Overview of Psychiatric Ethics V: Utilitarianism and the Ethics of Duty

2007 ◽  
Vol 15 (5) ◽  
pp. 402-410 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Robertson ◽  
Kirsty Morris ◽  
Garry Walter

Objective: The aim of this paper is to describe the ethical theories of utilitarianism and the ethics of duty (Kant's ethics) and to evaluate their value as theoretical bases of psychiatric ethics. Conclusions: Utilitarianism is a well-established moral philosophy and has significant instrumental value in dealing with common ethical problems faced by psychiatrists. Despite its capacity to generate solutions to ethical problems, utilitarianism requires a process of what Rawls described as ‘reflective equilibrium’ to avoid morally repugnant choices, based on utility. The criticisms of utilitarianism, such as the problems of quantifying utility and the responsibility for consequences, are very relevant for psychiatry. Singer's model of utilitarian thinking is particularly problematic for our profession. Kant's ethics provides the pretext for duty bound codes of ethics for psychiatrists, but suffers from problems of flawed claims to the universalizability prescribed by Kant's ‘categorical imperative’. Kant's valorization of reason as the core of the autonomy of persons is a valuable insight in understanding psychiatrists’ ethical obligations to their patients.

Author(s):  
Kamil Michta

The essay discusses the correlation between Immanuel Kant’s ethics, especially his views on human duties toward animals, and John Maxwell Coetzee's literary depiction of man’s struggle to rediscover the meaning of humanity by tending unwanted animal corpses. Hence, it firstly concentrates on the key issues concerning Kant's moral philosophy, placing particular emphasis on the third formula of his categorical imperative, the so-called formula of humanity as an end in itself, and on elucidating the thinker's contention that good treatment of animals, that is, as if they were moral agents, improves in humans the propensity to treat other people well. The essay argues that the manner in which people treat animals, approached from the Kantian perspective, partakes in the duty to improve their own morality and, thus, their humanity. After examining Kant's outlook on animals, the essay discusses Coetzee's 1999 novel Disgrace. In particular it scrutinizes the figure of an aging literature professor, David Lurie, who, having been expelled from his university for sexual abuse, moves to the country. Here he engages in putting down unwanted animals and also in taking personal care for incinerating their bodies with decency and respect. Adopting the perspective of Kantian philosophy, the essay argues that Lurie's concern for animal corpses, despite its apparent pointlessness, can be seen as indicating the renewal of his humanity. In a sense, then, it is nature (unwanted animals and their corpses) that makes Lurie rediscover his humanity. The essay concludes by maintaining that Disgrace, when coupled with Kant's moral theory, is a novel conveying the (Kantian) idea that the manner in which people frame nature, that is, how they relate to it, is formative of the manner in which they frame their own humanity. Resumen   Este ensayo analiza la correlación existente entre la ética de Immanuel Kant, especialmente sus opiniones sobre las obligaciones de los seres humanos hacia los animales, y la descripción literaria que hace John Maxwell Coetzee de la lucha de un hombre por redescubrir el significado de su humanidad ocupándose de cadáveres de animales no deseados. Se centra, por ello, en su primera parte en los temas clave de la filosofía moral de Kant, haciendo especial hincapié en la tercera formulación de su imperativo categórico, es decir, la llamada formulación de la humanidad como un fin en sí misma, y en la elucidación de la controversia kantiana de que el buen trato dado a los animales, o sea, el hecho de tratarlos como si fueran agentes morales, mejora la propensión del ser humano a tratar bien a las demás personas. El ensayo sostiene que la manera en que la gente trata a los animales, examinada desde una perspectiva kantiana, contribuye al deber de mejorar su propia moralidad y, con ello, su humanidad. Tras la parte dedicada al punto de vista kantiano sobre los animales, el ensayo examina la novela Desgracia de Coetzee, publicada en 1999, y, en particular, el personaje de un profesor de literatura cincuentón, David Lurie, quien, tras haber sido expulsado de su universidad por acoso sexual, se traslada al campo donde se dedica a eutanasiar e incinerar con decencia y respeto a animales no deseados. Desde la perspectiva de la filosofía kantiana, el ensayo argumenta que la preocupación de Lurie por los cadáveres de animales, a pesar de su aparente falta de sentido, podría ser considerada como un signo de la renovación de su humanidad. En cierto modo, es la naturaleza (los animales no deseados y sus cadáveres) la que hace redescubrir a Lurie su humanidad. El ensayo concluye sosteniendo que Desgracia, combinada con la teoría moral de Kant, es una novela que transmite la idea (kantiana) de que la forma en que los seres humanos encuadran a la naturaleza, es decir, su forma de relacionarse con ella, configura la manera en que encuadran a su propia humanidad.  


Author(s):  
Francisco Javier Iracheta Fernández

In this article I intend to show that Kant’s ethics is teleological (ethics of purposes), in contraposition to what a venerable neo-aristotelic and neo-hegelian moral tradition thinks. It is true that law ideas and categorical imperative are central to Kant’s moral theory, and therefore, it can be classified as deontological. However, here I want to prove that Kant’s deontological moral philosophy can’t be appropriately understood without assuming that, at the same time, it is a teleological moral theory in a sense very similar to the one that makes aristotelian ethics teleological, namely, based on a purpose of the action that consists in the fulfilment of a flourishing and good life.


2004 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
pp. 38-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dennis Klimchuk

The idea that respect for persons comprises the core of morality has long been associated with Kant and the ethics of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. In particular, the second formulation of the categorical imperative (CI), the Formula of Humanity as an End-in-itself (FHE) – ‘So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means’ (G, 429) – is often glossed as enjoining us to respect persons as such. On what I think may fairly be called the received view, the injunction to respect persons as such is thus, for Kant, co-extensive with morality itself.


Author(s):  
Robert A. Schultz

My aim in Section 1 was to locate and describe areas of ethical concern in IT-enabled globalization. Yet in doing so, I was not ethically neutral in my judgements. The reader, especially the reader who disagreed with some of those judgements, may wonder how they are justified. In this section, Section 2, I will address precisely that question. I will begin by showing that ethical judgments can be justified. Then I will state a theory of ethical development which I think allows great insight into conflicts of ethical principles. Next I will describe a method for justifying ethical principles called reflective equilibrium. Finally, the rest of Section 2 will examine ethical theories relevant to ethical problems of globalization.


2006 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 78-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Faviola Rivera

Perfect ethical duties have usually puzzled commentators on Kant's ethics because they do not fit neatly within his taxonomy of duties. Ethical duties require the adoption of maxims of ends: the happiness of others and one's own perfection are Kant's two main categories. These duties, he claims, are of wide obligation because they do not specify what in particular one ought to do, when, and how much. They leave ‘a latitude for free choice’ as he puts it. Perfect duties, however, such as the duties of respect, to avoid suicide, lying, and servility, do not appear to require the adoption of ends but only the performance or omission of specific types of actions. The puzzle is how these duties can be ethical, and therefore wide. Faced with this difficulty, Mary Gregor denies that perfect ethical duties are wide. She claims that they are an ‘anomaly’ and that they do not belong to ethics proper but to moral philosophy in general. She argues that these duties are derived from the categorical imperative, instead of, as Kant himself appears to have thought, the first principle of virtue. Taking a very different approach, Onora O'Neill finds the perfect/imperfect distinction of little importance and suggests doing without it altogether. Most other interpreters also assume that ‘wide’ is opposed to ‘perfect’ so that a wide perfect duty is a conceptual impossibility.


Conatus ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 125
Author(s):  
Evangelos D. Protopapadakis

Theoretical ethics includes both metaethics (the meaning of moral terms) and normative ethics (ethical theories and principles). Practical ethics involves making decisions about every day real ethical problems, like decisions about euthanasia, what we should eat, climate change, treatment of animals, and how we should live. It utilizes ethical theories, like utilitarianism and Kantianism, and principles, but more broadly a process of reflective equilibrium and consistency to decide how to act and be.


Author(s):  
PATRICK FRIERSON

Abstract This paper lays out the moral theory of philosopher and educator Maria Montessori (1870–1952). Based on a moral epistemology wherein moral concepts are grounded in a well-cultivated moral sense, Montessori develops a threefold account of moral life. She starts with an account of character as an ideal of individual self-perfection through concentrated attention on effortful work. She shows how respect for others grows from and supplements individual character, and she further develops a notion of social solidarity that goes beyond cooperation toward shared agency. Partly because she attends to children's ethical lives, Montessori highlights how character, respect, and solidarity all appear first as prereflective, embodied orientations of agency. Full moral virtue takes up prereflective orientations reflectively and extends them through moral concepts. Overall, Montessori's ethic improves on features similar to some in Nietzschean, Kantian, Hegelian, or Aristotelian ethical theories while situating these within a developmental and perfectionist ethics.


2021 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 107-122
Author(s):  
Columbus N. Ogbujah ◽  

Benedict de Spinoza (1632–1677) was about the most radical of the early modern philosophers who developed a unique metaphysics that inspired an intriguing moral philosophy, fusing insights from ancient Stoicism, Cartesian metaphysics, Hobbes and medieval Jewish rationalism. While helping to ground the Enlightenment, Spinoza’s thoughts, against the intellectual mood of the time, divorced transcendence from divinity, equating God with nature. His extremely naturalistic views of reality constructed an ethical structure that links the control of human passion to virtue and happiness. By denying objective significance to things aside from human desires and beliefs, he is considered an anti-realist; and by endorsing a vision of reality according to which everyone ought to seek their own advantage, he is branded ethical egoist. This essay identified the varying influences of Spinoza’s moral anti-realism and ethical egoism on post-modernist thinkers who decried the “naïve faith” in objective and absolute truth, but rather propagated perspective relativity of reality. It recognized that modern valorization of ethical relativism, which in certain respects, detracts from the core values of the Enlightenment, has its seminal roots in his works.


2020 ◽  
pp. 49-65
Author(s):  
Grethe Netland

The focus of this chapter is the potential conflicts between the values that are basic in the work of Norwegian child protection service. Such values are expressed in principles that serve as guidelines for judgement and decisions in the field. ‘The best interest of the child’ principle is held to be grounding. The ‘mildest intervention’ principle and the ‘biological’ principle are normally held to be at the core of how the best interest of the child is to be understood. Important in child protection work, is to interpret the principles, weigh them, and consider what implications they should have in specific cases. I argue that if, for some reason, one principle is ascribed too much weigh on the cost of others, the solution for the child might not be in its best interest. I highlight the importance of not only weighing the principles against each other, but also creating a coherent balance between the principles, people’s moral intuitions and the actual practices of the service. To this end, I suggest that John Rawls’s model called reflective equilibrium might be workable.


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