Electoral Volatility and the Dutch Party System: A Comparative Perspective

Acta Politica ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 43 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 235-253 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Mair
Author(s):  
Ekrem Karakoç

This chapter opens by providing empirical evidence that income inequality persists or increases in many new democracies after their transition. Then it gives a brief overview of studies that expect reduced inequality because of democratization and questions their three assumptions regarding median voters, party system stability, and the authoritarian legacy on citizen–party linkage. It offers a revision to the median voter theory, emphasizes high electoral volatility in new democracies, and reexamines the legacy of previous nondemocratic regimes on citizen–party linkage. Having offered its argument in a nutshell, it turns to research methodology and case selection. It offers the rationale behind employing a multimethod approach to test its arguments. It tests its argument through large-N analysis in new and longstanding democracies in Europe as well as two paired case studies: Poland and the Czech Republic in postcommunist Europe and Turkey and Spain in Southern Europe.


2016 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 115-139 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryan E. Carlin ◽  
Gregory J. Love

How does democratic politics inform the interdisciplinary debate on the evolution of human co-operation and the social preferences (for example, trust, altruism and reciprocity) that support it? This article advances a theory of partisan trust discrimination in electoral democracies based on social identity, cognitive heuristics and interparty competition. Evidence from behavioral experiments in eight democracies show ‘trust gaps’ between co- and rival partisans are ubiquitous, and larger than trust gaps based on the social identities that undergird the party system. A natural experiment found that partisan trust gaps in the United States disappeared immediately following the killing of Osama bin Laden. But observational data indicate that partisan trust gaps track with perceptions of party polarization in all eight cases. Finally, the effects of partisanship on trust outstrip minimal group treatments, yet minimal-group effects are on par with the effects of most treatments for ascriptive characteristics in the literature. In sum, these findings suggest political competition dramatically shapes the salience of partisanship in interpersonal trust, the foundation of co-operation.


2021 ◽  
pp. 27-51
Author(s):  
Fernando Casal Bértoa ◽  
Zsolt Enyedi

The second chapter introduces the dataset of the book, defines its units of measurement, and operationalizes its key concepts. We discuss the method of creating our principal tool of analysis, the composite closure index. We reflect in detail on the question of how experiences accumulated through time can be taken into account when measuring stability. Finally, in a validation exercise, we also investigate whether our closure index could have been used to predict which democracies collapsed around the world between the two World Wars. With this exercise we also show that closure is a better proxy for party system institutionalization than the more traditionally used indicator, the electoral volatility index.


2016 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 320-336
Author(s):  
Gülçın Balamır Coşkun

This article argues that the effects of high-level corruption scandals on the future of a dominant party depend on the existence of a rule of law system based on the separation of powers. The article will study two examples from a comparative perspective to concretise its theoretical claims: the Christian Democracy Party in Italy, which was the dominant party from 1948 to 1992, and the Justice and Development Party in Turkey. The comparison will be based on an institutionalist perspective. The first part tries to provide a theoretical clarification of the concepts of predominant party systems and corruption. The second part discusses whether the Turkish and Italian party systems can be classified as predominant and the characteristics of these systems. The final section seeks to draw out similarities and differences between these two systems and the effects corruption has on them.


1986 ◽  
Vol 80 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. Bingham Powell

Despite relatively favorable citizen attitudes, voter turnout in American national elections is far below the average of 80% of the eligible electorate that votes in other industrialized democracies. The American institutional setting—particularly the party system and the registration laws—severely inhibits voter turnout, and probably also accounts for the unusual degree to which education and other socioeconomic resources are directly linked to voting participation in the United States.Using a combination of aggregate and comparative survey data, the present analysis suggests that in comparative perspective, turnout in the United States is advantaged about 5% by political attitudes, but disadvantaged 13% by the party system and institutional factors, and up to 14% by the registration laws. The experience of other democracies suggests that encouraging voter participation would contribute to channeling discontent through the electoral process. Even a significantly expanded American electorate would be more interested and involved in political activity than are present voters in most other democracies.


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