Revolutionary High? Exposure to Violence and Drug Use after Revolution

Does exposure to violence during revolution increase drug use? We leverage a unique panel study, the Population Council’s Survey of Young People in Egypt (SYPE), to test whether rates of drug use are higher among those who witnessed violence during the 2011 revolution. We find that exposure to state violence during the revolution significantly increases drug use; respondents exposed to violence are 1 to 2 percentage points more likely to use drugs than those who were not, an effect size similar to important predictors such as losing employment or experiencing depression. Our results are robust to specifications that control for respondents’ reported exposure to police brutality prior to the revolution, as well as drug use among family and friends, factors identified in the medical literature as important predictors of drug use. This increase in drug use has important implications for drug policy preferences, particularly in nondemocratic regimes like Egypt.

From Benefits and Beneficiaries: The Historical Origins of Old-Age Pensions From a Political Regime Perspective

Global studies on the historical origins of old-age pensions from a political regime perspective are quite rare. Based on the novel PENLEG dataset this article shows that democratic and nondemocratic regimes had different policy priorities when designing old-age pensions for the first time. Whereas democracies had significantly higher legal pension coverage rates than nondemocratic regimes, the reverse pattern can be found for pension replacement rates. The study also shows that temporal effects and colonial legacy mattered. Longstanding democracies introduced much higher legal pension coverage rates than countries that had recently democratized. Additionally, the French colonial legacy spurred high legal pension coverage rates in African autocracies. These findings underline the importance of taking the multidimensionality of welfare programs into account when analyzing political regime differences. Moreover, due attention must be paid to the historical context when theorizing about welfare policies from a political regime perspective.

Institutional reforms as a factor of transit of power in non-democratic regimes: case studies of China, Iran and post-Soviet nations

How can institutional reforms ensure the transit of power in nondemocratic regimes? Having studied five cases in and around the Post-Soviet space, the authors offer three models of such transit: establishment of new institutions (Kazakhstan), parallel evolution of formal institutions and informal norms (China, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan), legalization of transit effected through informal norms (Iran). In the first model, the leader of the nation had his role perpetuated, received lifelong privileges and retained control over the security council with enhanced powers, some of the powers of the president being transferred to parliament. The second model observes the transit of power in three stages: the achievement of intra-elite consensus on new leadership, the occupation of key positions by the accepted individuals, and legitimation of the outcome through formal procedures. The third model is the result of an institutional reform that was not completed by the time of transit: the transfer of power looked legitimate to those who made an informal decision by imitating the formal procedure, but was illegal – legal provisions for such transit were adopted two months later. All the studied cases share three features: 1) the government conducts institutional reforms to ensure the transit of power, 2) elections are held, but instead of shaping new government they legitimize the agreements of the elites, 3) informal agreements are no less important than the institutional structure, the latter often being amended to match the former.

When Does Oil Harm Child Mortality?

When is oil a curse for health outcomes? This paper addresses the question by analyzing the effect of oil wealth on child mortality rates in nondemocratic countries. We argue that oil is particularly likely to harm child mortality when leaders have short time horizons. Such leaders are more likely to use oil revenues to finance private goods and patronage which builds their support coalition at the expense of public goods that benefit the broader population. We test this argument using panel regression and a global sample of nondemocratic regimes, supplemented with a case study of Cameroon. Results from both empirical approaches are consistent with our argument. These findings identify some specific conditions under which oil can be detrimental to child mortality, and thus explain some of the variation in health outcomes across oil-producing states.