Judicial Review and EC Merger Control: Reflections on the Effectiveness of the System with Regard to the Standard of Review and Speed

2008 ◽  
Vol 10 ◽  
pp. 133-166 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kyriakos Fountoukakos
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Current System ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
Central Problem ◽  
Green Paper ◽  
Considerable Time ◽  
Judicial Control ◽  
Merger Regulation ◽  
Community Courts

The central problem [with the current system of EC merger control] is that the Commission acts as investigator, prosecutor, judge, jury and executioner, with little meaningful right of appeal or other form of redress from a prohibition decision, since cases take a considerable time to reach the Community Courts, and even if the Courts overturn a prohibition decision, the case is only remitted to the MTF, as only the Commission has the power to clear a Community concentration. By that stage of course, the result is entirely academic, since the proposed deal in question will be long dead.The above quotation from the Confederation of British Industry’s (CBI) response to the European Commission’s (hereinafter, ‘the Commission’) Green Paper on the reform of the EC Merger Regulation in 2002 still summarises quite aptly the criticism expressed in recent years by members of the business and legal community about what the critics perceive as a serious shortcoming in the current system of EC merger control: the lack of effective, meaningful in practical terms, judicial control over the administration’s decisions in this area.

21. Mergers (2): EU law

2021 ◽  
pp. 871-958
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Merger Control ◽  
Merger Regulation ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Control Section ◽  
The Eu

This chapter examines EU merger control. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of EU merger control. Section 3 discusses the jurisdictional rules which determine whether a particular merger should be investigated by the European Commission in Brussels or by the national competition authorities (‘the NCAs’) of the Member States. Section 4 deals with the procedural considerations such as the mandatory pre-notification to the Commission of mergers that have a Union dimension and the timetable within which the Commission must operate. Section 5 discusses the substantive analysis of mergers under the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR), and section 6 explains the procedure whereby the Commission may authorise a merger on the basis of commitments, often referred to as remedies, offered by the parties to address its competition concerns. The subsequent sections describe the Commission’s powers of investigation and enforcement, judicial review of Commission decisions by the EU Courts and cooperation between the Commission and other competition authorities, both within and outside the EU. The chapter concludes with an examination of how the EUMR merger control provisions work in practice.

21. Mergers (2): EU law

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Eu Merger Control ◽  
Merger Regulation ◽  
National Competition ◽  
The Eu

This chapter provides an overview of EU merger control and the jurisdictional rules which determine whether a particular merger should be investigated by the European Commission or by the national competition authorities. It deals with procedural considerations such as the mandatory pre-notification to the Commission of mergers that have a Union dimension and the timetable within which the Commission must operate. It discusses the substantive analysis of mergers under the EU Merger Regulation (‘the EUMR’) and explains the procedure for the Commission to authorise a merger on the basis of commitments offered by the parties to address its competition concerns. Finally, it describes the Commission’s powers of investigation and enforcement, judicial review of Commission decisions by the EU Courts and cooperation between the Commission and other competition authorities, both within and outside the EU. The chapter concludes with an examination of how the EUMR merger control provisions work in practice.

Judicial review of Common Foreign and Security Policy by the ECtHR and the (re)negotiation on the accession of the EU to the ECHR

2021 ◽  
pp. 1023263X2198824
Author(s):  
Maria José Rangel de Mesquita
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Security Policy ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Regional Level ◽  
Judicial Control ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Foreign And Security Policy ◽  
Conclusion Section ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Eu

The article addresses the issue of judicial control of the implementation of Common Foreign and Security Policy at international regional level within the framework of the relaunching of the negotiation in view of the accession of the EU to the ECHR. Considering the extent of jurisdiction of the CJEU in respect of Common Foreign and Security Policy field in the light of its case law (sections 1 and 2), it analyses the question of judicial review of Common Foreign and Security Policy within international regional justice by the ECtHR in the light of the ongoing negotiations (section 3), in the perspective of the relationship between non-national courts (section 3.A), having as background the (2013) Draft Agreement of accession (section 3.B.1). After addressing the relaunching of the negotiation procedure (section 3.B.2) and the issue of CFSP control by the ECtHR according to the recent (re)negotiation meetings (section 3.B.3), some concrete proposals, including for the redrafting of the accession agreement, will be put forward (section 3.B.4), as well as a conclusion (section 4).

Judicial review of Common Foreign and Security Policy by the ECtHR and the (re)negotiation on the accession of the EU to the ECHR

2021 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 356-370
Author(s):  
Maria José Rangel de Mesquita
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Security Policy ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Regional Level ◽  
Judicial Control ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Foreign And Security Policy ◽  
Conclusion Section ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Eu

The article addresses the issue of judicial control of the implementation of Common Foreign and Security Policy at international regional level within the framework of the relaunching of the negotiation in view of the accession of the EU to the ECHR. Considering the extent of jurisdiction of the CJEU in respect of Common Foreign and Security Policy field in the light of its case law (sections 1 and 2), it analyses the question of judicial review of Common Foreign and Security Policy within international regional justice by the ECtHR in the light of the ongoing negotiations (section 3), in the perspective of the relationship between non-national courts (section 3.A), having as background the (2013) Draft Agreement of accession (section 3.B.1). After addressing the relaunching of the negotiation procedure (section 3.B.2) and the issue of CFSP control by the ECtHR according to the recent (re)negotiation meetings (section 3.B.3), some concrete proposals, including for the redrafting of the accession agreement, will be put forward (section 3.B.4), as well as a conclusion (section 4).

scholarly journals Did Lloyds/HBOS mark the failure of an enduring economics-based system of merger regulation?

2020 ◽  
Vol 62 (4) ◽  
pp. 539-552
Author(s):  
Andreas Stephan
Keyword(s):  
Public Interest ◽  
General Public ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
Merger Regulation

This article asks whether the merger of Lloyds TSB and Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS) in 2008, on public interest grounds, marked the failure of an enduring economics-based system of merger regulation. It argues that, far from marking a failure, the Lloyds/HBOS merger highlights the importance of only allowing public interest interventions on exceptional grounds in specific industries. Economics-based merger control is transparent and preferable to general public interest assessments, which are unpredictable and open to abuse. Concerns raised which support arguments for greater political interventions can be more effectively addressed in other ways.

scholarly journals Constitutional and administrative paradigms in judicial control over EU high and low politics

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. E-240-E-267
Author(s):  
Pola Cebulak
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Constitutional Theory ◽  
Two Dimensional ◽  
Judicial Control ◽  
Policy Domain ◽  
External Relations ◽  
Constitutional Judicial Review ◽  
High Politics

Abstract This article explores the particular tensions surrounding judicial review in EU external relations. The tensions are classified using a two-dimensional framework. Firstly, a distinction based on policy domains of high and low politics, which is derived from constitutional theory, and external to the CJEU; and secondly a distinction based on legitimizing paradigms of administrative (EU as effective global actor) or constitutional (judicial review as guarantee of fundamental rights) in character and determined by the Court itself. Even though one would expect a dominance of the administrative paradigm in the domain of high politics, the Court uses both the administrative and the constitutional paradigm in its external relations case-law. The decision on which of these becomes the guiding frame seems to depend more on the policy domain, and be made case by case, which suggests politically sensitive adjudication, rather than a coherent approach to legitimizing the nascent judicial review in EU external relations.

Courts

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Craig
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Judicial Control ◽  
National Courts ◽  
The Eu ◽  
The Way

The preceding chapter considered the foundations of judicial review in the EU. The discussion now turns to the EU Courts. The way in which the principles of review have developed has been affected by the jurisdictional divide between the CJEU and GC, and between these Courts and national courts. It will be argued that a necessary condition for an effective regime of judicial control is the existence of a rational judicial architecture, embracing the CJEU, GC, national courts, and agency boards of appeal.

Constitutional Review by the Judiciary in the Netherlands: A Bridge Too Far?

2010 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 275-290 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerhard van der Schyff
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
The Netherlands ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
United States Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
United States Supreme ◽  
Constitutional Review ◽  
Judicial Control ◽  
Chief Justice

One could be forgiven for thinking that constitutional review by the judiciary is invariably part of modern constitutionalism. Gone are the days that constitutions contained provisions that prevented the courts from testing the constitutionality of legislation, such as section 59 of South Africa's now repealed Constitution of 1961 that forbade the courts from inquiring into or pronouncing on the validity of legislation. It has come to be accepted in many quarters that a constitution presupposes judicial review in some form or another in gauging the integrity of legislation, instead of only relying on legislative wisdom as before. An attitude that echoes the views expressed inMarbury v. Madisonby Chief Justice Marshall of the United States Supreme Court, that by its very nature a written constitution implies judicial control. However, the Constitution of the Netherlands proves to be an exception in this regard, as section 120 states emphatically that:The constitutionality of Acts of Parliament and treaties shall not be reviewed by the courts.

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