scholarly journals Information Sharing in Oligopoly: Sharing Groups and Core-Periphery Architectures

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 95
Author(s):  
Sergio Currarini ◽  
Francesco Feri

The trade-off between the costs and benefits of disclosing a firm’s private information has been the object of a vast literature. The absence of incentives to share information on a common market demand prior to competition has been advocated to interpret information sharing as evidence of collusion. Recent contributions have looked at bilateral information sharing, showing that information sharing is consistent with pairwise stability, This paper studies the networked pattern of bilateral information sharing on market demand, focusing on the role of heterogeneous information (firms’ signals have different variances). We show that while pairwise stability predicts that i.i.d. signals are always shared in groups with a symmetric internal structure (both with and without side-payment and linking costs), heterogeneous signals are shared in asymmetric core-periphery architectures, in which “core” firms have more valuable information than periphery firms.

2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (8) ◽  
pp. 3075-3104 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Bird ◽  
Stephen A Karolyi ◽  
Thomas G Ruchti

Abstract To mitigate holdup by an informed incumbent lender, a private borrower may publicly share information in order to increase lender competition. Despite proprietary costs, a subset of private borrowers voluntarily share private information in loan and credit underwriting agreements. These borrowers switch lenders at a 16% higher rate and receive lower loan financing costs. For private firms that go public, we analyze changes in the net benefits of information sharing and study the potential estimation bias from unobservable borrower quality. This setting corroborates our inference that voluntary information sharing reduces lender holdup and alleviates financial constraints for private firms. Received May 25, 2017; editorial decision August 8, 2018 by Editor David Denis.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aditya Jain

We analyze demand information sharing collaboration between two manufacturers and a retailer under upstream competition. The manufacturers produce partially substitutable products, which are stocked by the retailer that sells them in the market characterized by random demand. The manufacturers are privately informed about uncertain demand and decide on whether to share this information with the retailer. We show that by not sharing information, a manufacturer ends up distorting its wholesale price upward to signal its private information to the retailer, and under upstream competition, this distortion is propagated to the competing manufacturer. Thus, although a manufacturer’s decision to not share information may benefit or hurt its own profit, this always benefits the competing manufacturer. Under low intensity of competition, signaling-driven distortions exacerbate double marginalization and hurt all parties, whereas under more intense competition, these distortions help manufacturers offset downward pressure on wholesale prices. Thus, in equilibrium similarly informed manufacturers share information in the former case but not in the latter case. Additionally, when manufacturers differ in their information accuracies, only the better-informed manufacturer shares information. The retailer always benefits from both manufacturers sharing information, and its benefits are larger when the better-informed manufacturer shares information. We show existence of a contracting mechanism the retailer can employ to enable information sharing. Finally, we analyze manufacturers’ information acquisition decisions and find that under competition, two manufacturers acquire minimal information so that they are better off not sharing information in the information sharing game. This paper was accepted by Vishal Gaur, operations management.


2011 ◽  
Vol 08 (03) ◽  
pp. 455-467 ◽  
Author(s):  
ERNESTO DAMIANI ◽  
FULVIO FRATI ◽  
ROMARIC TCHOKPON

Information sharing plays a role of paramount importance in modern supply chain environments. In fact, the elements that compose the chain need to share information about sensitive aspects of their business in order to build more accurate and profitable supply plans. In this paper, we describe how the increasing of information released increases the overall economic results of the whole chain, and how this information can be protected, exploiting secure computation techniques, to reduce the risk of data disclosure and prevent quasi-altruistic or selfish behaviors without interfering with the chain's normal operation, and in particular with the minimization of the cost function.


2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 135
Author(s):  
Suria Zainuddin ◽  
Che Ruhana Isa

The importance that workplace fairness and information sharing has on employees’ performance has gained a significant attention from researchers and practitioners. However, no empirical evidence on the combined role of both workplace fairness and information sharing on employee performance has been found so far. Thus the purpose of this study is to examine the effects of workplace fairness and information sharing on employees’ performance in a budget setting. A set of direct and indirect hypotheses are tested using survey data collected from 108 sub-unit managers from various industries, randomly selected from Bursa Malaysia (the stock exchange of Malaysia). The findings indicate that both workplace fairness and information sharing are positively associated with improved employee performance in a participative budget setting. Furthermore, information sharing mediates the relationship between workplace fairness and employee performance. This suggests that when employees perceive the budgeting process as being fair, they would be more willing to share information, which will then lead to improved employee performance.


2021 ◽  
pp. 105-122

Information sharing is examined to determine if the willingness to share information relates to the willingness to collaborate in interorganizational actions used to address cybersecurity threats. This study employs ANOVA by placing 85 organizational representatives that participated in a cyber terrorism training exercise into two categories: higher versus lower willingness to share information. The dependent measures in this study are proxies for collaboration measured by willingness to seek assistance from other organizations and willingness to offer assistance to other organizations. There is a significant statistical difference between the two categorizations of organizational representatives. The category that had a lower tendency to share information also had a lower willingness to collaborate with other organizations. This research shows that sharing information is critical when collaborative interorganizational action is required to face cybersecurity threats. Managers of organizations that respond to cybersecurity threats should promote the tendency to share information with other organizations that have the resources to aid in addressing the threat. Organizations involved in cybersecurity threats that are willing to share information are more willing to participate in integrative interorganizational efforts. This study includes a sample of actual decision makers of organizations that would handle cybersecurity attacks in their community. In this study, we demonstrate the role of information sharing for enhancing


Author(s):  
Rui Hou ◽  
Weijian Li ◽  
Xiaogang Lin ◽  
You Zhao

This study examines a retailer's decision to share market demand information in a supply chain wherein a supplier sells a product with a certain level of quality to a retailer, who then resells it to the end consumer. It also considers whether a supplier should establish a direct selling channel by incurring a fixed entry cost to compete with the retail channel. Although conventional wisdom indicates that a retailer may voluntarily disclose information under ex-ante supplier encroachment, our results show how and why a retailer may share information with the supplier who encroaches on the retail market with a decision on quality. Specifically, our findings reveal that information sharing is beneficial to the retailer when the quality cost coefficient is low and entry cost is relatively low, even under encroachment by the supplier. Moreover, the retailer may prefer to disclose demand information to the supplier if the quality cost coefficient is low, even when the entry cost is high, under non-encroachment. Interestingly, we found that the supplier prefers to encroach if the retailer shares demand information when the entry cost is moderate. Further, we found that the retailer has a higher incentive to share information under supplier encroachment compared with non-encroachment. These results are in sharp contrast with the extant literature.


2007 ◽  
pp. 70-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. Demidova

This article analyzes definitions and the role of hostile takeovers at the Russian and European markets for corporate control. It develops the methodology of assessing the efficiency of anti-takeover defenses adapted to the conditions of the Russian market. The paper uses the cost-benefit analysis, where the costs and benefits of the pre-bid and post-bid defenses are compared.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elisa Baek ◽  
Diana Tamir ◽  
Emily B. Falk

Information sharing is a ubiquitous social behavior. What causes people to share? Mentalizing, or considering the mental states of other people, has been theorized to play a central role in information sharing, with higher activity in the brain’s mentalizing system associated with increased likelihood to share information. In line with this theory, we present novel evidence that mentalizing causally increases information sharing. In three pre-registered studies (n = 400, 840, and 3500 participants), participants who were instructed to consider the mental states of potential information receivers indicated higher likelihood to share health news compared to a control condition where they were asked to reflect on the content of the article. Certain kinds of mentalizing were particularly effective; in particular, considering receivers’ emotional and positive mental states, led to the greatest increase in likelihood to share. The relationship between mentalizing and sharing was mediated by feelings of closeness with potential receivers. Mentalizing increased feelings of connectedness to potential receivers, and in turn, increased likelihood of information sharing. Considering receivers’ emotional, positive, and inward-focused mental states was most effective at driving participants to feel closer with potential receivers and increase sharing. Data provide evidence for a causal relationship between mentalizing and information sharing and provide insight about the mechanism linking mentalizing and sharing. Taken together, these results advance theories of information sharing and shed light on previously observed brain-behavior relationships.


2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carol Anilowski Cain ◽  
Antonio J. Macias ◽  
Juan Manuel Sanchez
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