Replication efforts have limited epistemic value

Nature ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 599 (7884) ◽  
pp. 201-201
Author(s):  
Kauê Machado Costa ◽  
Geoffrey Schoenbaum
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Value

Making Things Right

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Pettigrew
Keyword(s):  
Error Theory ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Healthy Patient ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Epistemic Consequentialism ◽  
Wrong Action

Pettigrew focuses on trade-off objections to epistemic consequentialism. Such objections are similar to familiar objections from ethics where an intuitively wrong action (e.g., killing a healthy patient) leads to a net gain in value (e.g., saving five other patients). The objection to the epistemic consequentialist concerns cases where adopting an intuitively wrong belief leads to a net gain in epistemic value. Pettigrew defends the epistemic consequentialist against such objections by accepting that the unintuitive verdicts of consequentialism are unintuitive, but offering an error theory for why these intuitions do not show the view to be false.

Understanding, Integration, and Epistemic Value

2012 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-181 ◽  
Author(s):  
Georgi Gardiner
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Value

A Moderately Pessimistic Perspective on “Cooperative Naturalism”

Projections ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 9-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Davies
Keyword(s):  
Mirror Neurons ◽  
Film Studies ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Philosophical Reflection ◽  
The Arts ◽  
Normative Dimension ◽  
Film Experience ◽  
Philosophical Questions

Murray Smith’s plea for a “cooperative naturalism” that adopts a “triangulational” approach to issues in film studies is both timely and well-defended. I raise three concerns, however: one is external, relating to this strategy’s limitations, and two are internal, relating to Smith’s application of the strategy. While triangulation seems appropriate when we ask about the nature of film experience, other philosophical questions about film have an ineliminable normative dimension that triangulation cannot address. Empirically informed philosophical reflection upon the arts must be “moderately pessimistic” in recognizing this fact. The internal concerns relate to Smith’s claims about the value and neurological basis of cinematic empathy. First, while empathy plays a central role in film experience, I argue that its neurological underpinnings fail to support the epistemic value he ascribes to it. Second, I question Smith’s reliance, in triangulating, upon the work of the Parma school on “mirror neurons.”

scholarly journals Comparative standard in institutional epistemology

2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 418-430
Author(s):  
Marko-Luka Zubcic
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Arrangements ◽  
Moral Conflict ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Epistemic State ◽  
Epistemic States ◽  
The Social ◽  
Democratic Authority ◽  
Philosophical Framework ◽  
Lock In ◽  
Agent Development

Which epistemic value is the standard according to which we ought to compare, assess and design institutional arrangements in terms of their epistemic properties? Two main options are agent development (in terms of individual epistemic virtues or capabilities) and attainment of truth. The options are presented through two authoritative contemporary accounts-agent development by Robert Talisse?s understanding in Democracy and Moral Conflict (2009) and attainment of truth by David Estlund?s treatment, most prominently in Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework (2008). Both options are shown to be unsatisfactory because they are subject to problematic risk of suboptimal epistemic state lock-in. The ability of the social epistemic system to revise suboptimal epistemic states is argued to be the best option for a comparative standard in institutional epistemology.

scholarly journals The Epistemic Value of Deep Disagreements

2018 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 263-292 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kirk Lougheed
Keyword(s):  
Argumentation Theory ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Peer Disagreement ◽  
Epistemology Of Disagreement ◽  
Epistemic Peer ◽  
Deep Disagreement ◽  
The Face ◽  
Deep Disagreements

In the epistemology of disagreement literature an underdeveloped argument defending the claim that an agent need not conciliate when she becomes aware of epistemic peer disagreement is based on the idea that there are epistemic benefits to be gained from disagreement. Such benefits are unobtainable if an agent conciliates in the face of peer disagreement. I argue that there are good reasons to embrace this line of argument at least in inquiry-related contexts. In argumentation theory a deep disagreement occurs when there is a disagreement between fundamental frameworks. According to Robert J. Fogelin disagreements between fundamental frameworks are not susceptible to rational resolution. Instead of evaluating this claim I argue that deep disagreements can lead to epistemic benefits, at least when inquiry is in view. Whether rational resolution is possible in cases of deep disagreements, their existence turns out to be epistemically beneficial. I conclude by examining whether this line of argument can be taken beyond research-related contexts.Dans la littérature sur l'épistémologie du désaccord, un argument sous-développé pour une approche non conciliatoire se fonde sur l'idée qu'il y a des bénéfices épistémiques à tirer du désaccord. De tels bénéfices sont impossibles à obtenir si un agent se concilie face au désaccord avec ses pairs, du moins dans les contextes liés à la recherche. Dans la théorie de l'argumentation, un désaccord profond se produit lorsqu'il y a un désaccord entre des propositions cadres. Je soutiens que des désaccords profonds peuvent mener à des avantages épistémiques, du moins dans le contexte de la recherche. Que la résolution rationnelle soit ou non possible en cas de désaccord profond, leur existence s'avère être bénéfique sur le plan épistémologique.

scholarly journals Conceptions of Epistemic Value

Episteme ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Timothy Perrine
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Value

Abstract This paper defends a conception of epistemic value that I call the “Simpliciter Conception.” On it, epistemic value is a kind of value simpliciter and being of epistemic value implies being of value simpliciter. I defend this conception by criticizing two others, what I call the Formal Conception and the Hybrid Conception. While those conceptions may be popular among epistemologists, I argue that they fail to explain why anyone should care that things are of epistemic value and naturally undercuts disputes about what is of epistemic value. I end by sketching and locating my conception within some increasingly popular views in meta-normativity.

scholarly journals EFEK NILAI KONSUMSI TERHADAP NIAT PEMBELIAN KEMBALI PADA GREEN PRODUCT

2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 83
Author(s):  
Yosephine Angelina Yulia ◽  
Wisnu Untoro
Keyword(s):  
Social Value ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Green Product ◽  
Repurchase Intention ◽  
Green Products ◽  
Factors Affecting ◽  
Product Consumption ◽  
Consumption Values ◽  
Functional Value ◽  
Emotional Value

Abstrak: Efek Nilai Konsumsi terhadap Niat Pembelian Kembali pada Green Product. Tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah untuk menerapkan teori nilai konsumsi untuk menentukan faktor-faktor yang mempengaruhi perilaku pilihan konsumen mengenai produk ramah lingkungan, dan meneliti pengaruh nilai-nilai konsumsi seperti nilai fungsional, nilai sosial, nilai emosional, nilai kondisional, dan nilai epistemis terhadap niat membeli kembali produk ramah lingkungan. Populasi penelitian ini adalah konsumen yang menggunakan produk ramah lingkungan yang ada di kota Surakarta. Penelitian ini mengambil sampel sebanyak 100 responden secara purposive. Analisis data menggunakan analisis regresi berganda. Berdasarkan data dapat diketahui bahwa nilai konsumsi yang terdiri dari nilai fungsional, nilai sosial, nilai emosional, nilai kondisional dan nilai epistemik terbukti berpengaruh positif terhadap niat pembelian kembali pada produk ramah lingkungan. Kata kunci: Produk ramah lingkungan, nilai konsumsi, sikap konsumen, niat pembelian kembali. Abstract: The Effect of Consumption Values to Repurchase Intention of Green Products. This study was aimed to apply the theory of consumption values to determine the factors affecting the behavior of consumers regarding the selection of green products, and examine the influence of consumption values such as the functional value, social value, emotional value, conditional value, and epistemic value to repurchase intention of green products. The population of this research is green product customers in Surakarta city. This research selected 100 respondents purposively. Based on the data showed that the consumption values that consist of functional value, social value, emotional value, conditional value and epistemic value had a positive effect on repurchase intention of green products. Keywords: Green product, consumption values, consumer behavior, repurchase intention.

scholarly journals Creativity and modelling the measurement process of the Higgs self-coupling at the LHC and HL-LHC

Synthese ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sophie Ritson
Keyword(s):  
Large Hadron Collider ◽  
High Energy Physics ◽  
Hadron Collider ◽  
High Energy ◽  
Measurement Process ◽  
The Self ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Philosophical Study ◽  
Epistemic Function ◽  
Improved Model

AbstractThis paper provides an account of the nature of creativity in high-energy physics experiments through an integrated historical and philosophical study of the current and planned attempts to measure the self-coupling of the Higgs boson by two experimental collaborations (ATLAS and CMS) at the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) and the planned High Luminosity Large Hadron Collider (HL-LHC). A notion of creativity is first identified broadly as an increase in the epistemic value of a measurement outcome from an unexpected transformation, and narrowly as a condition for knowledge of the measurement of the self-coupling of the Higgs. Drawing upon Tal’s model-based epistemology of measurement (2012) this paper shows how without change to ‘readings’ (or ‘instrument indicators’) a transformation to the model of the measurement process can increase the epistemic value of the measurement outcome. Such transformations are attributed to the creativity of the experimental collaboration. Creativity, in this context, is both a product, a creative and improved model, and the distributed collaborative process of transformation to the model of the measurement process. For the case of the planned measurements at the HL-LHC, where models of the measurement process perform the epistemic function of prediction, creativity is included in the models of the measurement process, both as projected quantified creativity and as an assumed property of the future collaborations.

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