Justice and Virtue in Kant's Account of Marriage

2005 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
pp. 58-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Brake

All duties are either duties of right (officia iuris), that is, duties for which external lawgiving is possible, or duties of virtue (officia virtutis s. ethica), for which external lawgiving is not possible. - Duties of virtue cannot be subject to external lawgiving simply because they have to do with an end which (or the having of which) is also a duty. No external lawgiving can bring about someone's setting an end for himself (because this is an internal act of the mind), although it may prescribe external actions that lead to an end without the subject making it his end. (Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals)

GEOgraphia ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 10 (19) ◽  
pp. 103
Author(s):  
Alexandre Domingues Ribas ◽  
Antonio Carlos Vitte

Resumo: Há um relativo depauperamento no tocante ao nosso conhecimento a respeito da relação entre a filosofia kantiana e a constituição da geografia moderna e, conseqüentemente, científica. Esta relação, quando abordada, o é - vezes sem conta - de modo oblíquo ou tangencial, isto é, ela resta quase que exclusivamente confinada ao ato de noticiar que Kant ofereceu, por aproximadamente quatro décadas, cursos de Geografia Física em Königsberg, ou que ele foi o primeiro filósofo a inserir esta disciplina na Universidade, antes mesmo da criação da cátedra de Geografia em Berlim, em 1820, por Karl Ritter. Não ultrapassar a pueril divulgação deste ato em si mesma só nos faz jogar uma cortina sobre a ausência de um discernimento maior acerca do tributo de Kant àfundamentação epistêmica da geografia moderna e científica. Abrir umafrincha nesta cortina denota, necessariamente, elucidar o papel e o lugardo “Curso de Geografia Física” no corpus da filosofia transcendental kantiana. Assim sendo, partimos da conjectura de que a “Geografia Física” continuamente se mostrou, a Kant, como um conhecimento portador de um desmedido sentido filosófico, já que ela lhe denotava a própria possibilidade de empiricização de sua filosofia. Logo, a Geografia Física seria, para Kant, o embasamento empírico de suas reflexões filosóficas, pois ela lhe comunicava a empiricidade da invenção do mundo; ela lhe outorgava a construção metafísica da “superfície da Terra”. Destarte, da mesma maneira que a Geografia, em sua superfície geral, conferiu uma espécie de atributo científico à validação do empírico da Modernidade (desde os idos do século XVI), a Geografia Física apresentou-se como o sustentáculo empírico da reflexão filosófica kantiana acerca da “metafísica da natureza” e da “metafísica do mundo”.THE COURSE OF PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY OF IMMANUEL KANT(1724-1804): CONTRIBUTION FOR THE GEOGRAPHICALSCIENCE HISTORY AND EPISTEMOLOGYAbstract: There is a relative weakness about our knowledge concerningKant philosophy and the constitution of modern geography and,consequently, scientific geography. That relation, whenever studied,happens – several times – in an oblique or tangential way, what means thatit lies almost exclusively confined in the act of notifying that Kant offered,for approximately four decades, “Physical Geography” courses inKonigsberg, or that he was the first philosopher teaching the subject at anyCollege, even before the creation of Geography chair in Berlin, in 1820, byKarl Ritter. Not overcoming the early spread of that act itself only made usthrow a curtain over the absence of a major understanding about Kant’stribute to epistemic justification of modern and scientific geography. Toopen a breach in this curtain indicates, necessarily, to lighten the role andplace of Physical Geography Course inside Kantian transcendentalphilosophy. So, we began from the conjecture that Physical Geography hasalways shown, by Kant, as a knowledge carrier of an unmeasuredphilosophic sense, once it showed the possibility of empiricization of hisphilosophy. Therefore, a Physical Geography would be, for Kant, theempirics basis of his philosophic thoughts, because it communicates theempiria of the world invention; it has made him to build metaphysically the“Earth’s surface”. In the same way, Geography, in its general surface, hasgiven a particular tribute to the empiric validation of Modernity (since the16th century), Physical Geography introduced itself as an empiric basis toKantian philosophical reflection about “nature’s metaphysics” and the“world metaphysics” as well.Keywords: History and Epistemology of Geography, Physical Geography,Cosmology, Kantian Transcendental Philosophy, Nature.


1859 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
pp. 381-457 ◽  

The necessity of discussing so great a subject as the Theory of the Vertebrate Skull in the small space of time allotted by custom to a lecture, has its advantages as well as its drawbacks. As, on the present occasion, I shall suffer greatly from the disadvantages of the limitation, I will, with your permission, avail myself to the uttermost of its benefits. It will be necessary for me to assume much that I would rather demonstrate, to suppose known much that I would rather set forth and explain at length; but on the other hand, I may consider myself excused from entering largely either into the history of the subject, or into lengthy and controversial criticisms upon the views which are, or have been, held by others. The biological science of the last half-century is honourably distinguished from that of preceding epochs, by the constantly increasing prominence of the idea, that a community of plan is discernible amidst the manifold diversities of organic structure. That there is nothing really aberrant in nature; that the most widely different organisms are connected by a hidden bond; that an apparently new and isolated structure will prove, when its characters are thoroughly sifted, to be only a modification of something which existed before,—are propositions which are gradually assuming the position of articles of faith in the mind of the investigators of animated nature, and are directly, or by implication, admitted among the axioms of natural history.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Deep Bhattacharjee

Psychiatric disorders’ or as emphasized in the paper in the form of somatic-symptom disorder, a sub-category of Schizophrenia has been from the ancient of the human civilization, when the medicinal approach and treatment of the subject hasn’t been developed yet, the notion of the affected subject to be under some spiritual subjugation has automatically been implied on the minds of the people which leads to immense torture and torment of the subject by the society. However, in the modern medical scenario, the situation has shifted from spiritual/evilness to the extreme derision where it has been already implied on the healthy societies brain that, the subject is intentionally acting like a patient or it’s a ‘disease of the mind’ with no associated physical pain which being attributed to the tendency of late diagnosis and recovery, makes the subject a sheer block of ‘sarcasm’ among the healthy society where they tries their best to make ‘the fun out of him’ as regards to his continuous pain and suffering. This generally amplified by the delay in the starting of the treatment for the difficulty of the doctors to diagnose the disease, as not so developed instruments are still in their infancy to detect and derelict the mental disorders, where in most of the time, the golden period of diagnosis is either over or even if psychiatric treatment is initiated can lead to a more defocused effects as doctors itself finds it difficult to approach the right medicine to the disordered person, where, in case, they have to go from one doctor to another in the risk of a trial and error effect.


1975 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
pp. 303-356 ◽  
Author(s):  
Basil Hall

Think nowHistory has many cunning passages, contrived corridorsAnd issues, deceives with whispering ambitions,Guides us by vanities. Think nowShe gives when our attention is distractedAnd what she gives, gives with such supple confusionsThat the giving famishes the craving. Gives too lateWhat’s not believed in, or if still believed,In memory only, reconsidered passion.Historians no doubt have problems enough without setting before themselves that ‘memento mori’ from Eliot, who, though he was describing an old man seeking to understand his own past, leaves nevertheless an echo in the mind disturbing to those who practise the historian’s craft. We assume a confidence which in our heart of hearts we do not always, or should not always, possess. Eliot’s words not only demonstrate the difficulty of one man understanding his own past, but also the historian’s difficulty in understanding those whom they select for questioning from among the vast multitudes of the silent dead, whose deeds, artifacts, ideas, passions, hopes and memories have died with them. We dig into the past, obtain data from archives, brush off the objects found, collect statistics, annotate, arrange, describe, establish a chronology – but do we effectively understand the dead, especially since we are affected by our own beliefs, customs and ideologies? We are, of course, all aware of this: we silently scorn the lecturer who raises these diffident hesitations. For we know our duty: we examine all that we can, we describe our findings, we annotate them, we draw conclusions, or leave our demonstrations to speak for themselves. There are reasons, as I shall hope to show, that these considerations – Eliot’s ominous words and our determination not to be disquieted by them – bear upon the subject of this paper, the almost forgotten Alessandro Gavazzi.


2018 ◽  
Vol 77 (3) ◽  
pp. 285-299 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryan Roark

In Stone-Heng Restored (1655), Inigo Jones, the father of English neoclassicism, used drawings, histories, and questionable logic to argue that Stonehenge was built by the ancient Romans and that it originally exhibited perfect Platonic geometries. This argument was never given much credence, but by 1725 the subject matter and the architect had received enough attention that two book-length responses (a challenge and a defense) were published, and both were then republished in a single volume alongside Jones's original text. While most Jones scholars have neglected this work because of its logical and historical shortcomings, Ryan Roark argues in “Stonehenge in the Mind” and “Stonehenge on the Ground”: Reader, Viewer, and Object in Inigo Jones's Stone-Heng Restored (1655) that it was in fact exemplary of what made Jones, for many, a protomodern architect and scholar. Rather than viewing Jones's book as an earnest attempt to prove a historical inaccuracy, Roark considers it as an exercise in formal analysis, one that set the precedent for the contemporary pedagogical trend of using geometric simplifications of existing structures as a first step in new design. Jones's idiosyncratic reading of Stonehenge belied the idea that such analysis could be anything but intensely reliant on the subjectivity of both architect and viewer.


1889 ◽  
Vol 35 (149) ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. T. Dent

So far as my researches extend little attention has been paid to the subject of this paper. Yet I think it would be rash to assume that what is unrecorded is necessarily rare, even in days when so much more is put into print than any of us can either read or mark, much less digest, and when the number of writers seems in danger of exceeding the number of readers. Insanity, in some degree, as a sequela of surgical operation, though certainly rare, is, I believe, less uncommon than usually supposed, and it is chiefly in the hope of eliciting additional information from others that I venture to record my own small experience. On two subjects medical science has still an infinite deal to learn: first, the influence of disease on the mind; secondly, the influence of mind on disease. In attempting to contribute a little to the first-mentioned subject, I can really deal only with a subdivision of it, viz., the effects that may be produced on the mind by surgical measures undertaken for the relief of disease.


2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-32
Author(s):  
Işık Sarıhan

Pure representationalism or intentionalism for phenomenal experience is the theory that all introspectible qualitative aspects of a conscious experience can be analyzed as qualities that the experience non-conceptually represents the world to have. Some philosophers have argued that experiences such as afterimages, phosphenes and double vision are counterexamples to the representationalist theory, claiming that they are non- representational states or have non-representational aspects, and they are better explained in a qualia-theoretical framework. I argue that these states are fully representational states of a certain kind, which I call “automatically non-endorsed representations”, experiential states the veridicality of which we are almost never committed to, and which do not trigger explicit belief or disbelief in the mind of the subject. By investigating descriptive accounts of afterimages by two qualia theorists, I speculate that the mistaken claims of some anti-representationalists might be rooted in confusing two senses of the term “seeming”.


Author(s):  
Jauhan Budiwan

Immanuel Kant is one of the most influential philosophers in the history of Western philosophy. His contributions to metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics have had a profound impact on almost every philosophical movement that followed him. This portion will focus on his metaphysics and epistemology in one of his most important works. The Critique of Pure Reason, A large part of Kant’s work addresses the question “What can we know?” The answer, if it can be stated simply, is that our knowledge is constrained to mathematics and the science of the -natural, empirical world. It is impossible, Kant argues, to extend knowledge to the supersensible realm of speculative metaphysics. The reason that knowledge has these constraints, Kant argues, is that the mind plays an active role in constituting the features of experience and limiting the mind's access to the empirical realm of space and time. In order to understand Kant's position, we must understand the philosophical background that he was reacting to. First, 1 will present a brief overview of his predecessor's positions with a brief statement of Kant's objections, then I will return to a more detailed exposition of Kant's arguments. There are two major historical movements in the early modem period of philosophy that had a significant impact on Kant; Empiricism and Rationalism,


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