Checks and Balances, Political Competition, and Public Goods in the Brazilian States

2013 ◽  
pp. 69-96
Author(s):  
Marcus André Melo ◽  
Carlos Pereira
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Political Competition ◽  
Checks And Balances

scholarly journals ELECTORAL LOYALTY AND QUALITY OF SERVICE DELIVERY IN RUSSIAN MUNICIPALITIES

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 62-75
Author(s):  
Margarita Zavadskaya ◽  
◽  
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Political Competition ◽  
Local Level ◽  
Administrative Practices ◽  
The Russian Federation ◽  
Quality Of Governance ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Election Commission ◽  
Analysis Point

Local self-government in Russia has undergone a number of transformations - from spontaneous decentralization in the 1990s until the stage-by-stage integration into the state vertical system from 2003-2006. Despite the de facto loss of political and, partly, administrative autonomy, we see a huge diversity in the quality of governance and provision of public goods at the local level. Based on the Database of Municipalities' Characteristics (DMC) of Rosstat from 2008 to 2017 and data from the Central Election Commission (CEC of the Russian Federation), the article presents indices of the quality of the provision of public goods and analyzes the relationship with the Duma voting in 2016 and the budgetary autonomy of the municipality. Despite the continuing centralization of government, researchers still observe an impressive variation in both the formats of political competition and administrative practices in the regions, especially at the local level. The results of the analysis point to a number of patterns: 1. There is no strong link between budget independence and the quality of management; 2. Securing votes does not lead to the attraction of additional resources to the field and may even divert scarce funds and the human resources to technically support this loyalty.

Did Hamilton, Jefferson, and Madison “Cause” the U.S. Government Shutdown? The Institutional Path from an Eighteenth Century Republic to a Twenty-first Century Democracy

2015 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
John H. Aldrich
Keyword(s):  
Civil Rights ◽  
Party System ◽  
Jim Crow ◽  
Political Competition ◽  
The South ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Partisan Polarization ◽  
The North ◽  
Post War ◽  
Separated Powers

This address asks how we got to today’s politics in America; a politics of polarized political parties engaged in close political competition in a system of checks and balances. The result has often been divided control of government and an apparent inability to address major political problems. This address develops the historical foundation for these characteristics. Historically, the Founding period set the stage of separated powers and the first party system. America developed a market economy, a middle class, and a mass-based set of parties in the Antebellum period. Through the Progressive era, nation-wide reforms led to a more democratic but increasingly candidate-centered politics in the North, and the establishment of Jim Crow politics in the South. The post-War period saw the full development of candidate-centered elections. While the breakup of Jim Crow due to the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts in the mid-1960s ended Jim Crow and made possible a competitive party system in the South, the later was delayed until the full implementation of the Republican’s “southern strategy” in 1980 and beyond. This set in motion the partisan polarization of today, to combine with separated powers to create what many refer to as the “current” political “dysfunction.”

Political Dynasties and Economic Development: Evidence using Nighttime Light in the Philippines

2021 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 215-261
Author(s):  
Ludigil Garces ◽  
Karl Jandoc ◽  
Mary Grace Lu
Keyword(s):  
Economic Development ◽  
Political Competition ◽  
The Philippines ◽  
Economic Effects ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Weak Institutions ◽  
Defense Meteorological Satellite Program ◽  
Nighttime Light Data ◽  
Nighttime Light ◽  
Relationship Of

Abstract Political dynasties, by limiting political competition, are thought to exacerbate corruption, poverty, and abuse of power. This paper examines the economic effects of the presence of political dynasties in Philippine cities and municipalities, taking into account possible channels in the local dynastic cycle – the framework in which politicians try to balance their goals to perform well for their constituents, to divert resources for personal gain, and to continue to be in power. Due to the lack of extensive income accounts or other economic indicators in finer geographical units (i.e., city or municipality level), we use the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program-Operational Linescan System (DMSP-OLS) nighttime light data as our proxy for economic activity. Using a panel of Philippine municipalities and cities, we find that, in general, the relationship of political dynasties on economic performance is weak. However, we find that a higher share of economic expenditures leads to lower economic development in municipalities where the mayor, governor, and congressman belong to the same clan. We see this as an indication of weak institutions of checks and balances in localities with dynasties.

Political Parties and Public Policy

2020 ◽  
pp. 180-204
Author(s):  
Christian Salas ◽  
Frances Mccall Rosenbluth ◽  
Ian Shapiro
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Political Parties ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Political Competition ◽  
Political Accountability ◽  
Party Discipline

Failures of representation and democracy cannot be solved by weakening parties. Rather, democratic success requires political competition among strong parties that can identify and defend the broad interests of the community as a whole. The fragmentation of political parties reduces spending on public goods, and weakening party discipline diminishes political accountability.

What resource curse? The null effect of remittances on public good provision

2018 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 431-450 ◽  
Author(s):  
Desiree A Desierto
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Political Competition ◽  
Resource Curse ◽  
Public Good Provision ◽  
Formal Models ◽  
Null Effect ◽  
The Government ◽  
Good Provision

Existing formal models show that remittances generate a resource curse by allowing the government to appropriate its revenues toward rents, rather than public good provision. Households spend their remittance income on public-good substitutes, thereby alleviating the pressure on the government to provide public goods. However, the process by which the government survives the implicit threat of political challengers remains unspecified. By explicitly modeling political competition, I show that there is actually no resource curse from remittances. When there are challengers who can threaten to replace the incumbent leader, the best that any challenger can do is to offer not to take advantage of households’ provision of public-good substitutes, which induces the incumbent to try to match the offer. In equilibrium, public good provision is independent of remittances. This result holds even when no challenger can credibly commit to maintaining her offer once she is in power.

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