The Mind and its Tenement; Their Mutual Relations

1856 ◽  
Vol 2 (18) ◽  
pp. 479-494
Author(s):  
C. Lockhart Robertson

“The knowledge concerning the sympathies and concordances between the mind and the body” saith the founder† of modern science, in discoursing of human philosophy, or the knowledge of ourselves, as he terms it, is “fit to be emancipate and made a knowledge by itself. The consideration is double: either how and how far the humours and effects of the body do alter or work upon the mind; or again, how and how far the passions and apprehensions of the mind do alter or work upon the body. The former of these,” (the influence of the body on the mental state,) continues Bacon, “hath been enquired and considered as a part and appendix of medicine, but much more as a part of religion or superstition. For the physician prescribeth cures of the mind in phrensies and melancholy passions; and pretendeth also to exhibit medicines to exhilarate the mind, to confirm the courage, to clarify the wits, to corroborate the memory and the like: but the scruples and superstitions of diet and other regimen of the body in the sect of Pythagoreans, in the heresy of the Manicheans, and in the law of Mahomet do exceed. … The root and life of all which prescripts is besides the ceremony, the consideration of that dependency, which the affections of the mind are submitted unto, upon the state and disposition of the body.”

Author(s):  
Robert C. Stalnaker

A mental state is luminous if and only if being in a state of that kind always puts one in a position to know that one is in the state. This chapter is a critique of Timothy Williamson’s margin-of-error argument that no nontrivial states are luminous in this sense. While I agree with Williamson’s rejection of a Cartesian internalist conception of the mind, I argue that an externalist conception (one based on information theory) can be reconciled with the luminosity of intentional mental states such as knowledge. My argument, which uses an artificial and simplified model of knowledge, is not a direct rebuttal to his argument, as applied to a more realistic notion of the knowledge of human beings, but I argue that it shows that a luminosity assumption is compatible with externalism about knowledge, and it suggest an intuitively plausible strategy for resisting his argument.


Author(s):  
Annabel S. Brett

This chapter discusses the relationship of the state to its subjects as necessarily physically embodied beings. The primary way in which the commonwealth commands its subjects is through the medium of its law. The law is for the common good and obliges the community as a whole, and thus the ontological status of the law—as distinct from any particular command of a superior to an individual—is intimately tied to that of the body politic. The question, then, concerning the relationship of the state to the natural body of the individual can be framed in terms of the extent of the obligation of the civil law.


Author(s):  
Rebecca McKnight ◽  
Jonathan Price ◽  
John Geddes

In general hospital and community settings, the term ‘physical examination’ is almost always applied to the procedures used by medical and other staff to examine the body, including the nervous system, of patients. In mental health settings, the terms ‘psy­chological examination’ or ‘mental examination’ might seem most appropriate for the procedures used to examine the mind. However, the lengthier term ‘mental state examination’ is usually used, often with capitals, for reasons of tradition. This term is often shortened to MSE. You will find that effective communication of the re­sults of the MSE requires familiarity with many new terms and with their precise meanings. It is important that you grapple with these issues early on in your training. Like specific diagnostic terms, the terms for specific abnormalities of mental state become an ef­fective shorthand, aiding communication between healthcare professionals. The goal of the MSE is to elicit the patient’s cur­rent psychopathology, that is, their abnormal sub­jective experiences, and an objective view of their mental state, including abnormal behaviour. It therefore includes both symptoms (what the pa­tient reports about current psychological symptoms, such as mood, thoughts, beliefs, abnormal percep­tions, cognitive function, etc.) and signs (what you observe about the patient’s behaviour during the interview). Inevitably, the MSE (i.e. now) merges at the edges with the history of the presenting problems (recently). Behavioural abnormalities which the pa­tient reports as still present, but which cannot be ob­served at interview (e.g. disturbed sleep, overeating, cutting) are part of the history of the presenting illness. A symptom which has resolved, such as an abnormal belief held last week but not today, should usually form part of the history, but will not be re­ported in the MSE. In contrast, an abnormal belief held last week which is still held today will be re­ported in both the history of the presenting prob­lems and the MSE. The components of the MSE are listed in Box 5.1. In taking the history, the interviewer will have learnt about the patient’s symptoms up to the time of the consultation. Often the clinical features on the day of the examination are no different from those described in the recent past, in which case the mental state will overlap with the recent history.


Lex Russica ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 70-82
Author(s):  
A. A. Liverovskiy

25 years of influence of the Constitution of the Russian Federation on public relations in our State has radically changed the idea of the Constitution and Constitutional Law. Admission of the Constitution of the Russian Federation by the society marked the formal recognition of social values spelled out in the Constitution and the nature of the legal principles implementing these values that are generally recognized by international law. The system of constitutional principles of natural origin became the basis for the constitutional regulation of social relations. The natural origin of legal principles means that they emerged in legal reality as a result of rational activity of a man, not only in terms of legitimizing the natural rights inherent in the man from birth, but also within the framework of their corrective impact on state regimes in light of promotion of civil rights and human freedoms. The natural origin of the constitutional principles gives an objective character to the constitutional regulation, and their predetermination and supremacy in relation to the influence of the legislative activity of the State power allows to create a constructive dichotomy of the constitutional and legislative regimes. In the theoretical and legal sense, constitutional principles as regulators of social relations constitute the “law of the Constitution”. Its fundamental part consists of the basic constitutional principles that determine the foundations of the constitutional system. The paper defines the mechanism of influence of constitutional principles on public relations that is different from the normative regulation: constitutional principles, in contrast to the norms acting in full compliance with their content, act in accordance with a a certain detectable extent of its content. Legal development of constitutional regulation arises from the interpretation of constitutional principles by the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation. Resolving cases with regard to the constitutionality of normative legal acts, the body of constitutional justice creates legal stances — new constitutional regulators of social relations that not only correct the constitutional development of the State, but also are the law-making characteristics of the decisions. Using the construction of constitutional regulation, the author proposes an actual understanding of the problem of constitutional identity.


Author(s):  
Sonja Filipović Kovačević

This paper studies the extended meanings of lexemes with the colour concepts red, pink, blue, green and yellow expressing emotional, mental and physical states in English and Serbian from a cognitive linguistic perspective. The initial hypothesis is that lexemes with these colour concepts express states of the mind and/or the body like being angry, unrealistic or sick, for instance, and that these transferred metaphoric meanings are essentially metonymically grounded. The aims are the following:1. to identify the conceptual metaphors associating concrete colour concepts with the abstract concepts of emotional, mental and physical states, 2. to determine metonymic motivation of colour-related metaphors, 3. to consider the issue of cultural universality and/or diversity. The results of the analysis have shown that the studied colour concepts express meanings associated with different states of the mind and the body, which is presented via conceptual metaphors (e.g. being embarrassed is being red, being unrealistic is seeing pink, etc.). Also, most of these metaphors are based on two metonymies: 1. colour of the skin for the state of the mind/body and 2. an experiential association between a particular colour and people`s psychological reaction. There are more similarities than differences between English and Serbian, which is strong ground for believing that the studied metaphors motivated by metonymies are universal.


2020 ◽  
pp. 177-216
Author(s):  
Charlotte Epstein

This chapter describes how the body served to privatise property and to establish the human subject, instead of the natural order, at the centre of the law. Whereas modern science expelled humanity from the world’s centre, a second revolution in the law achieved the opposite. It begat legal modernity and the right to private property that supports capitalism. The site for this revolution was early modern theories of natural rights. The chapter traces the genealogy of the concept of private property, from Hugo Grotius via Samuel von Pufendorf to John Locke, through this tradition and under the lens of the body, underscoring the extent to which they broke from premodern Thomist theories of natural law, whose default mode of property relations were communal. It then shows how Locke deployed the most effective legitimation of capitalism by locating the original mechanism by which property is privatised in ‘the hand that grabs’ – by corporealising it. The chapter then turns to the particular, labouring bodies that were explicitly excluded from Locke’s embodied labour theory of value: slaves. Slavery was not simply a practice Locke was deeply invested in personally, or an embarrassing but secondary feature of his political writings. It was, rather, part and parcel of the constitutive logic by which he articulated a racialised right to private property.


1871 ◽  
Vol 17 (79) ◽  
pp. 334-350
Author(s):  
Daniel H. Tuke

Passing, now, from the consideration of the influence of emotion upon motility, we proceed to examine the interesting series of phenomena resulting from the operation of the same influence upon sensation. Ever tending to be confounded with the converse succession of events, the influence of morbid states of sensibility in producing emotional disorder, its consideration requires more discrimination than that of the previous section. We can scarcely avoid employing language which is not strictly scientific, and can be only understood in a popular sense. Indeed, with two elements so closely allied as the emotional and sensational—mental feeling and bodily feeling (so-called)—it must constantly happen that in our terms, as in reality, we confound the two together, and in this blending fail to discover which is cause and which is effect, or speak of the consciousness of bodily pleasure and pain as if it were not a mental state. It is, however, perfectly easy, in spite of metaphysical difficulties of this kind, to make clear what is meant by the influence of a powerful emotion upon sensation as a part of that influence of the mind upon the body, which we are endeavouring in these papers to point out and illustrate. For example, there can be no question as to the fact that moral disgust does in some instances cause the sensation of nausea, or that distress of mind may occasion neuralgia, or fright the sensation of cold, or that the special senses may, under fear, be stimulated centrally, so as to cause subjective sensations, whether olfactory, visual, or auditory. These facts remain of interest and importance, although the bare statement of them suggests some questions of difficulty. They are so, whether our physiology regards the functions of the hemispherical ganglia as comprising the sensational as well as the ideational elements of the passions—(see ante, July, 1870, p. 174)—or whether it relegates the former to the sensory ganglia. They are so, although not only do mental and physical sensations merge imperceptibly into each other—for we constantly witness the same results from emotional as from sensational excitement, physical and corporeal pain alike acting upon the body (as, e. g., in quickening the circulation)—but mental sensations are so united with their associated ideas that it is difficult to separate the purely emotional from the ideational elements of passion. It is a penalty which we pay for our classifications and divisions that, however convenient they are up to a certain point, they sometimes lead us to do violence to nature; to dissever that which is inseparable, to sacrifice in the present case, it may be, the intimate cohesion of psychical states to the idol of reducing everything in science to orders and classes.


Author(s):  
Vladimir Valentinovich Kozhevnikov

This scientific article deals with the problem of the hierarchy of the modern legal sciences. The main purpose of the work is to justify the principle that modern general theory of the state retains the status of the fundamental, methodological legal science. There are following tasks of the achieving of the purpose in the article: 1) to analyse the positions of the legal scientists who doubt on the high status of the general theory of the state and the law; 2) to characterize Marxist-Leninist general theory of state and law, which had class, party character; 3) to justify the position that certain provisions of Marxism-Leninism have not lost relevance yet; 4) to display the similarity of Marxist-Leninist general theory of the state and law and modern theory of state and law in terms of methodological foundations. Result. Not agreeing that the theory of the state and law has the function of the serving of the official ideology currently, there is a suggestion in the article that the general theory of the state and law at all stages of the development of the society, not excluding the modern science, is the fundamental, methodological science in the system of other legal sciences, despite the attacks at both theoretical and practical levels.


2021 ◽  
Vol 02 (05) ◽  
pp. 9-13
Author(s):  
Intizor Turdimatovna Mamazhonova ◽  

Among the law enforcement agencies of our country, the state notary is of great importance. Notarial actions effectively ensure the protection and protection of indisputable rights and interests in the event that these actions are performed in accordance with the rules established in advance by law. Documents drawn up abroad with the participation of officials of the competent authorities of other states or outgoing from them are accepted by a notary, subject to their legalization by the body of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan. Without legalization, such documents are accepted by the notary in cases where it is provided for by the legislation and international treaties of the Republic of Uzbekistan.


Author(s):  
Deborah J. Brown ◽  
Calvin G. Normore

The union of mind and body in Descartes’ philosophy is the paradigm example of a whole that is more than the sum of its parts. Despite being composed of radically distinct kinds of substance, it has a unified nature of its own. It too is an ens per se not an ens per accidens and the subject of unique modes—sensations, passions and volitions terminating in movements of the body. It is argued that for neither Descartes’ interlocutors nor us need the terminology of “unio substantialis” entail that the mind-body union is a substance. Nor do we need to suppose that Descartes’ only interest in the union is in its phenomenology—that is, in the distinctively embodied experience we enjoy “in this life.” It is argued that the union belongs in Descartes’ theory of wholes and parts, as much a part of his metaphysics as it is of his phenomenology.


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