knows it....