scholarly journals Research on the Evolution of Collusion between Government and Civil Construction Enterprises in Environmental Regulation

2021 ◽  
Vol 248 ◽  
pp. 02053
Author(s):  
Cao Yingying
Keyword(s):  
Local Government ◽  
Environmental Regulation ◽  
Optimal Strategy ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Regional Migration ◽  
Construction Enterprises ◽  
Emission Behavior ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Way

Polluting civil construction enterprises usually use the way of "voting with their feet" to exert influence on the efforts of local government's environmental regulation, promote the formation of collusion between government and enterprises, and make the local government relax the supervision on the emission behavior of civil construction enterprises. Based on the Tibert model, this paper uses the evolutionary game method to study the collusion between government and enterprises in the cross regional migration of civil construction enterprises and its prevention. The results show that: when the civil construction enterprises comply with the production, the local government's optimal strategy is non collusion strategy; similarly, when the local government is not willing to collude, the non-collusion choice of civil construction enterprises will get higher benefits than collusion. In addition, the cost of civil construction enterprises transferring between different regions, the loss caused by the collusion between civil construction enterprises and local governments, and the probability of local government violations being found can effectively prevent the collusion between local governments and civil construction enterprises.

scholarly journals The Role of Social Media in Promoting Information Disclosure on Environmental Incidents: An Evolutionary Game Theory Perspective

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shuang Ling ◽  
Shan Gao ◽  
Wenhui Liu
Keyword(s):  
Social Media ◽  
Local Government ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Information Disclosure ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Media Use ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Media Influence ◽  
Social Media Use ◽  
The Public

Despite the expectation that social media use in the public sector contributes to enhancing government's transparency, few studies have been investigated whether social media use actually leads to more disclosure during environmental incidents in practice and how social media influence local governments and their officials' information disclosure. In this article, we model information disclosure during environmental incidents as an evolutionary game process between the central government and local government in social media context, and examine the internal mechanism that how social media influence the progress of information disclosure during environmental incidents. The findings indicate that social media plays an active constructive role in central-local government game relations. Specific- ally, social media can provides an efficient information channels for the central government supervise regional officials in environmental incidents, and thus improves its supervision efficiency, and it also provides an important means for internet mobilization and online-offline interaction by encouraging the public exchange information and express their views, and in turn forces local governments and their officials tend to disclosure ahead.

scholarly journals The Utilization Of Financial Information System To Support The Creation From Budget Costs Using e-Budgeting

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 119-125
Author(s):  
Dewi Immaniar ◽  
Mulyati Mulyati ◽  
Ulfatul Jannah Putri Musliawati
Keyword(s):  
Information System ◽  
Local Government ◽  
Computer Program ◽  
Financial System ◽  
Financial Information ◽  
Cost Transparency ◽  
The Creation ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Access Data ◽  
The Way

In an era of modernization as this is now very much in the development of applications that make use of the computer program. One of them, namely the creation of the budget costs using e-budgeting application. What is the e-budgeting? E-Budgeting is a financial system that is stored online with the aim of transparency for each party. This system is applied as documentation for the preparation of the budget is usually in an area. Anyone can access data budget compiled by a local government so hopefully can prevent attempts of embezzlement of funds. The application of e-budgeting was chosen because it can bring cost transparency can be seen by anyone who is shown through the website. The results presented in this study is the use of proven e-budgeting nature of transparency compared with the way that still are conventional. Keywords: The cost of the e-budget, budgeting, budget transparency.

scholarly journals Research on Local Government Governance and Enterprise Social Responsibility Behaviors under the Perspective of Cournot Duopoly Competition: Analyzing Taxi Companies and Online Car-Hailing Service Companies

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xintao Li ◽  
Zaisheng Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Local Government ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Regulatory System ◽  
Cost Savings ◽  
Service Companies ◽  
Regulatory Policies ◽  
Governance Model ◽  
Dynamic Game Model ◽  
The Cost

Clarifying the rational choice strategy of local governments and enterprises is crucial for promoting control on the failure of taxis and online car-hailing service companies to fulfill their social responsibilities. The local government can reduce the negative externalities and irresponsibility of such companies by improving the regulatory system; thus, it is important to build a governance model that bridges tradition and modernity. This paper, on the basis of summarizing the achievements of the predecessors, builds a mixed dynamic game model among the local government, online car-hailing service companies, and taxi companies; analyzes the relationship between local government preference, execution, and governance of irresponsible enterprise behaviors; and analyzes the equilibrium solution between local government and duopoly enterprises behavior game deeply. The results show that the key to governance irresponsible companies is to make the punishment cost higher than the cost savings for irresponsible behaviors; no matter what the preference of the local government no-governance of online car-hailing service companies’ irresponsible behaviors may persist; and local government ambivalence when regulating irresponsible companies is derived from the complex relationship between social benefits and company interests. Finally, through the analysis of the equilibrium results for the above model, this paper provides suggestions on regulatory policies so as to provide theoretical support and a decision-making basis for establishing scientific, universal, and feasible governance policies and offering responsible methods of urban transportation.

scholarly journals Does the Underwriter Reputation Affect the Pricing of Local Government Bonds in China?

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (7) ◽  
pp. 45
Author(s):  
Hongdan Ji
Keyword(s):  
Local Government ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Securities Market ◽  
Government Bonds ◽  
Government Interventions ◽  
Securities Company ◽  
Underwriter Reputation ◽  
The Cost ◽  
High Degree

As the product of the combination of fiscal and financial, local government bonds should also follow the pricing mechanism of the securities market even under the special financial system in China. This paper uses Heckman's two-stage model to investigate whether the mechanism of underwriter reputation affects the pricing of local government bonds. The empirical results show that local governments tend to choose securities company underwriters with high reputation when they issue bonds with large scale, long maturity, and call right which have high degree of information asymmetry, and this tendency has an obvious time trend. However, high-reputation securities company underwriters failed to play the role of information intermediary to reduce the cost of local governments. On the contrary, implicit guarantees and government interventions induced the commercial banks to depress their quotations even leading to “interest rate upside down”, which resulted in the lack of securities company underwriters. In order to play the mechanism of underwriter reputation to promote the marketization of local government bonds pricing, this paper proposes to eliminate government interference, guide underwriters to strengthen the construction of their reputation, promote the marketization of underwriting fees and strengthen the supervision of underwriters.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Research on the Impact of Environmental Regulation on Overcapacity in Coal Industry

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Bo Fan ◽  
Tingting Guo ◽  
Ruzhi Xu ◽  
Wenquan Dong
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Regulation ◽  
Technological Innovation ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Power Industry ◽  
Coal Industry ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Clean Production ◽  
Regulatory Policies ◽  
The Impact

Currently, the world is facing two significant challenges: low-carbon development and overcapacity. Government departments must reexamine their development strategy of energy industry. Implementing environmental regulatory policies and technological innovation can help alleviate coal industry’s overcapacity, while sustainable development requires joint actions of governments, enterprises, and the market. Based on the evolutionary game theory, this study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of local government, power industry, and coal enterprise. Under the premise of bounded rationality, the evolution path of each player in the game under the market incentive environmental regulation is analyzed, and the influence of the change of parameters of each player on the result is numerically simulated. The study found that strengthening environmental regulation by local governments is an inevitable choice to promote the transformation and upgrading of coal industry and power industry. In addition, reducing law enforcement costs and technological innovation costs are the fundamental point of the coordinated development of the three parties. Technological innovation in the power industry will reduce the probability of coal companies’ choosing clean production strategies, while seeking low-cost clean production technology and financial support is the key to coal companies’ optimization of production capacity.

scholarly journals Three-party evolutionary game theory analysis of the development of Chinese professional construction micro enterprises

2019 ◽  
Vol 136 ◽  
pp. 01033
Author(s):  
Changming Hu ◽  
Shasha Huang ◽  
Zhanxue Zhang ◽  
Ping Li
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
System Reform ◽  
Theory Analysis ◽  
Employment System ◽  
Construction Enterprises ◽  
Operational Costs ◽  
Evolutionary Paths ◽  
Micro Enterprises

With construction employment system reform, labor enterprise qualifications elimination and professional construction micro-enterprises development have become the general trends. In this case, this article builds a three-party evolutionary game model between local governments, contractor teams and construction enterprises to discusses evolutionary paths and stability strategies. And Matlab is used for numerical simulation to demonstrate the influence of different initial states on results. The research results show that increase initial probabilities, local governments’ reputations, rewards and punishments, contractor teams’ transformation profits, construction enterprises’ employment profits, and reduce local governments’ costs, contractor teams’ operational costs, construction enterprises’ subcontracting and management costs, which will help the dynamic system to evolve toward an ideal state, which is conducive to the development of micro-enterprises.

scholarly journals Local Government Competition, Environmental Regulation Intensity and Regional Innovation Performance: An Empirical Investigation of Chinese Provinces

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (12) ◽  
pp. 2130 ◽  
Author(s):  
Deng ◽  
Zhang ◽  
Ahmad ◽  
Draz
Keyword(s):  
Local Government ◽  
Environmental Regulation ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Generalized Least Squares ◽  
Institutional Arrangements ◽  
Innovation Performance ◽  
Regional Innovation ◽  
Regional Heterogeneity ◽  
Development Levels ◽  
The Impact

：The aim of this paper is to examine the impact of local government competition and environmental regulation intensity on regional innovation performance and its regional heterogeneity. Based on the theoretical mechanism of the aforementioned variables, this study uses the Chinese provincial panel data from 2001 to 2016. We use the super-efficiency data envelopment analysis (SE-DEA) to evaluate regional innovation performance. To systematically examine the impact of local government competition and environmental regulation intensity on regional innovation performance, we build a panel date model using the feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) method. The results indicate that: the regional innovation performance can be significantly improved through technological spillover; local governments compete for foreign direct investment (FDI) to participate in regional innovative production. Moreover, improvements in environmental regulation intensity enhance regional innovation performance through the innovation compensation effect. Our results show that the local governments tend to choose lower environmental regulation intensity to compete for more FDI, which has an inhibitory effect on regional innovation performance. Furthermore, due to regional differences in factor endowments, economic reforms and economic development levels in Chinese provinces, there exists a significant regional consistency in the impact of local government competition and environmental regulation intensity on regional innovation performance. Therefore, institutional arrangements and incentive constraints must be adopted to enhance regional innovation performance as well as to guide and foster the mechanism of green innovation competition among local governments. At the same time, considering the regional heterogeneity of local government competition and environmental regulation intensity affecting regional innovation performance, policy makers should avoid the “one-size-fits-all” strategy of institutional arrangements.

The integration role of governmental information disclosure platform

Kybernetes ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 49 (5) ◽  
pp. 1347-1379
Author(s):  
Jing Peng ◽  
Guoping Tu ◽  
Yanhong Liu ◽  
Hao Zhang ◽  
Bibing Leng
Keyword(s):  
Local Government ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Information Disclosure ◽  
Cost Allocation ◽  
Environmental Behavior ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Environmental Data ◽  
Online Information ◽  
Monitoring Cost ◽  
Content Type

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to provide a feasible scheme for local governments to regulate corporate environmental data fraud and to discuss whether the influence of the construction of online information disclosure platform on the environmental behavior of enterprises is better than the offline spot check. Design/methodology/approach Under the background of changing environmental fees into taxes in China, this paper conducts evolutionary game analysis between local governments and enterprises in view of the existing problem of environmental data fraud. Furthermore, through the introduction of government information disclosure platform, this paper discusses the impact of the integration of direct government regulation and indirect public concern regulation on the evolution of environmental behavior of both sides. Finally, the evolutionary game is simulated by adopting system dynamics to analyses the implementation effect of different cases on the game process and game equilibrium. Findings The results showed that the introduction of information disclosure platform mechanism can effectively suppress the fluctuations existing in the game play and stabilize the game. Moreover, it is worth noting that the regulatory effect of local governments investing part of the monitoring cost in the construction of online information platform is proved to be better than that of putting all the monitoring cost into offline investigation. While optimizing the monitoring cost allocation, the local government still needs to attach great importance to organically combine the attention of the public and media with the governmental official platform. Practical implications The obtained results confirm that the proposed model can assist local government in refining the effects of their environmental regulatory decisions, especially in the case of corporate data fraud under environmental tax enforcement. Originality/value Previous literature only suggested that local governments should reduce the cost of supervision to change the corporate behavior to a better direction, but no further in-depth study. Thus, this study fills the gap by discussing the positive transformation effect of local government cost allocation scheme on corporate environmental behavior.

scholarly journals Recreational Homes: Town Characteristics and Variations in Concentrations

1979 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 133-141
Author(s):  
Pamela H. Pataky ◽  
Edmund F. Jansen
Keyword(s):  
Local Government ◽  
New England ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Tax Revenue ◽  
Forest Land ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Over Time

Recreational home development has been and is likely to continue to be a major concern of many local governments in New England and elsewhere. Recreational homes are defined here as homes that are not the owner's primary residence and are used for vacation, leisure, or recreation. It is generally agreed that this type of development is initially beneficial to local government finances. While more town services may be required, the cost is usually outweighed by the added tax revenue. It is believed, however, that over time recreational homes may be converted to primary homes, which could lead to cost increases without proportional increases in revenue (Am. Soc. of Planning Officials, Clark, Payne). Also, from a wider perspective, the loss of agricultural and forest land to this use may not be desirable.

scholarly journals The Administrative Costs of Local Government Property-Based User Charges and Their Regressivity

2014 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Helena Blažić ◽  
Sandra Stašić ◽  
Saša Drezgić
Keyword(s):  
Local Government ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Small Scale ◽  
User Charges ◽  
Administrative Costs ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Collection Costs

The paper measures the administrative costs (assessment and collection costs) of immovable property user charges in local governments in Croatia. This study represents a small scale survey comprising mostly small local governments. First, we establish their costs structure and then we compare the cost-revenue ratio with their size. As expected, the administrative costs of the analyzed user charges turned out to be regressive in regards to the size of local governments. The results imply that substitution of those different charges would be beneficial for local government budgets. In order to mitigate the problem we propose several alternatives: one general tax/charge; amalgamation of the smallest local governments or referring to assessment and collection of user charges in small local governments to the larger/mutual unit.

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