scholarly journals Our Brain as Stone Age Computer

2007 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 174-176
Author(s):  
Manfred F. Greiffenstein

Evolutionary Cognitive Neuroscience. 2007. Steven M. Platek, Julian P. Keenan, & Todd K. Shackelford (Eds.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 616 pp., $65.00 (HB)Clinical neuropsychologists are most interested in the ‘what’ of brain function. Neuropsychological assessment requires only a working knowledge of functional localization and the tests best suited to capture that specialization. The ‘why’ of cortical specialization is not necessary for good clinical work. The edited volume Evolutionary Cognitive Neuroscience is entirely devoted to the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of brain specialization based on the fact (not ‘theory’) of natural selection. Editors Steven Platek, Julian Keenan, and Todd Shackelford are well qualified to organize and write this book; they devoted their careers to understanding neuropsychological functions as evolved mechanisms designed to solve recurrent survival and reproduction problems of our evolutionary past. In this view, our brains are Stone Age computers.

Author(s):  
Richard Frankham ◽  
Jonathan D. Ballou ◽  
Katherine Ralls ◽  
Mark D. B. Eldridge ◽  
Michele R. Dudash ◽  
...  

The harmful impacts of inbreeding are generally greater in species that naturally outbreed compared to those in inbreeding species, greater in stressful than benign environments, greater for fitness than peripheral traits, and greater for total fitness compared to its individual components. Inbreeding reduces survival and reproduction (i.e., it causes inbreeding depression), and thereby increases the risk of extinction. Inbreeding depression is due to increased homozygosity for harmful alleles and at loci exhibiting heterozygote advantage. Natural selection may remove (purge) the alleles that cause inbreeding depression, especially following inbreeding or population bottlenecks, but it has limited effects in small populations and usually does not completely eliminate inbreeding depression. Inbreeding depression is nearly universal in sexually reproducing organisms that are diploid or have higher ploidies.


Author(s):  
John Maynard Smith ◽  
Eors Szathmary

Imagine that, when the first spacemen step out of their craft onto the surface of one of the moons of Jupiter, they are confronted by an object the size of a horse, rolling towards them on wheels, and bearing on its back a concave disc pointing towards the Sun. They will at once conclude that the object is alive, or has been made by something alive. If all they find is a purple smear on the surface of the rocks, they will have to work harder to decide. This is the phenotypic approach to the definition of life: a thing is alive if it has parts, or ‘organs’, which perform functions. William Paley explained the machine-like nature of life by the existence of a creator: today, we would invoke natural selection. There are, however, dangers in assuming that any entity with the properties of a self-regulating machine is alive, or an artefact. In section 2.2, we tell the story of a self-regulating atomic reactor, the Oklo reactor, which is neither. This story can be taken in one of three ways. First, it shows the dangers of the phenotypic definition of life: not all complex entities are alive. Second, it illustrates how the accidents of history can give rise spontaneously to surprisingly complex machine-like entities. The relevance of this to the origin of life is obvious. In essence, the problem is the following. How could chemical and physical processes give rise, without natural selection, to entities capable of hereditary replication, which would therefore, from then on, evolve by natural selection? The Oklo reactor is an example of what can happen. Finally, section 2.2 can simply be skipped: the events were interesting, but do not resemble in detail those that led to the origin of life on Earth. There is an alternative to the phenotypic definition of life. It is to define as alive any entities that have the properties of multiplication, variation and heredity. The logic behind this definition, first proposed by Muller (1966), is that a population of entities with these properties will evolve by natural selection, and hence can be expected to acquire the complex adaptations for survival and reproduction that are characteristic of living things.


Author(s):  
Frederick L. Coolidge

This chapter reviews some of the fundamentals of evolution, particularly adaptations and exaptations. Adaptations are physical or behavioral features that through natural selection aided survival and reproduction. Exaptations are physical or behavioral features that have been co-opted from their initial adaptive functions and subsequently enhanced fitness. The reuse, recycling, or redeployment of brain neurons for purposes other than their original adaption may be considered a central organizing principle of the brain. The chapter reviews the beginnings of life and presents a timeline of life through the evolution of hominins. The term hominin refers to all current and extinct relatives and ancestors of Homo sapiens, including the australopithecines and habilines, within about the last 6 million years. The chapter introduces the hypothesis that Homo sapiens survived and flourished, instead of Neandertals, Denisovans, and other hominins, because of brain shape differences, which created cognitive differences that enhanced the evolutionary fitness of Homo sapiens.


F1000Research ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
pp. 2573 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rüdiger J. Seitz ◽  
Raymond F. Paloutzian ◽  
Hans-Ferdinand Angel

Despite the long scholarly discourse in Western theology and philosophy on religion, spirituality, and faith, explanations of what a belief and what believing is are still lacking. Recently, cognitive neuroscience research addressed the human capacity of believing. We present evidence suggesting that believing is a human brain function which results in probabilistic representations with attributes of personal meaning and value and thereby guides individuals’ behavior. We propose that the same mental processes operating on narratives and rituals constitute belief systems in individuals and social groups. Our theoretical model of believing is suited to account for secular and non-secular belief formation.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kendrick N. Kay ◽  
Kevin S. Weiner

AbstractThe goal of cognitive neuroscience is to understand how mental operations are performed by the brain. Given the complexity of the brain, this is a challenging endeavor that requires the development of formal models. Here, we provide a perspective on models of neural information processing in cognitive neuroscience. We define what these models are, explain why they are useful, and specify criteria for evaluating models. We also highlight the difference between functional and mechanistic models, and call attention to the value that neuroanatomy has for understanding brain function. Based on the principles we propose, we proceed to evaluate the merit of recently touted deep neural network models. We contend that these models are promising, but substantial work is necessary to (i) clarify what type of explanation these models provide, (ii) determine what specific effects they accurately explain, and (iii) improve our understanding of how they work.


2001 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 398-399
Author(s):  
Julie A. Bobholz ◽  
Thomas A. Hammeke

This volume is part of the series Human Brain Function: Assessment and Rehabilitation and aims to present information regarding how brain function is assessed with neuropsychological instruments. In general, this text is designed to cover assessment from the perspective of both behavioral neurologists and neuropsychologists. The book is divided into three sections: “Developmental Considerations,” “Clinical Considerations,” and “Specialized Assessment.”


2000 ◽  
Vol 176 (5) ◽  
pp. 412-413 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian H. Robertson

Those involved in research or clinical work related to brain function will be used to the dinner party question “we only use 50% of the brain, don't we?” The scientist's dismissive sneer is usually well enough concealed, depending on how much he or she has had to drink. Where on earth did this lay myth arise, we chuckle over coffee in the common room on Monday morning? But scientists and clinicians are not immune to myths also. For many decades, neuroscientists preached the doctrine that the adult brain is ‘hard-wired’. Perhaps in very early childhood, we conceded, plastic changes in the brain were possible, but after the age of three or four years connections were indelibly made.


2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hang Zhou ◽  
Sile Hu ◽  
Rostislav Matveev ◽  
Qianhui Yu ◽  
Jing Li ◽  
...  

The spatiotemporal distribution of recent human adaptation is a long standing question. We developed a new coalescent-based method that collectively assigned human genome regions to modes of neutrality or to positive, negative, or balancing selection. Most importantly, the selection times were estimated for all positive selection signals, which ranged over the last half million years, penetrating the emergence of anatomically modern human (AMH). These selection time estimates were further supported by analyses of the genome sequences from three ancient AMHs and the Neanderthals. A series of brain function-related genes were found to carry signals of ancient selective sweeps, which may have defined the evolution of cognitive abilities either before Neanderthal divergence or during the emergence of AMH. Particularly, signals of brain evolution in AMH are strongly related to Alzheimer's disease pathways. In conclusion, this study reports a chronological atlas of natural selection in Human.


2016 ◽  
Vol 39 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carolyn Parkinson ◽  
Thalia Wheatley

AbstractMultivariate pattern analysis can address many of the challenges for cognitive neuroscience highlighted in After Phrenology (Anderson 2014) by illuminating the information content of brain regions and by providing insight into whether functional overlap reflects the recruitment of common or distinct computational mechanisms. Further, failing to consider submaximal but reliable population responses can lead to an overly modular account of brain function.


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