Feeling as knowing — Part I

2000 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 245-257 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timo Järvilehto

The theoretical approach described in a series of articles (Jarvilehto, 1998a,b,c, 1999, 2000) is developed further in relation to the problems of emotion, consciousness, and brain activity. The approach starts with the claim that many conceptual confusions in psychology are due to the postulate that the organism and the environment are two interacting systems (”Two systems theory”). The gist of the approach is the idea that the organism and environment form a unitary system which is the basis of subjective experience. This starting point leads to the conception of emotions as reorganization of the organism-environment system, and entails that emotion and knowledge are only different aspects of the same process. In the first part of the article the general outline of the approach is sketched, and in a subsequent second part (Jarvilehto, 2001) the relations between emotions, consciousness, and brain activity will be discussed in detail.

Author(s):  
Phil Hiver ◽  
Ali H. Al-Hoorie ◽  
Diane Larsen-Freeman

Abstract Complexity theory/dynamic systems theory has challenged conventional approaches to applied linguistics research by encouraging researchers to adopt a pragmatic transdisciplinary approach that is less paradigmatic and more problem-oriented in nature. Its proponents have argued that the starting point in research design should not be the quantitative–qualitative distinction, or even mixed methods, but the distinction between individual versus group-based designs (i.e., idiographic versus nomothetic). Taking insights from transdisciplinary complexity research in other human and social sciences, we propose an integrative transdisciplinary framework that unites these different perspectives (quantitative–qualitative, individual–group based) from the starting point of exploratory–falsificatory aims. We discuss the implications of this transdisciplinary approach to applied linguistics research and illustrate how such an integrated approach might be implemented in the field.


2020 ◽  
Vol 48 (2-4) ◽  
pp. 192-223
Author(s):  
Volkhard Krech

If religion is a socio-cultural meaning system as part of the socio-cultural sphere, then how does it relate to mental, organic, and physical processes that belong to the environment of religion? The article contributes to answering this question by referring to semiotics, systems theory, and theoretical biology. The starting point is understanding religious evolution as a co-evolution to societal evolution, namely, as one of the latter’s internal differentiations. In turn, societal evolution is a co-evolution to mental, organic, and physical evolution. These evolutionary spheres mutually constitute one another’s environments. The eigenstate of the socio-cultural sphere consists of language activated via communication. Language is the replicator of socio-cultural processes corresponding to the function of the genome in organic processes. The differentiation of spheres in general evolution concerns respective organic, mental, and socio-cultural substrates, while the substrate-neutral structure of the two evolutionary dimensions of organic and societal processes, including religion, is revealed as semiotic patterns that organic and societal processes have in common. Organic and religious processes of generating information are isomorphic. Thus, semiosis mediates between religious communication and its environment.


2014 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-102 ◽  

Synchronized neuronal activity in the cortex generates weak electric fields that are routinely measured in humans and animal models by electroencephalography and local field potential recordings. Traditionally, these endogenous electric fields have been considered to be an epiphenomenon of brain activity. Recent work has demonstrated that active cortical networks are surprisingly susceptible to weak perturbations of the membrane voltage of a large number of neurons by electric fields. Simultaneously, noninvasive brain stimulation with weak, exogenous electric fields (transcranial current stimulation, TCS) has undergone a renaissance due to the broad scope of its possible applications in modulating brain activity for cognitive enhancement and treatment of brain disorders. This review aims to interface the recent developments in the study of both endogenous and exogenous electric fields, with a particular focus on rhythmic stimulation for the modulation of cortical oscillations. The main goal is to provide a starting point for the use of rational design for the development of novel mechanism-based TCS therapeutics based on transcranial alternating current stimulation, for the treatment of psychiatric illnesses.


2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 78-83
Author(s):  
Jonas Gonçalves Coelho

Many neuroscientific experiments, based on monitoring brain activity, suggest that it is possible to predict the conscious intention/choice/decision of an agent before he himself knows that. Some neuroscientists and philosophers interpret the results of these experiments as showing that free will is an illusion, since it is the brain and not the conscious mind that intends/chooses/decides. Assuming that the methods and results of these experiments are reliable the question is if they really show that free will is an illusion. To address this problem, I argue that first it is needed to answer three questions related to the relationship between conscious mind and brain: 1. Do brain events cause conscious events? 2. Do conscious events cause brain events? 3. Who is the agent, that is, who consciously intends/chooses/ decides, the conscious mind, the brain, or both? I answer these questions by arguing that the conscious mind is a property of the brain due to which the brain has the causal capacity to interact adaptively with its body, and trough the body, with the physical and sociocultural environment. In other words, the brain is the agent and the conscious mind, in its various forms - cognitive, volitional and emotional - and contents, is its guide of action. Based on this general view I argue that the experiments aforementioned do not show that free will is an illusion, and as a starting point for examining this problem I point out, from some exemplary situations, what I believe to be some of the necessary conditions for free will.Key-words: Agent brain, conscious mind, free will, Libet-style experiments.


Author(s):  
Catherine Raeff

The goals of this chapter are to summarize systems theory, which provides an overarching theoretical basis for the current work, and to introduce action as the key concept that will be conceptualized in more detail in subsequent chapters. Systems theory is the starting point for the current work because it is based on integrative and relational assumptions and because it offers a way of understanding complex phenomena in terms of multiple processes that mutually affect each other. In this chapter, systems theory is further summarized in terms of connections among parts and wholes, multiple kinds of causality, emergence, stability, and variability. Action is then identified as the wider whole or system that represents what people do. The chapter ends by acknowledging some of the values that inform how the author is thinking about action.


2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (7) ◽  
pp. 1369-1380 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicola Binetti ◽  
Alessandro Tomassini ◽  
Karl Friston ◽  
Sven Bestmann

Timing emerges from a hierarchy of computations ranging from early encoding of physical duration (time sensation) to abstract time representations (time perception) suitable for storage and decisional processes. However, the neural basis of the perceptual experience of time remains elusive. To address this, we dissociate brain activity uniquely related to lower-level sensory and higher-order perceptual timing operations, using event-related fMRI. Participants compared subsecond (500 msec) sinusoidal gratings drifting with constant velocity (standard) against two probe stimuli: (1) control gratings drifting at constant velocity or (2) accelerating gratings, which induced illusory shortening of time. We tested two probe intervals: a 500-msec duration (Short) and a longer duration required for an accelerating probe to be perceived as long as the standard (Long—individually determined). On each trial, participants classified the probe as shorter or longer than the standard. This allowed for comparison of trials with an “Objective” (physical) or “Subjective” (perceived) difference in duration, based on participant classifications. Objective duration revealed responses in bilateral early extrastriate areas, extending to higher visual areas in the fusiform gyrus (at more lenient thresholds). By contrast, Subjective duration was reflected by distributed responses in a cortical/subcortical areas. This comprised the left superior frontal gyrus and the left cerebellum, and a wider set of common timing areas including the BG, parietal cortex, and posterior cingulate cortex. These results suggest two functionally independent timing stages: early extraction of duration information in sensory cortices and Subjective experience of duration in a higher-order cortical–subcortical timing areas.


2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Charlotte Martial ◽  
Armand Mensen ◽  
Vanessa Charland-Verville ◽  
Audrey Vanhaudenhuyse ◽  
Daniel Rentmeister ◽  
...  

Abstract The neurobiological basis of near-death experiences (NDEs) is unknown, but a few studies attempted to investigate it by reproducing in laboratory settings phenomenological experiences that seem to closely resemble NDEs. So far, no study has induced NDE-like features via hypnotic modulation while simultaneously measuring changes in brain activity using high-density EEG. Five volunteers who previously had experienced a pleasant NDE were invited to re-experience the NDE memory and another pleasant autobiographical memory (dating to the same time period), in normal consciousness and with hypnosis. We compared the hypnosis-induced subjective experience with the one of the genuine experience memory. Continuous high-density EEG was recorded throughout. At a phenomenological level, we succeeded in recreating NDE-like features without any adverse effects. Absorption and dissociation levels were reported as higher during all hypnosis conditions as compared to normal consciousness conditions, suggesting that our hypnosis-based protocol increased the felt subjective experience in the recall of both memories. The recall of a NDE phenomenology was related to an increase of alpha activity in frontal and posterior regions. This study provides a proof-of-concept methodology for studying the phenomenon, enabling to prospectively explore the NDE-like features and associated EEG changes in controlled settings.


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