Why Impossible Options Are Better: Consequentializing Dilemmas

Utilitas ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Brian Talbot
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Ought Implies Can

Abstract To consequentialize a deontological moral theory is to give a theory which issues the same moral verdicts, but explains those verdicts in terms of maximizing or satisficing value. There are many motivations for consequentializing: to reconcile plausible ideas behind deontology with plausible ideas behind consequentialism, to help us better understand deontological theories, or to extend deontological theories beyond what intuitions alone tell us. It has proven difficult to consequentialize theories that allow for moral dilemmas or that deny that “ought” implies “can.” This article argues that the problem is best solved by allowing impossible actions as inputs into consequentializations. It shows that all other approaches that have been advocated are inadequate. It also argues that progress in consequentialization, and in formal ethics more generally, requires thinking about more than just wrongness and permissibility; we should think about contrary-to-duty obligations and degrees of wrongness as well.

Moral dilemmas

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shyam Nair
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Deontic Logic ◽  
Moral Dilemma ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Careful Consideration ◽  
Moral Emotions ◽  
The Other ◽  
Ought Implies Can ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Course Of Action

A moral dilemma is a situation where an agent’s obligations conflict. Debate in this area focuses on the question of whether genuine moral dilemmas exist. This question involves considering not only the nature and significance of dilemmas, but also the connections between dilemmas, the logic of obligation and moral emotions. Certain cases involving difficult choices suggest that moral dilemmas exist. These cases also suggest that dilemmas are significant because they show that moral theory cannot help with these choices. If this is right, morality may be unimportant because it may be a system of inconsistent rules that cannot be used as a guide that tells us what to do. But this understanding of the cases is disputable. Perhaps the cases show that agents can be ignorant about what they ought to do. Or perhaps dilemmas are not significant because moral theory tells agents to do the most important of their obligations. On the other hand, principles from the logic of obligation or deontic logic can be used to argue against the existence of moral dilemmas. Principles of deontic logic such as the ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ principle and the agglomeration principle, which says that if you ought to do a and ought to do b, then you ought to do a and b, taken together with the assumption that moral dilemmas exist, turn out to entail a contradiction. This means that one of these principles must be given up, or else it must be the case that moral dilemmas do not exist. Careful consideration of the moral emotions has suggested that dilemmas do exist. It is appropriate for agents to feel guilt only if they ought to have done otherwise. In cases involving difficult choices, it is appropriate to feel guilt no matter what course of action is taken. This suggests that such cases involve genuine dilemmas.

scholarly journals Kantian Dilemmas? Moral Conflict in Kant’s Ethical Theory

2013 ◽  
Vol 95 (1) ◽  
pp. 36-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jens Timmermann
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Moral Conflict ◽  
Ought Implies Can ◽  
Ethical Duty ◽  
Kant's Ethics ◽  
Explicit Discussion

Abstract: This paper explores the possibility of moral conflict in Kant’s ethics. An analysis of the only explicit discussion of the topic in his published writings confirms that there is no room for genuine moral dilemmas. Conflict is limited to nonconclusive ‘grounds’ of obligation. They arise only in the sphere of ethical duty and, though defeasible, ought to be construed as the result of valid arguments an agent correctly judges to apply in the situation at hand. While it is difficult to determine in theory what makes some of them stronger than others, these ‘grounds’ can account for practical residue in conflict cases and for a plausible form of agent regret. The principle that ‘ought implies can’ survives intact.

scholarly journals Ideal and nonideal moral theory for disaster bioethics

Human Affairs ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dónal O’Mathúna
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Ethical Dilemmas ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Moral Goodness ◽  
The Right ◽  
Practical Implications

AbstractMoral theory has generally focused on resolving ethical dilemmas by identifying ethically sound options. Whether the focus is on consequences, duties, principles or virtues, ethical cases are often approached in ways that assume morally sound solutions can be found and followed. Such ‘ideal morality’ assumes that moral goodness is always possible, leaving people confident they have done the right thing. Such an approach becomes inadequate in disaster settings where any good solution is often difficult to see. This paper examines recent work on nonideal moral theory as a useful model for disaster bioethics. This approach views moral dilemmas as situations where no choice is ideal and every option involves some element of unavoidable wrongdoing. Rather than straining for ideal answers, this approach acknowledges that sometimes the lesser of two evils is the best that can be done. Such situations inevitably lead to feelings of regret or guilt, commonly encountered in discussions of disaster bioethics. This paper explores the practical implications of nonideal approaches for disaster responders working in tragic situations.

Moral Conflicts and Moral Awareness

Philosophy ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 86 (4) ◽  
pp. 563-587 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chris Bessemans
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Moral Awareness ◽  
Phenomenological Method ◽  
Moral Choice ◽  
Moral Conflicts ◽  
Adequate Understanding ◽  
Action Guidance

AbstractBy making use of Aurel Kolnai's ethical writings I want to offer a more adequate understanding of moral conflicts and moral dilemmas. Insisting on Kolnai's phenomenological method, in particular, focussing on the agent's moral awareness (or conscience) and his deliberation, results in an understanding of moral conflicts as moments of moral choice rather than anomalies of moral theory. In this way, I argue that one can account for Bernard Williams's phenomenological description of moral conflicts without having to accept his anti-realist conclusions. Moreover, this approach indicates the adequacy of ordinary moral reasoning for decision-making and action guidance. Lastly and importantly, the essay illustrates the relevance of Kolnai's writings to contemporary moral philosophy.

scholarly journals Two Dogmas of Moral Theory? Comments on Lisa Tessman’s Moral Failure

2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Eva F Kittay
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Normative Theory ◽  
Ought Implies Can ◽  
Moral Failure ◽  
Guiding Principles

In Moral Failure, Lisa Tessman argues against two principles of moral theory, that ought implies can and that normative theory must be action-guiding. Although Tessman provides a trenchant account of how we are thrust into the misfortune of moral failure, often by our very efforts to act morally, and although she shows, through a discussion well-informed by the latest theorizing in ethics, neuroethics, and psychology, how much more moral theory can do than provide action-guiding principles, I argue that the two theses of moral theory that she disputes remain indispensable for ethical theory.

Les Mains Sales Versus Le Sale Monde: A Metaethical Look at Dirty Hands

2009 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 74-105
Author(s):  
Kevin DeLapp ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Realism ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Ethical Consideration ◽  
Value Pluralism ◽  
Dirty Hands ◽  
Ought Implies Can ◽  
Moral Domain ◽  
Political Expediency

The phenomenon of “dirty hands” is typically framed as an issue for normative or applied ethical consideration—for example, in debates between consequentialism and nonconsequentialism, or in discussions of the morality of torture or political expediency. By contrast, this paper explores the metaethical dimensions of dirty-hands situations. First, empirically-informed arguments based on scenarios of moral dilemmas involving metaethical aspects of dirty hands are marshaled against the view that “ought implies can.” Second, a version of moral realism is conjoined with a version of value-pluralism that charitably accommodates and explains the central features of the phenomenology related to dirty hands. It is not simply that agents are or are not justified in getting their hands dirty (les mains sales); rather, in certain situations, it is the nature of the moral domain itself to be intractably messy (le sale monde), such that dirty hands are unavoidable. The paper concludes by considering some important normative and psychological implications of this view.

Evaluating Parental Power

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allyn Fives
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
Civic Education ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Applied Ethics ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Moral Pluralism ◽  
Postgraduate Students ◽  
General Rules ◽  
Moral Claims

Is parents’ power over their children legitimate? And what role do both theoretical analysis and practical judgement play when we make such normative evaluations? While this book adds to the growing literature on parents, children, families, and the State, it does so by focusing on one issue, the legitimacy of parents’ power. It also takes seriously the challenge posed by moral pluralism, and considers the role of both theoretical rationality and practical judgement in resolving moral dilemmas associated with parental power. This book makes a number of conceptual and methodological innovations. While parental power is usually conceptualised as form of paternalism, this book shows that non-paternalistic parental power can be legitimate as well. While parental power is often assumed to involve interference with children’s liberty, in fact there is a plurality of forms of parental power. And while political theorists offer general rules to resolve dilemmas arising between competing moral claims, it is demonstrated here that, in the evaluation of parental power, practical judgements are required in specific cases. A number of such cases of parental power are explored here at length, including parental licenses, children’s informed consent, and civic education. The primary intended market for this book is advanced undergraduate and postgraduate students and established academics, in particular those with an interest in practical and applied ethics, contemporary political theory, moral theory, social theory, the sociology of childhood, political sociology, social work, and social policy.

Character in Kant’s Moral Psychology: Responding to the Situationist Challenge

2019 ◽  
Vol 101 (4) ◽  
pp. 508-534 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Frierson
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Behavioral Outcomes ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Ought Implies Can ◽  
Ethical Theories ◽  
Empirical Reality ◽  
Moral Anthropology ◽  
Human Motivation ◽  
The Face

Abstract In recent years, several philosophers have used “situationist” findings in social psychology to criticize character-based ethical theories. After showing how these criticisms apply, prima facie, to Kant’s moral theory, I lay out a Kantian response to them. Kant admits the empirical reality of situation-dependence in human actions but articulates a conception of “ought implies can” that vindicates his character-based moral theory in the face of rarity of character. Moreover, he provides an interpretive framework for the situation-dependence of human motivation in terms of humans’ “propensity to evil.” He also provides a framework for highlighting empirical bases for moral hope, a framework that makes it possible to see lack of character as something human beings can overcome. And he outlines a “moral anthropology” that develops something akin to what Mark Alfano calls “moral technologies,” but in Kant’s case, these technologies focus on cultivating character as such rather than merely good behavioral outcomes.

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