Saint Martin of Tours in a New World of Medical Ethics

1994 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 159-167 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard D. Lamm
Keyword(s):  
World War I ◽  
Medical Ethics ◽  
New World ◽  
Clinical Skills ◽  
Standard Of Care ◽  
World War ◽  
True Story ◽  
Saint Martin ◽  
International Reputation ◽  
Do So

I end with another parable, but it is also a true story. Harvey Gushing, the famous surgeon after whom the Gushing Lectures are named, made an international reputation in his allegiance to quality. He badgered his profession to a higher standard of self-effacement and railed against the debasement of clinical skills and overemphasis on research and pursuit of personal gain. We honor him to this day because those were, and remain, important points. Yet, Harvey Gushing served as a surgeon during World War I and at Ypres. Although the Allied mortality was as much as 50,000 soldiers a day, not counting the wounded, Gushing refused to operate on any more than two patients each day, arguing that to do so would have lowered his standard of care for his patients a – standard that made sense in one time but that became strikingly insensitive, and I suggest even unethical, in another when confronted with a different reality.

Two post-war paths: Popular violence in the Bohemian lands and in Austria in the aftermath of World War I

2018 ◽  
Vol 46 (5) ◽  
pp. 759-775 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ota Konrád
Keyword(s):  
World War I ◽  
Political Culture ◽  
New World ◽  
Collective Identities ◽  
World War ◽  
Habsburg Monarchy ◽  
Successor State ◽  
Post War ◽  
Forms Of Violence ◽  
Wartime Experience

The study explores the phenomenon of popular violence in the first months and years after the end of World War I on the basis of a comparison between the Bohemian lands, forming the central part of the newly established Czechoslovakia, and Austria, as another successor state to the former Habsburg monarchy. Aside from the continuities, new forms of violence increasingly emerged in the first years after the end of the war, and also the “language” of violence was transformed. While in Czechoslovakia, the framework within which people were learning to understand the new world was shaped by the national and republican discourse oriented to the future, in Austria the collective identities and mentalities were being formed along the lines of particular party political blocks. In both cases, the nationalization and politicization of violence respectively contributed to the emergence of new forms of popular violence; but at the same time they could also be used for its de-escalation, necessary for the re-integration of society disrupted by the wartime experience. However, even if both countries went out from the war on different paths, the violence stayed part of their political culture and it could be mobilized again.

“When Women Do the Work of Men”: Representations of Gendered Occupational Identities on British Railways in World War I Cartoons

2019 ◽  
Vol 117 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-78
Author(s):  
Emma Robertson ◽  
Lee-Ann Monk
Keyword(s):  
Women Workers ◽  
World War I ◽  
Occupational Culture ◽  
World War ◽  
National Union ◽  
Late Twentieth ◽  
Traditional Work ◽  
Late Twentieth Century ◽  
Do So

During World War I in Britain, women workers took on previously men-only jobs on the railways. In response to this wartime development, the National Union of Railwaymen published a series of cartoons in their journal, Railway Review. These images depicted women employed as porters and guards, occupying the engine footplate, and acting in the role of station-mistress. Through a close reading of the cartoons, and related images in the journal, this article examines how the humorous portrayal of female railway workers reinforced masculine occupational identities at the same time as revealing ambiguities in (and negotiating anxieties over) the gendered nature of railway employment. Despite wartime labour shortages, certain occupations, notably the driving and firing of steam trains, remained stolidly men’s work and would do so until the late twentieth century. By scrutinising the construction of gendered occupational culture in union journals, we can better understand the tenacity of notions of “traditional” work for men and women on the railways.

Quite Like Ourselves

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robin Archer
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World War I ◽  
New World ◽  
Military Training ◽  
The United States ◽  
World War ◽  
Social Experiments ◽  
American Interest ◽  
English Speaking

In the United States, there was substantial opposition to entering World War I, and yet conscription was introduced more quickly than in any other English-speaking country. In Australia, opposition to entry was minimal, but opposition to conscription was so great that its introduction was blocked. The period before US entry into the war also saw an unusual surge of American interest in Australian social experiments—including experiments with Compulsory Industrial Arbitration and Compulsory Military Training—which reached a peak in the wake of a unique Australian referendum on conscription. This essay examines the extent of this surge of transnational interest, the reason for it, and its possible effects, before considering why the outcome of the conflict over conscription was so different in these two similar historically liberal New World societies.

Boom, Echo, and Splinter

2019 ◽  
pp. 146-168
Author(s):  
Mark Healey
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
World War I ◽  
New World ◽  
Buenos Aires ◽  
Population Expansion ◽  
Active Citizenship ◽  
World War ◽  
Military Dictatorship ◽  
Labor Politics ◽  
European Immigrants

Buenos Aires began the twentieth century as a prosperous port drawing European immigrants to serve a booming export economy. It expanded outward from its core of urban power and prosperity through suburbanization, early on segregating slaughterhouse zones from sites of recreation for the comfortable. Mid-century industrialization drew workers to the peripheries—which became zones of labor politics and bases for active citizenship and Peronist power. Peronist economic and political power sustained an unequally shared prosperity past World War I. Then de-industrialization in times of population expansion accompanied by military dictatorship (1976-1983) and a new suburbanization to protect the wealthy brought the polarizing mix wealth and marginality, formality and informality faced earlier in other New World cities. Re-democratization failed to bring more shared prosperity—or an escape from repeated cycles of promise and crisis.

WORLD WAR I AND THE PARADOX OF WILSONIANISM

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-22
Author(s):  
Lloyd E. Ambrosius
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World War I ◽  
New World ◽  
World Order ◽  
The United States ◽  
New World Order ◽  
World War ◽  
Imperial Germany ◽  
The World ◽  
The Individual

One hundred years ago, on April 6, 1917, President Woodrow Wilson led the United States into the First World War. Four days earlier, in his war message to Congress, he gave his rationale for declaring war against Imperial Germany and for creating a new world order. He now viewed German submarine attacks against neutral as well as belligerent shipping as a threat to the whole world, not just the United States. “The present German submarine warfare against commerce is a warfare against mankind,” he claimed. “It is a war against all nations.” He now believed that Germany had violated the moral standards that “citizens of civilized states” should uphold. The president explained: “We are at the beginning of an age in which it will be insisted that the same standards of conduct and responsibility for wrong done shall be observed among nations and their governments that are observed among the individual citizens of civilized states.” He focused on protecting democracy against the German regime of Kaiser Wilhelm II. “A steadfast concert for peace,” he said, “can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants.” Wilson called on Congress to vote for war not just because Imperial Germany had sunk three American ships, but for the larger purpose of a new world order. He affirmed: “We are glad, now that we see the facts with no veil of false pretense about them, to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its peoples, the German peoples included: for the rights of nations great and small and the privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life and of obedience. The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundation of political liberty.”

Organizing for performance: coalition effectiveness on the battlefield

2020 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 953-978
Author(s):  
Rosella Cappella Zielinski ◽  
Ryan Grauer
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
World War I ◽  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Organization Theory ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Organizational Dynamics ◽  
World War ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Do So

States often fight side-by-side on the battlefield. As detailed in our new dataset, Belligerents in Battle, 178 of the 480 major land battles fought during interstate wars waged between 1900 and 2003 involved at least one multinational coalition. Though coalition partners fight battles together to increase their odds of securing specific objectives, they vary significantly in their capacity to do so. Why? Drawing on organization theory insights, we argue that coalitions’ variable battlefield effectiveness is a function of interactions between their command structures and the resources each partner brings to the fight. Coalitions adopting command structures tailored to simultaneously facilitate the efficient use of partners’ variably sized resource contributions and discourage free-riding, shirking, and other counterproductive actions will fight effectively; those that employ inappropriate command structures will not. Evidence from Anglo-French operations during World War I and Axis operations during World War II strongly supports our claim. For scholars, our argument and findings about the importance of military organizational dynamics for the operation and performance of coalitions raise important new questions and provide potential insights about coalition formation, duration, and termination. For practitioners, it is significant that, since 1990, 36 of 49 of major battles in interstate wars have involved at least one coalition and the majority of those coalitions have been, like the cases we study, ad hoc in nature. Understanding how command arrangements affect performance and getting organization right at the outset of wars is increasingly important.

scholarly journals Litvinov and Kamenev—Ambassadors Extraordinary: The Problem of Soviet Representation Abroad

Slavic Review ◽  
1975 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 463-482
Author(s):  
Richard Kent Debo
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Civil War ◽  
World War I ◽  
European Society ◽  
Democratic Peace ◽  
Socialist Revolution ◽  
World War ◽  
Leon Trotsky ◽  
Do So

In November 1917, the Bolshevik Party came to power in Russia with a foreign policy based on “proletarian internationalism” and the aim of spreading the socialist revolution to all parts of Europe. Developed by V. I. Lenin and Leon Trotsky this policy sought to take advantage of the disruption of European society caused by World War I to transform that conflict of state against state into a vast international civil war of class against class. Believing that the peoples of Europe were weary of war and ripe for revolution the Bolsheviks called for the negotiation of a “just and democratic peace” based on the principles of no annexations, no indemnifications and the liberation of all colonial, dependent and oppressed nations. The Bolsheviks hoped that bourgeois governments would be unable to accept these principles and that their failure to do so would generate sufficient popular unrest to ignite revolution everywhere in Europe.

scholarly journals A 2x2=4 hobbyhorse: Mark Blaug on rational and historical reconstructions

2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harro Maas
Keyword(s):  
World War I ◽  
Second World War ◽  
Economic Thought ◽  
Historical Reconstruction ◽  
World War ◽  
History Of Economics ◽  
History Of ◽  
Magnum Opus ◽  
Second World ◽  
Do So

Over time, Mark Blaug became increasingly sceptical of the merits of the approach to the history of economics that we find in his magnum opus, Economic theory in retrospect, first published in 1962, and increasingly leaned to favour 'historical' over 'rational' reconstructions. In this essay, I discuss Blaug's shifting historiographical position, and the changing terms of historiographical debate. I do so against the background of Blaug's personal life history and the increasingly beleaguered position the history of economic thought found itself in after the Second World War. I argue that Blaug never resolved the tensions between historical and rational reconstructions, partly because he never fleshed out a viable notion of historical reconstruction. I trace Blaug's difficulty in doing so to his firm conviction that the history of economics should speak to economists, a conviction clearly present in his 2001 essay: "No history of ideas, please, we're economists".

scholarly journals All of Life an Experiment

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-39
Author(s):  
Jared Harpt
Keyword(s):  
World War I ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Free Speech ◽  
World War ◽  
Supreme Court Justice ◽  
Oliver Wendell Holmes ◽  
Us Supreme Court ◽  
The Common ◽  
Clear And Present Danger ◽  
Do So

US Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. reshaped American free speech law through his Supreme Court opinions during World War I and after. This paper explores the oft-debated questions of whether and how Holmes’s free speech views changed between his legal education (during which he was taught that the common law’s bad tendency test allowed governments to punish any speech after it was uttered) and World War I (during which he created and developed the more expansive clear and present danger test). This paper argues that Holmes developed the underlying principles of his later free speech ideas in his writings on American common law, but that he only expressed those ideas in Supreme Court opinions after several other legal thinkers prodded him to do so.

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