WORLD WAR I AND THE PARADOX OF WILSONIANISM

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-22
Author(s):  
Lloyd E. Ambrosius

One hundred years ago, on April 6, 1917, President Woodrow Wilson led the United States into the First World War. Four days earlier, in his war message to Congress, he gave his rationale for declaring war against Imperial Germany and for creating a new world order. He now viewed German submarine attacks against neutral as well as belligerent shipping as a threat to the whole world, not just the United States. “The present German submarine warfare against commerce is a warfare against mankind,” he claimed. “It is a war against all nations.” He now believed that Germany had violated the moral standards that “citizens of civilized states” should uphold. The president explained: “We are at the beginning of an age in which it will be insisted that the same standards of conduct and responsibility for wrong done shall be observed among nations and their governments that are observed among the individual citizens of civilized states.” He focused on protecting democracy against the German regime of Kaiser Wilhelm II. “A steadfast concert for peace,” he said, “can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants.” Wilson called on Congress to vote for war not just because Imperial Germany had sunk three American ships, but for the larger purpose of a new world order. He affirmed: “We are glad, now that we see the facts with no veil of false pretense about them, to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its peoples, the German peoples included: for the rights of nations great and small and the privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life and of obedience. The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundation of political liberty.”

2021 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 65-69
Author(s):  
Dmitrii N. Khristenko

The article examines the foreign policy concept of the «new world order» of George Herbert Walker Bush, which he put forward during the Gulf War (1990-1991). Despite its short duration, the Middle East conflict has become a symbol of the transformation of international relations initiated by the crisis of the bipolar system and arising of the United States as the main military and political world power. Consequently, Washington sought to rethink its role in the world arena. This task was intended to solve by the concept of a «new world order». The main sources for this article were the memoirs of the former American president and James Addison Baker III (U.S. Secretary of State), documents of White House’ administration, as well as publications of «Foreign Affairs» – the most influential journal on international relations in the United States. The research methodology includes the space-time analysis of Fernand Paul Achille Braudel, historical-descriptive and historical-genetic methods. It is noted that the foreign policy concept of a «new world order» was in the centre of public attention and caused a heated discussion in the United States, as a result of which was rejected its main element – reliance on allies and the rule of international law. The attempts of Russian diplomacy to propose a corrected interpretation of the concept of a «new world order» did not meet the understanding overseas. Washington took a course towards sole leadership in the world that triggered the deterioration of the state of affairs in the world arena in the long term.


1991 ◽  
Vol 6 (0) ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Chong-Ki Choi

Order is not always the same as justice. But after radical changes of the Soviet Union and east Europe, most analysts and specialists of international politics are trying to predict new world order after Cold War. Of course order gives us concrete situation for making foreign policies and economic cooperation and pursuing them. And order at least frees us from instability of international politics. But order, at the same time, limits each country's right to take alternatives for her interests. At any rate, we need to analyze the international situation and predict new world order after Cold War. What will be the shape of the new world order? Some analyst, such as Prof. Paul Kennedy in the Rise and Fall of Great Powers describe the change in the world as the decline of the superpowers, including both the Soviet Union and the United States. Other specialists such as Prof. Joseph Nye in Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power describes that while the United States will remain the largest state, the world will see a diffusion of power and a growth of multiple inter-dependencies.


2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (11) ◽  
pp. 179
Author(s):  
Nazhan Hammoud Nassif Al Obeidi ◽  
Abdul Wahab Abdul Aziz Abu Khamra

The Gulf crisis 1990-1991 is one of the important historical events of the 1990s, which gave rise to the new world order by the sovereignty of the United States of America on this system. The Gulf crisis was an embodiment to clarify the features of this system. .     The crisis in the Gulf was an opportunity for the Moroccans to manage this complex event and to use it for the benefit of the Moroccan situation. Therefore, the bilateral position of the crisis came out as a rejection, a contradiction and a supporter of political and economic dimensions at the external and internal levels. On the Moroccan situation, and from these points came the choice of the subject of the study (the dimensions of the Moroccan position from the Gulf crisis 1990-1991), which shows the ingenuity of Moroccans in managing an external crisis and benefiting from it internally.


2018 ◽  
Vol 72 (3) ◽  
pp. 304-316
Author(s):  
Anne M. Blankenship

During the World War II incarceration of Japanese Americans, visions of a peaceful new world order led mainline Protestants to manipulate the worship practices of incarcerated Japanese Americans ( Nikkei) to strengthen unity of the church and nation. Ecumenical leaders saw possibilities within the chaos of incarceration and war to improve themselves, their church, and the world through these experiments based on ideals of Protestant ecumenism and desires for racial equality and integration. This essay explores why agendas that restricted the autonomy of racial minorities were doomed to fail and how Protestants can learn from this experience to expand their definition of unity to include pluralist representations of Christianity and America as imagined by different sects and ethnic groups.


2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 324
Author(s):  
Zheming Zhang

<p>With the continuous development and evolution of the United States, especially the economic center shift after World War II, the United States become the economic hegemon instead of the UK and thus it seized the economic initiative of the world. After the World War I, the European countries gradually withdraw from the gold standard. In order to stabilize the world economy development and the international economic order, the United States prepared to build the economic system related with its own interests so as to force the UK to return to the gold standard. The game between the United States and the UK shows the significance of economic initiative. Among them, the outcome of the two countries in the fight of the financial system also demonstrates a significant change in the world economic system.</p>


2020 ◽  
pp. 13-24
Author(s):  
I. V. Bocharnikov ◽  
O. A. Ovsyannikova

Тhe article reveals the main directions of transformation of the modern world order caused by the decline of the American-centric system, as well as the crisis of European integration. The main factors that determine the development of these processes, problems and prospects for the formation of a new world order at the beginning of the third decade of the XXI century are determined. The most significant aspects of the transformation of the policy of the United States and its European allies in relation to Russia are considered, and historical analogies are drawn with the processes of transformation of the world community in the XIX and XX centuries.


Author(s):  
Robin Archer

In the United States, there was substantial opposition to entering World War I, and yet conscription was introduced more quickly than in any other English-speaking country. In Australia, opposition to entry was minimal, but opposition to conscription was so great that its introduction was blocked. The period before US entry into the war also saw an unusual surge of American interest in Australian social experiments—including experiments with Compulsory Industrial Arbitration and Compulsory Military Training—which reached a peak in the wake of a unique Australian referendum on conscription. This essay examines the extent of this surge of transnational interest, the reason for it, and its possible effects, before considering why the outcome of the conflict over conscription was so different in these two similar historically liberal New World societies.


2021 ◽  
pp. 69-90
Author(s):  
David Bosco

The world wars of the 20th century saw the collapse of pre-war rules designed to protect merchant shipping from interference. In both wars, combatants engaged in unrestricted submarine warfare and imposed vast ocean exclusion zones, leading to unprecedented interference with ocean commerce. After World War I, the United States began to supplant Britain as the leading naval power, and it feuded with Britain over maritime rights. Other developments in the interwar period included significant state-sponsored ocean research, including activity by Germany in the Atlantic and the Soviets in the Arctic. Maritime commerce was buffeted by the shocks of the world wars. Eager to trim costs, US shipping companies experimented with “flags of convenience” to avoid new national safety and labor regulations. The question of the breadth of the territorial sea remained unresolved, as governments bickered about the appropriate outer limit of sovereign control.


2021 ◽  
pp. 108-151
Author(s):  
Rebecca Lissner

This chapter studies the Persian Gulf War. Prior to the Persian Gulf War, the United States was focused primarily on Europe, where rapid changes to the regional security order provided early signals of the nation’s dawning preeminence, but few indications of what a “new world order” would entail. Beyond the Soviet Union, there were no clear threats to U.S. global interests, and emergent American grand strategy envisioned a world where economic and diplomatic power would predominate, resulting in some measure of multipolarity. Yet the shock and awe of the war revealed that the United States stood alone as the world’s sole superpower, backed by international political support—including from a surprisingly deferential Russia—as well as unprecedented military preponderance. Washington therefore moved toward a more militarily assertive form of hegemony, characterized by the discretionary use of force to enforce the terms of the “new world order.” The war also inaugurated the preoccupation with Iraq and nonproliferation as central focuses of post–Cold War foreign policy.


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