scholarly journals Three-party evolutionary game theory analysis of the development of Chinese professional construction micro enterprises

2019 ◽  
Vol 136 ◽  
pp. 01033
Author(s):  
Changming Hu ◽  
Shasha Huang ◽  
Zhanxue Zhang ◽  
Ping Li
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
System Reform ◽  
Theory Analysis ◽  
Employment System ◽  
Construction Enterprises ◽  
Operational Costs ◽  
Evolutionary Paths ◽  
Micro Enterprises

With construction employment system reform, labor enterprise qualifications elimination and professional construction micro-enterprises development have become the general trends. In this case, this article builds a three-party evolutionary game model between local governments, contractor teams and construction enterprises to discusses evolutionary paths and stability strategies. And Matlab is used for numerical simulation to demonstrate the influence of different initial states on results. The research results show that increase initial probabilities, local governments’ reputations, rewards and punishments, contractor teams’ transformation profits, construction enterprises’ employment profits, and reduce local governments’ costs, contractor teams’ operational costs, construction enterprises’ subcontracting and management costs, which will help the dynamic system to evolve toward an ideal state, which is conducive to the development of micro-enterprises.

Evolutionary Game Theory

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 20-28
Author(s):  
Arij Michel
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Institutional Change ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Theory Analysis ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Advantages And Disadvantages ◽  
Development Direction

The article uses evolutionary game theory analysis as the research object, which is the most commonly used research method of institutional change, and summarizes some methods in the research of institutional change, and points out the advantages and disadvantages of evolutionary game analysis in the research of institutional change and through the comparison of cutting-edge methods and evolutionary games to see the development direction of future research institutional changes.

scholarly journals An Evolutionary Game Model to Study Manufacturers and Logistics Companies’ Behavior Strategies for Information Transparency in Cold Chains

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Xiao-Hu Xing ◽  
Zhi-Hua Hu ◽  
Shu-Wen Wang ◽  
Wen-Ping Luo
Keyword(s):  
Information Sharing ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Service Providers ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Cold Chain ◽  
Logistics Service ◽  
Logistics Service Providers ◽  
Sharing Strategy ◽  
Behavior Strategies ◽  
Evolutionary Paths

Cold goods manufacturers and logistics service providers are two essential groups of players in the goods safety issue in cold chains under the administration or inspection of governments and various stakeholders, including customers and final consumers. In this research, we applied the evolutionary game theory to examine the behavioral strategies of manufacturers and logistics service providers, while we formulated the governments and various other stakeholders’ impacts by contracted subsidy and penalty. First, we developed an evolutionary game theory model of the interaction between manufacturers and logistics service providers. Then, we examined the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) of the manufacturers and logistics service providers under various constraints. Finally, we used simulation to demonstrate the impact of combinations of various parameters on the ESS and evolutionary paths. The results showed that the behavior strategies of the manufacturers and logistics service providers are interleaved and affected by the parameters in the developed model. We analyzed the ESSs and evolutionary paths by considering profits of the cold goods, the cold chain logistics costs, mainly the additional profits and costs of sharing information, and the subsidy and penalty regulated by contracts and governments. By tuning the parameters for numerical studies, we can find that the subsidy and penalty are essential for the cold chain manufactures and logistics service providers to adopt the information-sharing strategy, while the cost of the strategy and the profit of them constrains the positivity. Although, besides instant costs and profits, the information-sharing strategy can add values to cold chains in the long run, the administrators must consider the two populations of players and advocate them to adopt the information-sharing strategy consistently by using optimal policies.

scholarly journals Production-Use Water Pricing and Corporate Water Use in China: An Evolutionary Game Theory Model

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Yao Xiao ◽  
Qiao Peng ◽  
Wanting Xu ◽  
Hongye Xiao
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Water Supply ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Water Conservation ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Policy Formulation ◽  
Theory Model ◽  
Water Pricing

Decisions related to pricing production-use water are a critical issue that local governments in China are facing. Its significance has increased in recent years, as a serious corporate water-supply shortage has surfaced with rapid economic development and urbanization. Different from developed countries, the pricing of production-use water is a complex issue in China that involves the distribution of benefits among local governments, water-supply companies, and water-consuming companies, where the overall balance is affected by every slight adjustment. Based on the evolutionary game theory, this study constructs an evolutionary game model involving water-supply companies and water-consuming companies with a systematic analysis of the interaction process between the policy formulation related to water pricing by water-supply companies and the decision making related to water consumption by water-consuming companies. The research finds that the difficulty of balancing corporate financial benefits and public water conservation benefits has led to the complexity of water pricing. Moreover, raising water prices will not necessarily cause companies to save water, but it will increase the production cost of the entire economy. This is the direct cause of low water prices, implemented by water-supply companies, in many regions of China.

scholarly journals Research on the Evolution of Collusion between Government and Civil Construction Enterprises in Environmental Regulation

2021 ◽  
Vol 248 ◽  
pp. 02053
Author(s):  
Cao Yingying
Keyword(s):  
Local Government ◽  
Environmental Regulation ◽  
Optimal Strategy ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Regional Migration ◽  
Construction Enterprises ◽  
Emission Behavior ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Way

Polluting civil construction enterprises usually use the way of "voting with their feet" to exert influence on the efforts of local government's environmental regulation, promote the formation of collusion between government and enterprises, and make the local government relax the supervision on the emission behavior of civil construction enterprises. Based on the Tibert model, this paper uses the evolutionary game method to study the collusion between government and enterprises in the cross regional migration of civil construction enterprises and its prevention. The results show that: when the civil construction enterprises comply with the production, the local government's optimal strategy is non collusion strategy; similarly, when the local government is not willing to collude, the non-collusion choice of civil construction enterprises will get higher benefits than collusion. In addition, the cost of civil construction enterprises transferring between different regions, the loss caused by the collusion between civil construction enterprises and local governments, and the probability of local government violations being found can effectively prevent the collusion between local governments and civil construction enterprises.

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