Partners Who Trust Each Other Have Better Conflict Outcomes Due to Greater Forgiveness Behavior

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
John S. Kim ◽  
Yanna J. Weisberg ◽  
Jeffry A. Simpson
Keyword(s):  
1989 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-266 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zeev Maoz

It has been persistently demonstrated that militarily superior states that are engaged in wars with militarily inferior ones may end up on the losing side. Unlike the processes by which military capabilities are converted into control over resources, the so-called “paradoxical conflict outcomes” phenomenon is more severe than a lack of correspondence between control over resources and control over outcomes. The paradox of power involves cases in which increased control over resources actually causes reduced control over outcomes. Several of the theoretical examples of this paradox are taken from social choice theory. These examples are applied to the analysis of the outcome of the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913 and of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. The implications of the power paradox for theories of international politics are briefly discussed.


2012 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 16-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Staniland

Ethnic insurgents sometimes defect to join forces with the state during civil wars. Ethnic defection can have important effects on conflict outcomes, but its causes have been understudied. Using Sunni defection in Iraq as a theory-developing case, this article offers a theory of “fratricidal flipping” that identifies lethal competition between insurgent factions as an important cause of defection. It examines the power of the fratricidal-flipping mechanism against competing theories in the cases of Kashmir and Sri Lanka. These wars involve within-conflict variation in defection across groups and over time. A detailed study of the empirical record, including significant fieldwork, suggests that fratricide was the dominant trigger for defection, while government policy played a secondary role in facilitating pro-state paramilitarism. Deep ideological disagreements were surprisingly unimportant in driving defection. The argument is probed in other wars in Asia. The complex internal politics of insurgent movements deserve careful attention.


Author(s):  
Jason Klocek

The academic study of religion and irregular warfare has expanded considerably since the turn of the 21st century—driven by both global events such as 9/11 and empirical studies that find armed rebellions with religious dimensions to be longer, bloodier, and more difficult to resolve than nonreligious conflicts. Most of this research focuses on the religious, usually radical, ideas and practices of insurgent groups. Of particular interest has been the way religion shapes the motivations and means of guerrilla fighters. Less attention has been paid to the role of counterinsurgent armies in irregular, religious wars. Following the U.S.-led invasions in Iraq and Afghanistan, a few initial studies explored how state forces misunderstand or ignore the religious dynamics of armed conflict. A growing body of research since the mid-2010s has pushed further, cataloguing a more varied set of ways counterinsurgent forces account for religion in combat and information operations. Moving forward, studies that look at both sides of the battlefield need to expand their empirical emphases, as well as more directly address a common set of challenges to the broader study of religious violence—how best to conceptualize, measure, and analyze the religious dynamics of war. Future scholarship should also consider research designs that test the causal processes purported to link religion with conflict outcomes and pay increased attention to the interaction between insurgent and counterinsurgent forces.


2020 ◽  
pp. 002200272095041
Author(s):  
Heather Elko McKibben ◽  
Amy Skoll

How do different types of external intervention affect the likelihood of a negotiated settlement in civil conflicts? Drawing on the negotiation literature, which shows that the nature of the parties’ “best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA)” influences the bargaining process between them, we argue different types of intervention affect governments’ and rebel groups’ BATNAs in different ways. This, in turn, affects the likelihood of a negotiated settlement. To test this argument, we address the fact that interventions are nonrandom, and that characteristics of civil conflicts that lead to different types of intervention also influence the likelihood of a negotiated settlement. We therefore use a two-stage statistical model. The first stage predicts the likelihood of different types of intervention, and drawing on those results, the second stage analyzes the likelihood of a negotiated settlement. The results provide insights into how different types of intervention affect civil conflict outcomes.


2018 ◽  
Vol 104 (4) ◽  
pp. 328-332 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liz Forbat ◽  
Sarah Barclay

ObjectiveTo test a new conflict management framework (CMF) to help staff identify and de-escalate conflict between staff and patients/families.DesignBefore/after study that reports staff quality of life, frequency/severity of conflicts and qualitative interviews on using the framework. Data were collected from May 2017 to September 2017.SettingA paediatric oncology department day-patient and 23-bed inpatient ward.InterventionA two-stage CMF used by staff during daily handovers to identify and then manage conflict cases with families.ResultsStaff found the CMFto be helpful in identifying and de-escalating conflicts. The number of conflicts reported decreased by 64% from baseline to follow-up. Communication regarding conflict identification improved. Reports of staff burn-out decreased between the two time-points (n=55 at baseline, n=31 at follow-up; p=0.001). Scores on compassion and secondary traumatic stress did not change.ConclusionsThe CMF substantially reduces the incidence of conflicts and is an acceptable approach for staff. Continued use of the framework would require it to be fully integrated into the working of the ward, which would need to include senior medical buy-in. Further refinements to the framework have been made and will be tested in four UK sites in 2018/2019.


2015 ◽  
Vol 61 (6) ◽  
pp. 1203-1229 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lindsay L. Heger ◽  
Danielle F. Jung

When rebels provide social services, do they have more leverage negotiating the terms of a peace deal? The literature suggests service-providing groups may, on average, have a wider base of support and a more centralized organizational structure. We argue that these features deter potential spoilers from breaking away from the organization during negotiation processes. This, in turn, makes governments more willing to enter negotiations since the threat from spoilers is smaller. Thus, compared to nonproviders, service-providing rebels are more likely to engage in negotiations and these processes are likely to be more stable. This article analyzes these propositions by gathering service provision data on nearly 400 rebel groups and their involvement in and behavior during peace talks. It also serves as an introduction to a larger project about the implications of rebel service provision on conflict outcomes.


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