Inmate suicide case law in the federal courts (2000 to the present)

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
2019 ◽  
pp. 939
Author(s):  
M Moore

Under Winter v. NRDC, federal courts considering a preliminary injunction motion look to four factors, including the public interest impact of the injunction. But courts do not agree on what the public interest is and how much it should matter. This Note describes the confusion over the public interest factor and characterizes the post-Winter circuit split as a result of this confusion. By analyzing the case law surrounding the public interest factor, this Note identifies three aspects of a case that consistently implicate the direction and magnitude of this factor: the identity of the parties, the underlying cause of action, and the scope of injunctive relief. By centering the public interest factor on these three aspects, courts and litigants will achieve a unified conception of the public interest factor.


2018 ◽  
Vol 43 (04) ◽  
pp. 1257-1278 ◽  
Author(s):  
B. Robert Owens

This article explores the settling and unsettling of legal concepts in relation to refugee-status determination. To gain admission to the United States, asylum seekers are required to demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of one of five protected grounds: race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group. Accordingly, many political asylum claims turn on the interpretation of “particular social group.” This article examines case law disputes in the federal courts of appeals over the meaning of that phrase and describes how statutory interpretation by judges has contributed to the persistence of such disputes over several decades since the passage of the 1980 Refugee Act. My analysis reveals the tensions between different forms of rationality at play in judicial statutory interpretation and applies the concept of legal settling to a new empirical domain.


2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 255-271
Author(s):  
Andrew W. Bell

This Comment seeks to clarify the scope of cross-jurisdictional tolling in Texas. Although both Texas and federal courts interpreting Texas law have addressed this issue, no Texas court has specifically addressed whether putative members of a class action lawsuit—which was filed in a federal court located in Texas and that asserts Texas property-related claims—can rely on the class action lawsuit to toll the statute of limitations applicable to their claims. Part I of this Comment provides a brief history of the class action tolling doctrine, specifically describing American Pipe and its progeny. Part II discusses recent Texas case law decisions on the American Pipe doctrine and their applicability when cross-jurisdictional tolling is involved. Part III briefly discusses the policy concerns behind cross-jurisdictional tolling. Part IV recommends that Texas should adopt cross-jurisdictional tolling in property-related cases, especially when the class action lawsuit is filed in a federal court located in Texas. Finally, Part V summarizes the points discussed in this Comment.


2011 ◽  
Vol 72 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin C Abbott ◽  
Nicolle R Snyder Bagnell

Pennsylvania has a long history of natural gas exploration and development beginning in the 1800's. Despite having some of the country's oldest jurisprudence dealing with oil and gas disputes, Pennsylvania case law regarding oil and gas operations is relatively undeveloped in comparison to states like Texas and Oklahoma. With the boom in leasing and developing in the region in the last few years, there has also been an increase in oil and gas litigation in Pennsylvania state and federal courts. This paper will discuss the recent decisions that have impacted the development of Marcellus law in Pennsylvania, as well as identify some of the significant pending issues that are worth watching.


Author(s):  
Rita Kesselring

In relation to inequality, the law is ambivalent. Legal norms can be used to create or formalize differences in a society, but social groups can also use legal norms in their attempts to attenuate inequality. This contribution differentiates three ways in which law can affect structures of inequality: legislation, case law, and law enforcement, and law’s discursive forms and legal practices. It focuses on the latter, or what Bourdieu calls ‘the force of law’, at the level of lived reality. To do so, it examines the apartheid litigations where South African victims of human rights violations turned to U.S. federal courts to seek redress, and shows how, in that pursuit, new forms of inequalities were produced. As the law needs to valuate life, the evaluation of human life poses the danger of producing new disparities. Recourse to the law can, however, also be emancipatory for the injured. Both effects—emancipation from and cementation of inequalities—have societal rather than mere technical causes.


2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 30-38
Author(s):  
Donald L. Buresh

The question that this paper answer is whether the Illinois Reporter’s Privilege should protect an online blogger. The definitions of the terms “reporter,” “news medium,” and “source” quoted from 735 ILCS 5/8-902, followed by several examples. Second, a brief history of journalism is presented, where it is demonstrated that for hundreds of years, journalists and publishers alike engaged in their profession with little formal training, but rather with a sincere desire to convey the facts and the truth to their peers. Second, the essay outlines how Illinois and federal courts have employed the privilege in case law. In answering the question, the work examines whether WikiLeaks qualifies under the Illinois Reporter’s Privilege. The position taken is that the answer is yes. The idea is that if WikiLeaks qualifies under the privilege, then other online blogs also qualify. The opinion of the author is that the law is sufficient as it stands. There is no need to change its wording. Finally, some loose ends are discussed before reiterating the conclusion that the Illinois Reporters’ should not be changed.


Author(s):  
Mollie T. Adams ◽  
William A. Bailey

To protect the privacy and other civil liberties of its citizens, federal courts place limits on the power and actions of government. These limits create a need for balance between the IRS’s mission of tax law enforcement and taxpayers’ privacy rights. A much-watched contemporary lower court case intersecting cryptocurrencies, summons power, and taxpayer privacy is Coinbase v. U.S.  There, the IRS sought to summons massive amounts of customer information from Coinbase, a cryptocurrency exchange platform. This article examines the history of the IRS summons power and argues that the Coinbase court correctly extended a wealth of summons enforcement case law by weighing the protection of taxpayer privacy with the tax compliance mission of the IRS. By allowing the IRS summons to stand, but limiting and defining the scope of relevant records allowed to be examined, the Coinbase court correctly balanced IRS tax enforcement with taxpayer data privacy.


2020 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 12-19
Author(s):  
Justin D. Beck ◽  
Judge David B. Torrey

Abstract Medical evaluators must understand the context for the impairment assessments they perform. This article exemplifies issues that arise based on the role of impairment ratings and what edition of the AMA Guides to the Impairment of Permanent Impairment (AMA Guides) is used. This discussion also raises interesting legal questions related to retroactivity, applicability of prior precedent, and delegation. On June 20, 2017, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania handed down its decision, Protz v. WCAB (Derry Area Sch. Dist.), which disallows use of the “most recent edition” of the AMA Guides when determining partial disability entitlement under the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act. An attempted solution was passed by the Pennsylvania General Assembly and was signed into law Act 111 on October 24, 2018. Although it affirms that the AMA Guides, Sixth Edition, must be used for impairment ratings, the law reduces the threshold for total disability benefits from 50% to 35% impairment. This legislative adjustment benefited injured workers but sparked additional litigation about whether, when, and how the adjustment should be applied (excerpts from the laws and decisions discussed by the authors are included at the end of the article). In using impairment as a threshold for permanent disability benefits, evaluators must distinguish between impairment and disability and determine an appropriate threshold; they also must be aware of the compensation and adjudication process and of the jurisdictions in which they practice.


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