scholarly journals Impact of quality decisions on information sharing with supplier encroachment

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rui Hou ◽  
Weijian Li ◽  
Xiaogang Lin ◽  
You Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Information Sharing ◽  
Retail Market ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Quality Cost ◽  
Retail Channel ◽  
Cost Coefficient ◽  
Entry Cost ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Demand Information ◽  
Share Information

This study examines a retailer's decision to share market demand information in a supply chain wherein a supplier sells a product with a certain level of quality to a retailer, who then resells it to the end consumer. It also considers whether a supplier should establish a direct selling channel by incurring a fixed entry cost to compete with the retail channel. Although conventional wisdom indicates that a retailer may voluntarily disclose information under ex-ante supplier encroachment, our results show how and why a retailer may share information with the supplier who encroaches on the retail market with a decision on quality. Specifically, our findings reveal that information sharing is beneficial to the retailer when the quality cost coefficient is low and entry cost is relatively low, even under encroachment by the supplier. Moreover, the retailer may prefer to disclose demand information to the supplier if the quality cost coefficient is low, even when the entry cost is high, under non-encroachment. Interestingly, we found that the supplier prefers to encroach if the retailer shares demand information when the entry cost is moderate. Further, we found that the retailer has a higher incentive to share information under supplier encroachment compared with non-encroachment. These results are in sharp contrast with the extant literature.

Sharing Demand Information with Retailer Under Upstream Competition

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aditya Jain
Keyword(s):  
Information Sharing ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Operations Management ◽  
Information Acquisition ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Substitutable Products ◽  
Downward Pressure ◽  
Demand Information ◽  
Intensity Of Competition ◽  
Share Information

We analyze demand information sharing collaboration between two manufacturers and a retailer under upstream competition. The manufacturers produce partially substitutable products, which are stocked by the retailer that sells them in the market characterized by random demand. The manufacturers are privately informed about uncertain demand and decide on whether to share this information with the retailer. We show that by not sharing information, a manufacturer ends up distorting its wholesale price upward to signal its private information to the retailer, and under upstream competition, this distortion is propagated to the competing manufacturer. Thus, although a manufacturer’s decision to not share information may benefit or hurt its own profit, this always benefits the competing manufacturer. Under low intensity of competition, signaling-driven distortions exacerbate double marginalization and hurt all parties, whereas under more intense competition, these distortions help manufacturers offset downward pressure on wholesale prices. Thus, in equilibrium similarly informed manufacturers share information in the former case but not in the latter case. Additionally, when manufacturers differ in their information accuracies, only the better-informed manufacturer shares information. The retailer always benefits from both manufacturers sharing information, and its benefits are larger when the better-informed manufacturer shares information. We show existence of a contracting mechanism the retailer can employ to enable information sharing. Finally, we analyze manufacturers’ information acquisition decisions and find that under competition, two manufacturers acquire minimal information so that they are better off not sharing information in the information sharing game. This paper was accepted by Vishal Gaur, operations management.

scholarly journals Information sharing and leakage in the two-echelon supply chain

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jingru Wang ◽  
Zhiyuan Zhen ◽  
Qiang Yan
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Information Sharing ◽  
Information Acquisition ◽  
Information Leakage ◽  
High Signal ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Retail Competition ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Private Signals ◽  
Demand Information

We consider ex post demand information sharing and leakage in a two-echelon supply chain consisting of one supplier and two retailers competing in quantities. The incumbent retailer has an advantage to acquire information about the market at a cost. If he invests in information acquisition, he privately acquires a signal about the market demand. We examine the incumbent’s incentive of information acquisition and sharing, and the upstream supplier’s information leakage strategy. We confirm that the incumbent’s information acquisition and sharing decisions depend on whether the information acquisition is observable. When it is observable, the incumbent fully shares his private signals even though the shared high signal may hurt him. However, when it is unobservable, the incumbent can share the favorable signal (low signal) and withhold the unfavorable signal (high signal). Moreover, we also find that the supplier will always leak the signal to the entrant no matter what signal she acquires. In addition, we demonstrate under the information sharing and leakage strategy, it may benefit the whole supply chain when the retail competition intensity is not very large.

Supply Chain Competition with Information Sharing

2011 ◽  
Vol 486 ◽  
pp. 309-312
Author(s):  
Rong Yao He ◽  
Zhong Kai Xiong ◽  
Yu Xiong
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Information Sharing ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Pricing Policy ◽  
Supply Chain Competition ◽  
Demand Information ◽  
Total Profit

Given the case of two competing supply chains each consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer, we explore whether the retailers should share the market demand information they know with their manufacturers when the manufacturers do not know the same specific demand information. We also determine the optimal pricing policy and total profit for the retailers when each chain either shares or does not share market demand information. We find that sharing information is always more profitable for both retailer and supply chain.

Information sharing in a green supply chain with promotional effort

Kybernetes ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 49 (11) ◽  
pp. 2683-2712 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junfei Ding ◽  
Wenbin Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Information Sharing ◽  
Consumer Surplus ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Promotional Effort ◽  
Demand Information ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Share Information

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the retailer’s strategy of information sharing in a green supply chain with promotional effort, and the impact of information sharing on the decisions and profits of the manufacturer and the retailer. Design/methodology/approach The developed models aim to maximize the profits of the manufacturer, the retailer and the green supply chain system. The game theory is used to obtain the equilibrium solutions of both the manufacturer and the retailer. A two-part compensation (TPC) contract is designed to motivate the retailer to share information with the retailer. Numerical examples are used to show the impact of parameters on decisions by Matlab 2014. Findings The results show that the green degree increases while the promotional effort level decreases when the manufacturer receives the larger demand information from the retailer; information sharing leads to a profit increase to the manufacturer and a profit loss to the retailer, but can increase the profit of supply chain under a certain condition; information sharing reduces the expected consumer surplus. The TPC contract designed in this paper can not only motivate the retailer to share information but also increases the consumer surplus. Research limitations/implications The study has been done in a monopoly environment where only a retailer can forecast demand information. It is an interesting direction of future research when considering there are more retailers who can forecast such information in a supply chain. Originality/value There exist two main aspects that are different from the existing literature. The stochastic demand function related to the retail price, the green degree and the promotional effort have never appeared in previous literature. This paper considers a green product supply chain with a manufacturer who produces green products and a retailer who has an information advantage because of her promotional effort; this paper investigates the impact of information sharing on the consumer surplus and designs a contract to coordinate the green supply chain.

scholarly journals Information Sharing in Oligopoly: Sharing Groups and Core-Periphery Architectures

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 95
Author(s):  
Sergio Currarini ◽  
Francesco Feri
Keyword(s):  
Information Sharing ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Side Payment ◽  
Costs And Benefits ◽  
Pairwise Stability ◽  
Heterogeneous Information ◽  
Vast Literature ◽  
Share Information

The trade-off between the costs and benefits of disclosing a firm’s private information has been the object of a vast literature. The absence of incentives to share information on a common market demand prior to competition has been advocated to interpret information sharing as evidence of collusion. Recent contributions have looked at bilateral information sharing, showing that information sharing is consistent with pairwise stability, This paper studies the networked pattern of bilateral information sharing on market demand, focusing on the role of heterogeneous information (firms’ signals have different variances). We show that while pairwise stability predicts that i.i.d. signals are always shared in groups with a symmetric internal structure (both with and without side-payment and linking costs), heterogeneous signals are shared in asymmetric core-periphery architectures, in which “core” firms have more valuable information than periphery firms.

Considering Others’ Mental States Causally Increases Feelings of Social Bonding and Information Sharing

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elisa Baek ◽  
Diana Tamir ◽  
Emily B. Falk
Keyword(s):  
Social Behavior ◽  
Information Sharing ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Social Bonding ◽  
Health News ◽  
Brain Behavior ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Share Information ◽  
Shed Light ◽  
Mentalizing System

Information sharing is a ubiquitous social behavior. What causes people to share? Mentalizing, or considering the mental states of other people, has been theorized to play a central role in information sharing, with higher activity in the brain’s mentalizing system associated with increased likelihood to share information. In line with this theory, we present novel evidence that mentalizing causally increases information sharing. In three pre-registered studies (n = 400, 840, and 3500 participants), participants who were instructed to consider the mental states of potential information receivers indicated higher likelihood to share health news compared to a control condition where they were asked to reflect on the content of the article. Certain kinds of mentalizing were particularly effective; in particular, considering receivers’ emotional and positive mental states, led to the greatest increase in likelihood to share. The relationship between mentalizing and sharing was mediated by feelings of closeness with potential receivers. Mentalizing increased feelings of connectedness to potential receivers, and in turn, increased likelihood of information sharing. Considering receivers’ emotional, positive, and inward-focused mental states was most effective at driving participants to feel closer with potential receivers and increase sharing. Data provide evidence for a causal relationship between mentalizing and information sharing and provide insight about the mechanism linking mentalizing and sharing. Taken together, these results advance theories of information sharing and shed light on previously observed brain-behavior relationships.

scholarly journals Information Sharing and Channel Construction of Supply Chain under Asymmetric Demand Information

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guangdong Wu ◽  
Qingshan Kong ◽  
Jian-gang Shi ◽  
Hamid Reza Karimi ◽  
Wei Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Information Sharing ◽  
Marketing Channel ◽  
Dominant Strategy ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Management Theory ◽  
Force Model ◽  
Direct Channel ◽  
Structure Characteristics ◽  
Demand Information

Information sharing and marketing channel building have become an important problem of supply chain management theory and practice. The research of information sharing focused on traditional channel of supply chain between upstream and downstream enterprises; however, the research ignores the behavior of information sharing with potential entrants and composite structure characteristics about traditional marketing channel with the direct channel. This paper uses the model to research the effects brought about sharing demand information with potential entrants and building marketing channel, which reveals information sharing and channel building mechanism in the supply chain. The study found that the five-force model of Porter regards potential entrants only as a threat that is one-sided. When the channel competitiveness meets certain conditions, manufacturer and retailer will share demand information with potential entrants. Building composite marketing channel is the manufacturer's absolute dominant strategy. Channel construction will increase the entry barriers for potential entrants and weaken the effect of double marginalization; meanwhile, the performance of supply chain will be augmented.

scholarly journals Model of health information sharing behavior among patients in cervical cancer

2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 139
Author(s):  
Ragil Tri Atmi
Keyword(s):  
Cervical Cancer ◽  
Information Sharing ◽  
Cancer Patients ◽  
Health Information ◽  
Early Stage ◽  
Snowball Sampling ◽  
Patterns Of Behavior ◽  
Health Information Sharing ◽  
Sharing Behavior ◽  
Share Information

Cervical cancer is the second highest cause of death for women in Indonesia, despite a deadly illness, patients with cervical cancer are not desperate to survive. Instead, they are motivated to undertake positive actions, one of which is to do health informtion sharing or share information on environmental health tersekatnya. This study aims to look at how the patterns of behavior of sharing health information on cervical cancer patients, as well as the motive behind their actions the health information sharing. This study uses the method of qualitative research grounded approach. Location of the study conducted in Surabaya, while the search for informants researchers used snowball sampling. The results from this study is there are different behavior patterns of health information sharing among cervical cancer patients who have been diagnosed with advanced cervical cancer with cervical cancer at an early stage level.

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