scholarly journals Two Dogmas of Moral Theory? Comments on Lisa Tessman’s Moral Failure

2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Eva F Kittay
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Normative Theory ◽  
Ought Implies Can ◽  
Moral Failure ◽  
Guiding Principles

In Moral Failure, Lisa Tessman argues against two principles of moral theory, that ought implies can and that normative theory must be action-guiding. Although Tessman provides a trenchant account of how we are thrust into the misfortune of moral failure, often by our very efforts to act morally, and although she shows, through a discussion well-informed by the latest theorizing in ethics, neuroethics, and psychology, how much more moral theory can do than provide action-guiding principles, I argue that the two theses of moral theory that she disputes remain indispensable for ethical theory.

scholarly journals Kantian Dilemmas? Moral Conflict in Kant’s Ethical Theory

2013 ◽  
Vol 95 (1) ◽  
pp. 36-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jens Timmermann
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Moral Conflict ◽  
Ought Implies Can ◽  
Ethical Duty ◽  
Kant's Ethics ◽  
Explicit Discussion

Abstract: This paper explores the possibility of moral conflict in Kant’s ethics. An analysis of the only explicit discussion of the topic in his published writings confirms that there is no room for genuine moral dilemmas. Conflict is limited to nonconclusive ‘grounds’ of obligation. They arise only in the sphere of ethical duty and, though defeasible, ought to be construed as the result of valid arguments an agent correctly judges to apply in the situation at hand. While it is difficult to determine in theory what makes some of them stronger than others, these ‘grounds’ can account for practical residue in conflict cases and for a plausible form of agent regret. The principle that ‘ought implies can’ survives intact.

Reasons First

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Schroeder
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Action Theory ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Justify Belief ◽  
Moral Worth ◽  
Normative Theory ◽  
Common Currency ◽  
Normative Concepts ◽  
The World ◽  
Explanatory Priority

The last fifty years or more of ethical theory have been preoccupied by a turn to reasons. The vocabulary of reasons has become a common currency not only in ethics, but in epistemology, action theory, and many related areas. It is now common, for example, to see central theses such as evidentialism in epistemology and egalitarianism in political philosophy formulated in terms of reasons. And some have even claimed that the vocabulary of reasons is so useful precisely because reasons have analytical and explanatory priority over other normative concepts—that reasons in that sense come first. Reasons First systematically explores both the benefits and burdens of the hypothesis that reasons do indeed come first in normative theory, against the conjecture that theorizing in both ethics and epistemology can only be hampered by neglect of the other. Bringing two decades of work on reasons in both ethics and epistemology to bear, Mark Schroeder argues that some of the most important challenges to the idea that reasons could come first are themselves the source of some of the most obstinate puzzles in epistemology—about how perceptual experience could provide evidence about the world, and about what can make evidence sufficient to justify belief. And he shows that along with moral worth, one of the very best cases for the fundamental explanatory power of reasons in normative theory actually comes from knowledge.

Utilitarian Strategies in Bentham and John Stuart Mill

Utilitas ◽  
1990 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 245-266 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. J. Kelly
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Recent Scholarship ◽  
Careful Scrutiny ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Theories Of Justice ◽  
The Common ◽  
Utilitarian Theory

The argument of this paper is part of a general defence of the claim that Bentham's moral theory embodies a utilitarian theory of distributive justice, which is developed in his Civil Law writings. Whereas it is a commonplace of recent revisionist scholarship to argue that J. S. Mill had a developed utilitarian theory of justice, few scholars regard Bentham as having a theory of justice, let alone one that rivals in sophistication that of Mill. Indeed, Gerald J. Postema in his bookBentham and the Common Law Tradition, argues that Bentham had no substantial concern with the concept of justice, and that what analysis of the concept there is in Bentham's thought is unlike the utilitarian theory of justice to be found in chapter five of J. S. Mill'sUtilitarianismAlthough Postema's interpretation is not the only one that will be addressed in this paper, it serves as an important starting point for any rival interpretation of Bentham's ethical theory for two reasons. Firstly, it is the most comprehensive and most penetrating discussion of Bentham's utilitarian theory, drawing as it does on a wide variety of published and unpublished materials written throughout Bentham's career. Secondly, it is interesting in this particular context because the contrast that Postema draws between Bentham's and Mill's theories of justice depends upon a particular reading of Mill's theory of justice and utility which is derived from recent scholarship and which is by no means uncontroversial. As part of the defence of the claim that Bentham had a sophisticated theory of distributive justice, it will be argued in this paper that the contrast drawn between Bentham and Mill does not stand up to careful scrutiny, for insofar as Mill's theory of justice can be consistently defended it is not significantly different from the utilitarian strategy that Bentham employed for incorporating considerations of distributive justice within his theory. This is not to claim that there are not significant differences between the theories of justice of Bentham and J. S. Mill, but it is to claim that whatever technical differences exist between their theories, both writers saw the need to incorporate the concept of justice within utilitarianism. Therefore, rather than showing that Mill is an interesting thinker to the extent that he abandons his early Benthamism, by demonstrating how close Mill's theory of utility and justice is to that of Bentham, it will be possible to argue that Bentham employed a sophisticated and subtle utilitarian theory that was responsive to the sort of problems which occupied Mill a generation later.

Metaphorical and Literal Groundings

2020 ◽  
Vol 42 (4) ◽  
pp. 335-352
Author(s):  
Anna Cook ◽  
Bonnie Sheehey ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Indigenous Communities ◽  
Normative Theory ◽  
Ethical Standard ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Ethical Responsibility ◽  
Land Ethic ◽  
Indigenous Knowledges ◽  
Indigenous Philosophy ◽  
Ethical Approaches

Accounts of grounded normativity in Indigenous philosophy can be used to challenge the groundlessness of Western environmental ethical approaches such as Aldo Leopold’s land ethic. Attempts to ground normativity in mainstream Western ethical theory deploy a metaphorical grounding that covers up the literal grounded normativity of Indigenous philosophical practices. Furthermore, Leopold’s land ethic functions as a form of settler philosophical guardianship that works to erase, assimilate, and effectively silence localized Indigenous knowledges through a delocalized ethical standard. Finally, grounded normativ­ity challenges settlers to question their desire for groundless normative theory and practice as reflective of their evasion of ethical responsibility for the destruction and genocide of Indigenous communities.

Material Practice and Morality in the Marxist Tradition

2020 ◽  
pp. 87-108
Author(s):  
Anna L. Peterson
Keyword(s):  
Special Interest ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Karl Marx ◽  
Ethical Framework ◽  
Material Forces ◽  
Material Practice ◽  
Marxist Tradition

This chapter examines Marxist thought, which is primarily a sociological rather than an ethical framework. However, both Karl Marx and later Marxist thinkers developed theories with clear moral assumptions and goals, from their anthropology to visions of a revolutionized society. Marxist thought makes “human sensuous activities” central to everything, and that has to include its (implicit) ethical theory. Even though Marx showed little interest in moral theory, both meta-ethical and normative claims run throughout his work. This chapter reflects special interest in Marx’s emphases on the role of material forces in shaping ideas and on the creative tensions between individuals and structures. To explore these issues, the chapter engages the thought of Marx and some of his recent interpreters to understand the ways all ideas, including ideas about value, are grounded in material practices, experiences, and structures.

Moral dilemmas

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shyam Nair
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Deontic Logic ◽  
Moral Dilemma ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Careful Consideration ◽  
Moral Emotions ◽  
The Other ◽  
Ought Implies Can ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Course Of Action

A moral dilemma is a situation where an agent’s obligations conflict. Debate in this area focuses on the question of whether genuine moral dilemmas exist. This question involves considering not only the nature and significance of dilemmas, but also the connections between dilemmas, the logic of obligation and moral emotions. Certain cases involving difficult choices suggest that moral dilemmas exist. These cases also suggest that dilemmas are significant because they show that moral theory cannot help with these choices. If this is right, morality may be unimportant because it may be a system of inconsistent rules that cannot be used as a guide that tells us what to do. But this understanding of the cases is disputable. Perhaps the cases show that agents can be ignorant about what they ought to do. Or perhaps dilemmas are not significant because moral theory tells agents to do the most important of their obligations. On the other hand, principles from the logic of obligation or deontic logic can be used to argue against the existence of moral dilemmas. Principles of deontic logic such as the ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ principle and the agglomeration principle, which says that if you ought to do a and ought to do b, then you ought to do a and b, taken together with the assumption that moral dilemmas exist, turn out to entail a contradiction. This means that one of these principles must be given up, or else it must be the case that moral dilemmas do not exist. Careful consideration of the moral emotions has suggested that dilemmas do exist. It is appropriate for agents to feel guilt only if they ought to have done otherwise. In cases involving difficult choices, it is appropriate to feel guilt no matter what course of action is taken. This suggests that such cases involve genuine dilemmas.

scholarly journals Review EssayExemplarist Moral Theory

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 755-768
Author(s):  
Lani Watson ◽  
Alan T. Wilson
Keyword(s):  
Moral Development ◽  
Empirical Research ◽  
Review Essay ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
Critical Discussion ◽  
Practical Guide ◽  
The Way

This review essay provides a critical discussion of Linda Zagzebski’s (2017) Exemplarist Moral Theory (emt). We agree that emt is a book of impressive scope that will be of interest to ethical theorists, as well as epistemologists, philosophers of language, and philosophers of religion. Throughout the critical discussion we argue that exemplarism faces a number of important challenges, firstly, in dealing with the fallibility of admiration, which plays a central role in the theoretical framework, and secondly, in serving as a practical guide for moral development. Despite this, we maintain that emt points the way for significant future theoretical and empirical research into some of the most well-established questions in ethical theory.

scholarly journals Ethical Theories and Moral Guidance

Utilitas ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 291-309 ◽  
Author(s):  
PEKKA VÄYRYNEN
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Ought Implies Can ◽  
Ethical Theories ◽  
Better Than ◽  
Moral Guidance

Let the Guidance Constraint be the following norm for evaluating ethical theories: Other things being at least roughly equal, ethical theories are better to the extent that they provide adequate moral guidance. I offer an account of why ethical theories are subject to the Guidance Constraint, if indeed they are. We can explain central facts about adequate moral guidance, and their relevance to ethical theory, by appealing to certain forms of autonomy and fairness. This explanation is better than explanations that feature versions of the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. In closing, I address the objection that my account is questionable because it makes ethical theories subject not merely to purely theoretical but also to morally substantive norms.

Idealizing Morality

Hypatia ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 797-824 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lisa Tessman
Keyword(s):  
Moral Agent ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Normative Theory ◽  
Nonideal Theory ◽  
Moral Failure ◽  
Normative Expectations ◽  
Action Guidance

Implicit in feminist and other critiques of ideal theorizing is a particular view of what normative theory should be like. Although I agree with the rejection of ideal theorizing that oppression theorists (and other theorists of justice) have advocated, the proposed alternative of nonideal theorizing is also problematic. Nonideal theorizing permits one to address oppression by first describing (nonideal) oppressive conditions, and then prescribing the best action that is possible or feasible given the conditions. Borrowing an insight from the “moral dilemmas debate”—namely that moral wrongdoing or failure can be unavoidable—I suggest that offering (only) action-guidance under nonideal conditions obscures the presence and significance of unavoidable moral failure. An adequate normative theory should be able to issue a further, non-action-guiding evaluative claim, namely that the best that is possible under oppressive conditions is not good enough, and may constitute a moral failure. I find exclusively action-guiding nonideal theory to be both insufficiently nonidealizing (because it idealizes the moral agent by falsely characterizing the agent as always able to avoid moral wrongdoing) and meanwhile too strongly adapted to the nonideal (because normative expectations are lowered and detrimentally adapted to options that, while the best possible, are still unacceptable).

Could Kant have really been an utilitarian?

2004 ◽  
Vol 47 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 37-61
Author(s):  
Nenad Cekic
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
The Real

In this paper the author examines Hare's idea of reconciliation of utilitarianism and Kant's moral theory. The key term which connects these two theories is the idea of universality of moral notions and judgments. But the real question is: which type of universality, and how does that universality work? Hare's idea of universalisability apparently is not Kantian universality required by categorical imperative. The author concludes that main Hare's argument in favor of "Kantian utilitarianism" is based upon basic misunderstanding of central notions of Kant's ethical theory.

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