Department of Defense Report: The Military Requirements and Costs of NATO Enlargement

1998 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 119-128
Keyword(s):  
North Atlantic ◽  
Department Of Defense ◽  
The United States ◽  
United States Senate ◽  
The Czech Republic ◽  
The North ◽  
Nato Enlargement ◽  
The North Atlantic ◽  
Central Pillar ◽  
The Military

At the July 1997 NATO summit in Madrid, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization invited Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic to begin accession talks to join the Alliance. On February 11, 1998 the President transmitted the accession protocols to the United States Senate seeking its advice and consent on this central pillar of the Administration's strategy for ensuring European stability into the 21st century.

Strategy and the Atlantic Alliance

1963 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 709-732 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert R. Bowie
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
North Atlantic ◽  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ◽  
The United States ◽  
The North ◽  
Nuclear Control ◽  
The North Atlantic ◽  
The Military

The debate over strategy, forces, and nuclear control, which now divides the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), is framed largely in military terms: what is the best way to protect the NATO area and its members from aggression? The military aspects are complex in themselves, but the import of these issues extends far beyond defense. Their handling will greatly affect prospects for a partnership between the United States and a strong, united Europe

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

1969 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
pp. 711-746 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edwin Brown Firmage
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
North Atlantic ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
The United States ◽  
United States Senate ◽  
International Agreement ◽  
The North ◽  
Nuclear Age ◽  
The North Atlantic ◽  
Nuclear Arms

On March 13, 1969, the United States Senate by a vote of 83 to 15 consented to the ratification of a treaty described as “the most important international agreement brought before the U. S. Senate since the North Atlantic Pact” and “the most important international agreement limiting nuclear arms since the nuclear age began.” Assuming a timely entry into force, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons may delay incarnation of the specter which “haunted” John F. Kennedy:I see the possibility in the 1970's of the President of the United States having to face a world in which 15 or 20 or 25 nations may have these [nuclear] weapons. I regard that as the greatest possible danger and hazard.

North Atlantic Council

1950 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 518-520
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
North Atlantic ◽  
The United States ◽  
Military Equipment ◽  
The North ◽  
Primary Object ◽  
Official Statement ◽  
The Hague ◽  
The North Atlantic ◽  
The Military

Defense CommiteeA week of conferences on strategic plans for meeting the threat of communist aggression preceded the meeting of the Defense Committee on the North Atlantic Treaty organization on April 1at the Hague. The North Atlantic Military Production and Supply Board met for one day on March 24 at the Hague under the chairmanship of Hubert K. Howard, head of the United States delegation. The primary object of this meeting was to consider certain proposals for an integrated and coordinated production of military equipment and supplies by members of the pact. An official statement made at the end of the meeting announced that “encouraging” progress had been made in laying the groundwork for effective operation of production and supply activity. Thestanding group of the Military Committee, composed of military representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and France, on March 25 resolved final, minor differences in an all inclusive program evolved from plans of the five regional military groups in the pact.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

1952 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 144-147
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
North Atlantic ◽  
The United States ◽  
Economic Resources ◽  
Interim Report ◽  
The North ◽  
The North Atlantic ◽  
Foreign Ministers ◽  
The Military ◽  
Of Greece

The eighth meeting of the North Atlantic Council met in Rome from November 24 through November 28, 1951, under the chairmanship of Lester B. Pearson (Canada) and with representatives of Gṙeece and Turkey participating as observers. Press reports indicated that the agenda included: 1) discussion of an interim report on the non-military objectives of the Atlantic alliance prepared by a five-power committee consisting of representatives of Canada, Italy, Norway, the Netherlands and Belgium; 2) the report of the Military Committee calling for increased rearmament pledges for 1954 and increased commitment of military contingents in 1952; 3) a report by Dean G. Acheson (United States) on discussions held between Konrad Adenauer (Germany) and the foreign ministers of the United States, United Kingdom and France; 4) a recommendation that the Council of Deputies receive more power; and 5) an interim report by the Temporary Council Committee appointed at Ottawa to survey the economic resources of the members of the alliance.

The North Atlantic Treaty in the United States Senate

1949 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 633-665 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard H. Heindel ◽  
Thorsten V. Kalijarvi ◽  
Francis O. Wilcox
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
North Atlantic ◽  
The United States ◽  
United States Senate ◽  
The North ◽  
The North Atlantic

In joining the North Atlantic Treaty the United States made a momentous decision in its foreign policy. This article undertakes to analyze the rôle of the United States Senate in this historic step and to summarize the more important issues encountered.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

1951 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 399-401
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
North Atlantic ◽  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization ◽  
The United States ◽  
The North ◽  
The Press ◽  
Combat Unit ◽  
Western Germany ◽  
The North Atlantic ◽  
The Military

On December 7, 1950 it was reported that the Council of Deputies of the North Atlantic Pact Organization had resolved the difficulties standing in the way of the creation of integrated military forces for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization by accepting a compromise proposal put forward by the United States representative (Charles M. Spofford). The essence of the plan was reported to be that the twelve treaty countries would proceed with the formation of integrated forces under a supreme command, including German combat teams recruited by German civilian authorities under the supervision of the Allied High Commissioners; in the meantime the French would call a conference to explore the possibilities of forming a European army into which German units would be merged. Despite indications from western Germany that the Federal Republic was dissatisfied with the limitation of 6,000 men per combat unit as compared with units of from 10,000 to 15,000 for the twelve members of NATO, the press reported that the compromise was agreed to by the Council of Deputies and by the Military Committee at a meeting on December 12 and 13, 1950.

Allied High Commission for Germany

1951 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 825-832
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
North Atlantic ◽  
Foreign Minister ◽  
The United States ◽  
Scrap Metal ◽  
German Federal Republic ◽  
The North ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
The North Atlantic ◽  
Contractual Agreements

With the development of certain administrative frictions (concerning coal quotas, occupation costs, and the scrap metal treaty) between the western occupying powers and the German Federal Republic, early indications were that if the talk of “contractual agreements” did materialize it would reserve, for the occupying powers, wide controls over important areas of west Germany's internal and external affairs. In Washington, however, a general modification of approach was noted during the September discussions between the United States Secretary of State (Acheson), the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary (Morrison), and the French Foreign Minister (Schuman), preparatory to the Ottawa meetings of the North Atlantic Council.

Shaping the postwar balance of power: multilateralism in NATO

1992 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 633-680 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steve Weber
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
North Atlantic ◽  
Balance Of Power ◽  
The United States ◽  
The North ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The North Atlantic ◽  
Multilateral Organization ◽  
John Ruggie

At the end of the 1940s, the United States and several West European states allied to defend themselves against invasion by the Soviet Union. Balance-ofpower theory predicts the recurrent formation of such balances among states. But it says little about the precise nature of the balance, the principles on which it will be constructed, or its institutional manifestations. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been a peculiar mix. As a formal institution, NATO has through most of its history been distinctly nonmultilateral, with the United States commanding most decision-making power and responsibility. At the same time, NATO provided security to its member states in a way that strongly reflected multilateral principles. Within NATO, security was indivisible. It was based on a general organizing principle, the principle that the external boundaries of alliance territory were completely inviolable and that an attack on any border was an attack on all. Diffuse reciprocity was the norm. In the terms set out by John Ruggie, NATO has generally scored low as a multilateral organization but high as an institution of multilateralism.

The Shipping of the North Atlantic Cotton Trade in the Mid-Nineteenth Century

2000 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lars U. Scholl ◽  
Lars U. Scholl ◽  
Lars U. Scholl
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
North Atlantic ◽  
The United States ◽  
Southern States ◽  
Atlantic Trade ◽  
The North ◽  
Seasonal Characteristics ◽  
Arrival Dates ◽  
The North Atlantic ◽  
Cotton Trade

This essay analyses the North Atlantic Cotton Trade through records of cotton arrivals at Liverpool, using two sets of data from 1830-1832 and 1853-1855. Using Customs Bills of Entry, Williams presents data of cotton receipts from the United States to Liverpool; quantities of bales exported; numbers of vessels; origin ports of vessels; distinguishes between regular and occasional cotton traders; arrivals at Liverpool by nationality; and vessel tonnage. He determines that the majority of vessels participated in the cotton trade seasonally, and suggests that the cotton trade was not self-contained, but part of a complex interrelationship within the North Atlantic trade system, encompassing commodity dealings, shipping employment levels, and the seasonal characteristics of cargo. The conclusion requests further scholarly research into the pattern of ship movements in the Atlantic. Two appendices provide more data, concerning arrival dates of regular traders in Liverpool, and the month of departure of cotton vessels from Southern states.

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