Impact of quality decisions on information sharing with supplier encroachment

This study examines a retailer's decision to share market demand information in a supply chain wherein a supplier sells a product with a certain level of quality to a retailer, who then resells it to the end consumer. It also considers whether a supplier should establish a direct selling channel by incurring a fixed entry cost to compete with the retail channel. Although conventional wisdom indicates that a retailer may voluntarily disclose information under ex-ante supplier encroachment, our results show how and why a retailer may share information with the supplier who encroaches on the retail market with a decision on quality. Specifically, our findings reveal that information sharing is beneficial to the retailer when the quality cost coefficient is low and entry cost is relatively low, even under encroachment by the supplier. Moreover, the retailer may prefer to disclose demand information to the supplier if the quality cost coefficient is low, even when the entry cost is high, under non-encroachment. Interestingly, we found that the supplier prefers to encroach if the retailer shares demand information when the entry cost is moderate. Further, we found that the retailer has a higher incentive to share information under supplier encroachment compared with non-encroachment. These results are in sharp contrast with the extant literature.

Process R&D investment and social dilemmas

We consider a coopetitive game model of firms’ behavior in process R&D with entry cost. We compare the competitive behavior of firms in R&D with the R&D coopetition scenario. In R&D coopetition, firms engage in a bargaining process to reach a binding R&D agreement. We find that R&D competition can lead to a prisoner’s dilemma or a chicken game between market rivals. The possibility of entering a binding R&D agreement resolves the above social dilemmas associated with the firms’ competitive behavior. In turn, under R&D coopetition, for a medium level of R&D entry cost, firms may enter a trust dilemma, but it is a beneficial scenario in comparison with the corresponding R&D competition outcome.

Understanding the Complex Adoption Behavior of Cloud Services by SMEs Based on Complexity Theory: A Fuzzy Sets Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA)

To survive in a competitive environment, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) have had to adapt to the digital environment in order to adjust to customer needs globally, particularly in the post-COVID-19 world. The advantages of cloud computing (e.g., flexibility, scalability, and low entry cost) provide opportunities for SMEs with a restricted budget and limited resources. To understand how SMEs adopt cloud computing in a complex digital environment, this study examines how antecedents combine with each other to explain the high adoption of cloud computing. From the perspectives of holism and set theory, we draw on complexity and configuration theories, present a conceptual model including seven antecedents based on the technology-organization-environment framework, and conduct an asymmetric fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis. Through an empirical study with 123 Chinese companies, we identify nine combinations (configurations) of determinant antecedents that lead to the high adoption of cloud computing. The results show that none of the factors are indispensable to explain a high adoption on their own; instead, they are insufficient but necessary parts of the causal combinations that explain a high adoption. This study contributes to the literature on cloud computing adoption by extending current knowledge on how antecedents combine to increase the adoption and identify specific patterns of SMEs for whom these factors are essential and greatly influence their adoption.

Exit/Entry, Voice/Noise, and Loyalty/Apathy in the era of social media

Use of Social Media in public life has changed the way how citizens relate to public sector. Modern communication tools, in particular Social Media, have made citizens easier to use their “voice” to mobilize. When citizens can easily mobilize, the cost of mobilization is low for them, while its impact can lead to a larger cost for the State. As the exit/entry cost of Social Media is very low or almost nothing, a virtual network has been substituting institutions, causing new issues to the State. This leads to the issue of loyalty: citizens now feel that they do not need institution like the State to belong to, as many networks substitute its function. This paper analyses the Social Media use by citizens and its impact on public sector through Albert Hirschman’s classis “Exit, Voice, and Loyalty” and tries to address new aspects.

Extreme Parties and Political Rents

We study the rent-seeking behavior of political parties in a proportional representation system. In our model, the final policy choice of the parliament is a weighted average of parties’ policy positions, weights being their vote shares. An extreme party chooses a higher rent level than a moderate party in exchange for greater policy influence, except in some cases of unlikely distributions of parties. Moreover, political rents are not eliminated even with free entry, unless the entry cost is arbitrarily small.

A Two-factor Model of Intra-industry Trade: A Demonstration of Robustness of Krugman’s (1980) Model

Using Cobb-Douglas production function with increasing returns to scale, this paper presents an intra-industry trade model which contains two factors, capital and labor. Thus, this paper extends Krugman’s (1980) single-factor model to a two-factor model with the entry cost. Firstly, an equilibrium analysis of closed economy is carried out. After the condition of existence and uniqueness of equilibrium is obtained, the analytic solutions are given. Secondly, it provides an analysis on trade effects. The results show that, under setup of symmetry among firms, the intra-industry trade can only enable consumers to benefit from product diversification without making firms achieve economies of scale. Obviously, this conclusion is consistent with Krugman (1980), which thus indicates robustness of Krugman’s (1980) model.