High-Income Developing Countries, FDI Outflows and the International Investment Agreement Regime

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Yoram Z. Haftel ◽  
Soo Yeon Kim ◽  
Lotem Bassan-Nygate

Abstract The international investment agreement regime (IIA Regime) is composed of thousands of IIAs and a system of investor–state dispute settlement. Historically, high-income developing countries (HIDCs) were part of the global South and thus ‘hosts’ of foreign direct investment (FDI). Increasingly, however, these countries have become ‘home’ to investors who are hosted and exposed to political risk abroad. Representing both home and host country interests simultaneously, how do HIDCs balance these crosscutting pressures? We argue that as the position of an HIDC shifts from mostly a recipient towards a sender of significant amounts of FDI, it will be more willing to provide protection to foreign investors at the expense of state regulatory space in its IIAs, thereby increasing its exposure to the IIA Regime. Employing an original data set that measures this exposure for sixty-four HIDCs over six decades, we first show that the degree of HIDC exposure to the IIA Regime varies a great deal. Using a general method of moments (GMM) analysis and controlling for a host of confounding factors, we demonstrate that, indeed, higher levels of FDI outflows as a share of the national economy result in greater exposure to the IIA Regime.

Author(s):  
Won-Mog Choi

The Korea–China–Japan Investment Promotion, Facilitation and Protection Agreement is the first treaty in the economic field that binds the three Northeast Asian countries together under a single legal instrument. The existence of effective dispute settlement procedures under the treaty will contribute to the creation of a favourable investment climate in the host country. Nevertheless, there have been fears about frivolous or vexatious claims that could inhibit legitimate regulatory actions by governments. How to compose an investment chapter of the Korea–China–Japan FTA that is being negotiated is a pressing demand for all in the region. Any pertinent answers to such a quest require a thorough comparison of the benefits and drawbacks of any development of relevant rules and governance. In the end, a quest for better international investment governance in Northeast Asia in the future requires sound evaluation of lessons from the past and present.


1995 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 500-509 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicolas B. C. Ahouissoussi ◽  
Christopher S. McIntosh ◽  
Michael E. Wetzstein

AbstractThe general method of moments procedure is used for estimating a soybean acreage response function assuming that producers hold rational expectations. Results indicate that soybean, corn, and wheat futures prices, lagged acreage, and government programs are significant factors for determining soybean plantings. Implications of the results are that crop acreage selection by Georgia producers is not very responsive to demand shocks. Thus, producers in other regions are more likely to absorb impacts from these shocks on crop acreage selection.


2017 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-91
Author(s):  
BERK DEMIRKOL

AbstractThis article explores the conditions under which it is possible to bring claims based on non-international investment agreement (IIA) norms of international law in investment treaty arbitration. For that purpose, it analyzes in the first instance broad dispute settlement clauses incorporated in IIAs that make reference to the settlement of ‘any investment dispute’. Such clauses grant jurisdiction to investment treaty tribunals to hear non-IIA claims. However, at least two additional conditions need to be satisfied for the investor to bring a self-standing claim based on a non-IIA norm of international law. First, the non-IIA instrument (a contract or another international treaty) may include a dispute settlement clause envisaging exclusive jurisdiction in favour of another forum. Second, the investor's standing to bring a claim based on a non-IIA norm of international law depends on whether this norm attributes any legal entitlement in the benefit of the investor.


2016 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 401-429 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manuel P. Teodoro ◽  
M. Anne Pitcher

AbstractThis study investigates the effects of formal bureaucratic independence under varying democratic conditions. Conventional accounts predict that greater formal independence of technocratic agencies facilitates policy implementation, but those claims rest on observations of industrialised, high-income countries that are also established democracies. On the basis of research in developing countries, we argue that the effects of agency independence depend on the political context in which the agency operates. Our empirical subjects are privatisation agencies and their efforts to privatise state-owned enterprises in Africa. We predict that greater independence leads to more thorough privatisation under authoritarian regimes, but that the effect of independence declines as a country becomes more democratic. Using an original data set, we examine the relationship between formal agency independence and privatisation in Africa from 1990 to 2007. Our results modify the conventional wisdom on bureaucratic independence and culminate in a more nuanced theory of “contingent technocracy”.


2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 205
Author(s):  
Vunieta . ◽  
Walida Ahsana Haque

A dispute between two or more countries involved in a foreign investment may arises<br />from investment agreement agreed upon by the parties. If one of the parties breaches<br />the agreement, the parties will automatically agree to resolve the dispute to the agreed<br />arbitration forum based on the dispute settlement clause on the agreement, those<br />forum such as the ICSID arbitration. Therefore, the existence of dispute settlement<br />clause on an investment agreement (Bilateral Investment Treaty) is very necessary.<br />The result of the above-mentioned arbitration proceeding is a binding and final<br />decision for the parties. An arbitral award, should contain relief or compensation<br />set by the arbitrator as the result of the proceeding. The reliefs are given as orders to<br />indemnify the damages obtained by Claimant. Issues arises when Respondent has been<br />proven to have done detrimental damage to the Claimant yet Respondent deliberately<br />neglected his/her obligation to compensate Claimant accordingly based on the relief/<br />compensation specified in the award. The non-compliance of the Respondent to<br />fulfill the compensation obligation is due to the fact that the party habitually assume<br />that the arbitration award does not have the legal force equivalent to the decision<br />of general court, even though the nature of the award is final and binding. Thus the<br />interests and rights of the Applicant who has been declared entitled to compensation<br />based on the arbitration award must be protected so that their rights can be fulfilled<br />according to the law.


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