Length perception and production of normal subjects in proximal versus distal peripersonal space

2004 ◽  
Vol 10 (6) ◽  
pp. 913-919 ◽  
Author(s):  
JAY C. KWON ◽  
BYUNG H. LEE ◽  
JUNG MIN JI ◽  
YONG JEONG ◽  
BONG JIK KIM ◽  
...  

We investigated whether the perception or production of a given line length in normal subjects varies according to where in peripersonal space the line is perceived or produced. We also investigated the influence of the direction of movement used to make the line. In Experiment 1, blindfolded normal subjects were asked to estimate distances while the examiner moved the subject's hand in proximal (medial) or distal (lateral) space, moving centripetally or centrifugally. The subjects showed a spatial effect, perceiving the same length as shorter in proximal space than distal space. This result could be related to either a proximal spatial attentional bias or an anisometric representation of spatial distances. In Experiment 2, we attempted to dissociate these hypotheses by studying blindfolded normal subjects, who were requested to produce horizontal lines of a given length (100 or 200 mm) in proximal versus distal peripersonal space using centripetal or centrifugal movements. Centrifugal movements in proximal space were the longest; centrifugal movements in distal space were the shortest; in between were the proximal centripetal and distal centripetal movements which did not differ from each other. These results suggest that in peripersonal space the perception of length in normal subjects is most consistent with anisometric mental representation where the size of mental representations of length units decreases as a function of the distance from the subject's midsagittal plane. Length production, however, may depend on an interaction of the anisometric mental representation and the premotor/intentional factors. (JINS, 2004, 10, 913–919.)

2001 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucia Savadori ◽  
Eraldo Nicotra ◽  
Rino Rumiati ◽  
Roberto Tamborini

The content and structure of mental representation of economic crises were studied and the flexibility of the structure in different social contexts was tested. Italian and Swiss samples (Total N = 98) were compared with respect to their judgments as to how a series of concrete examples of events representing abstract indicators were relevant symptoms of economic crisis. Mental representations were derived using a cluster procedure. Results showed that the relevance of the indicators varied as a function of national context. The growth of unemployment was judged to be by far the most important symptom of an economic crisis but the Swiss sample judged bankruptcies as more symptomatic than Italians who considered inflation, raw material prices and external accounts to be more relevant. A different clustering structure was found for the two samples: the locations of unemployment and gross domestic production indicators were the main differences in representations.


2014 ◽  
Vol 26 (39) ◽  
pp. 819
Author(s):  
Cleverson Leite Bastos ◽  
Tomas Rodolfo Drunkenmolle

This article critically analyses the notion of intentionality from several philosophical cognitive points of view. The authors argue that the notion of mental representation in the wider sense and intentionality in the narrower sense remains elusive despite accommodated paradoxes, improved semantic precision and more sophisticated strategies in dealing with intentionality. We will argue that different approaches to intentionality appear to be coherent in their inferences. However, most of them become contradictory and mutually exclusive when juxtaposed and applied to borderline questions. While the explanatory value of both philosophy of mind as well as cognitive psychology should not be underestimated, we must note that not even hard-core neuroscience has been able to pin point what is going on in our minds, let alone come up with a clear cut explanation how it works or a definition of what thought really is. To date, however, intentionality is the best of all explanatory models regarding mental representations.


2014 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 73-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Regan N. Schmidt

ABSTRACT: This study examines how external auditors' accessibility to “tone at the top” knowledge impacts subsequent audit judgments. To examine this relationship, a decision aid is investigated that differentially facilitates the auditors' retrieval of “tone at the top” evidence from memory. Results of an experiment indicate that, holding the client's “tone at the top” constant, the structure of a control environment decision aid influences the auditors' mental representation of the “tone at the top.” Further, favorable “tone at the top” mental representations transfer to induce relatively favorable control environment and fraud risk assessments, and greater reliance on management's explanation for variances detected in analytical procedures. Mediation analyses identify the control environment assessment as a mediator between the influenced mental representation and the subsequent fraud risk and analytical procedure judgments. The results of the paper underscore the importance of how auditors develop their “tone at the top” mental representations, the influence of these mental representations on subsequent audit judgments, and the stage in the audit process where interventions can improve audit quality. Data Availability: Contact the author.


Author(s):  
Hiroki Fukushima

In this chapter, methodologies for producing a mental representation of a cup of sake are introduced. Mental representations of taste are often vague and fuzzy in comparison to audio or visual images. On the other hand, some individuals, such as sommeliers or tasters of sake, are able to readily formulate a representation of the taste they experience. How can the average person produce words or other types of mental representations in such a situation? In this chapter, the author presents three methodologies for eliciting mental representations of taste: a new supporting tool for verbalizing an image of taste, an experimental method for testing a verbal and visual image for taste, and an experimental methodology for producing a free drawing representation of a cup of sake.


Linguistics ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-81
Author(s):  
Véronique Verhagen ◽  
Maria Mos ◽  
Joost Schilperoord ◽  
Ad Backus

AbstractIn a usage-based framework, variation is part and parcel of our linguistic experiences, and therefore also of our mental representations of language. In this article, we bring attention to variation as a source of information. Instead of discarding variation as mere noise, we examine what it can reveal about the representation and use of linguistic knowledge. By means of metalinguistic judgment data, we demonstrate how to quantify and interpret four types of variation: variation across items, participants, time, and methods. The data concern familiarity ratings assigned by 91 native speakers of Dutch to 79 Dutch prepositional phrases such as in de tuin ‘in the garden’ and rond de ingang ‘around the entrance’. Participants performed the judgment task twice within a period of one to two weeks, using either a 7-point Likert scale or a Magnitude Estimation scale. We explicate the principles according to which the different types of variation can be considered information about mental representation, and we show how they can be used to test hypotheses regarding linguistic representations.


Author(s):  
Tuan Q. Tran ◽  
Peter D. Elgin ◽  
Keith S. Jones ◽  
Kimberly R. Raddatz ◽  
Elizabeth T. Cady

The increasingly popular avenue of web-based distance education places high demand on distance educators to format web pages that facilitate learning. Guidelines regarding appropriate writing styles for web-based distance education, however, do not currently exist. The purpose of this study is to investigate the effects of four different writing styles on the reader's mental representation of web text. Participants will study hypertext written in one of four web-writing styles (e.g., concise, scannable, objective, and combined) and then be given a cued association task intended to measure participants' mental representations of the studied information. It is hypothesized that the scannable and combined styles will bias readers to scan rather than elaborately read which may result in less dense mental representations relative to the objective and concise writing styles. Further, the use of more descriptors in the objective writing style will lead to better integration of ideas and more dense mental representations than the concise writing style.


2011 ◽  
Vol 64 (11) ◽  
pp. 2168-2180 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joanna L. Brooks ◽  
Robert H. Logie ◽  
Robert McIntosh ◽  
Sergio Della Sala

Two experiments explored lateralized biases in mental representations of matrix patterns formed from aural verbal descriptions. Healthy participants listened, either monaurally or binaurally, to verbal descriptions of 6 by 3 matrix patterns and were asked to form a mental representation of each pattern. In Experiment 1, participants were asked to judge which half of the matrix, left or right, contained more filled cells and to rate the certainty of their judgement. Participants tended to judge that the left side was fuller than the right and showed significantly greater certainty when judging patterns that were fuller on the left. This tendency was particularly strong for left-ear presentation. In Experiment 2, participants conducted the same task as that in Experiment 1 but were also asked to recall the pattern for the side judged as fuller. Participants were again more certain in judging patterns that were fuller on the left—particularly for left-ear presentation—but were no more accurate in remembering the details from the left. These results suggest that the left side of the mental representation was represented more saliently but it was not remembered more accurately. We refer to this lateralized bias as “representational pseudoneglect”. Results are discussed in terms of theories of visuospatial working memory.


2001 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Powell

In this paper my aim is to approach the referential–attributive distinction in the interpretation of definite descriptions, originally discussed by Donnellan (1966), from a cognitive perspective grounded in Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson 1986/95). In particular, I argue that definite descriptions encode a procedural semantics, in the sense of Blakemore (1987), which is neutral as between referential and attributive readings (among others). On this account, the distinction between referential and attributive readings arises as a result of the differing links that exist between different types of mental representation and the world, rather than as a result of the differing links between language and mental representations.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Michael Garrett ◽  
Murray Bennett ◽  
Zachary L Howard ◽  
Cheng-Ta ◽  
Daniel R. Little ◽  
...  

People express quantities using a remarkably small set of units – digits. Confusing digits could be costly, and not all confusions are equal; confusing a price tag of 2 dollars with 9 dollars is naturally more costly than confusing 2 with 3. Confusion patterns are intimately related to the distances between mental representations, which are hypothetical internal symbols said to stand for, or represent, ‘real’ external stimuli. The distance between the mental representations of two digits could be determined by their numerical distance. Alternatively, it could be driven by visual similarity. In an English speaking cohort, we investigated the mental representations of familiar and unfamiliar numbers (4 sets: Arabic, Chinese, Thai, and non-symbolic dots) through a set of identification experiments, using multi-dimensional scaling and cluster analysis. We controlled for undesired effects of response bias using Luce’s choice model. Our findings show Arabic, Chinese and Thai numerals were represented in the mental space by perceptual similarities. We also find non-symbolic dots were represented by perceptual and numerical similarities. This work is a novel contribution to the literature and lays the foundation for further investigations into the mental representation of numerals across cultures.


Author(s):  
Jean-Michel Roy

My first goal is to question a received view about the development of Analytical Philosophy. According to this received view Analytical Philosophy is born out of a Linguistic Turn establishing the study of language as the foundation of the discipline; this primacy of language is then overthrown by the return of the study of mind as philosophia prima through a second Cognitive Turn taken in the mid-sixties. My contention is that this picture is a gross oversimplification and that the Cognitive Turn should better be seen as an extension of the Linguistic one. Indeed, if the Cognitive Turn gives explicit logical priority to the study of mind over the study of language, one of its central features is to see the mind as a representational system offering no substantial difference with a linguistic one. However, no justification is offered for the fundamental assimilation of the nature of a mental representation with that of a linguistic symbol supporting this picture of the mind, although the idea that a system of mental representations is identical in structure with a system of linguistic symbols has been argued over and over. I try to demonstrate this point through a close critical examination of Fodor's paradigmatic notion of 'double reduction.' My second claim is that the widespread contemporary assimilation of a mental representation with a symbol of a linguistic kind is no more than a prejudice. Finally I indicate that this prejudice cannot survive a rigorous critical examination.


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