Language-education policies and international institutions

2014 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maryam Borjian

One of the grand claims of neoliberalism is that the free-market world is an ‘actor-free’ process, in which no one is in charge. The aim of this article is to problematize this claim by examining the agency of two international institutions, the World Bank and UNESCO, and the ways in which they shape global language-education policies. In light of the latest reports released by the two institutions, the findings of this study suggest that both institutions are key players in the realm of global policies. Their differences, however, recline in their orientations, motives, and power. Whereas the World Bank is a finance institution with ‘economic prosperity’ as its motto, and neoliberalism as the basis of its policies, UNESCO is an intellectual institution with peace as its mantra, and universal consensus and social inclusion as the basis of its policies. The impact of such differences is notable on the type of policies each institution advocates. Whereas the World Bank’s policies call for an alliance between language, education and economy as a means to eradicate poverty and achieve development, UNESCO’s policies call for multiculturalism, multilingualism, and pluralism in education as a means to promote intercultural and international dialogues as a strategy to safeguard peace. The former model is currently in vogue in education sectors worldwide. Its global domination, however, cannot be explained without taking into account the financial supremacy of the World Bank, the economic dependency of many world’s nations on the World Bank’s long-term developmental loans, and the many conditions set by the Bank for its loan distributions, which includes, among others, the implementation of its neoliberal-driven educational and linguistic policies.

2013 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 89
Author(s):  
M. N. S. Marobela ◽  
Rudolph. L. Boy

This paper examines how powerful international institutions work to influence the reforms trajectory in the developing countries. A key dynamic that brings them to Botswana is the neoliberal agenda of the World Bank, which has been increasingly creeping into the public sector in many countries. For Botswana, this comes not as a surprise as the government is renowned for its strong conviction in the free market as a vehicle for development and prosperity. However, what is surprising is the idea being peddled by government bureaucrats that these changes are mainly initiated from within. It is argued that the involvement of networks of international organisations in Botswana’s reforms dispels this myth. The paper demonstrates how earlier concerns raised by the World Bank, of low productivity in Botswana became materialised with the assistance of a number of consultants from international institutions, who provided varied support to the government of Botswana. For example such assistance came in form of financial, intellectual, and training of government officers. It is from the role played by these international institutions that the national structures and mechanisms have changed the public service. This has eventually led to neoliberal reforms in the form of Performance Management System being the accepted dogma for improving productivity in the Botswana public service. 


2017 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 1357-1379 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allison Carnegie ◽  
Cyrus Samii

How do international institutions affect political liberalization in member states? Motivated by an examination of the World Bank loans program, this article shows that institutions can incentivize liberalization by offering opportunities for countries to become associated with advanced, wealthy members. In the World Bank, when a loan recipient reaches a specified level of economic development, it becomes eligible to graduate from borrower status to lender status. Using a regression discontinuity design, the study demonstrates that this incentive motivates states to improve their domestic behavior with respect to human rights and democracy. Combining qualitative and quantitative evidence, the results suggest that the desire to become a member of this elite group is responsible for motivating member states to reform due to the belief that such membership brings diffuse international and domestic benefits.


2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 115
Author(s):  
Samuel D. Barrows

The dynamics of the five fastest growing GDP per capita economies in Asia and the EU are studied between 2010 and 2014. This time frame was selected in order to avoid the height of the 2008-2009 financial crisis, but to include the stimulus and recovery periods which occurred afterward. The intent was not to compare the recoveries or the impact of the stimulus programs. The intent was to compare the economic growth rates of the two groups and also the absolute per capita income along with five topic areas on economies including: configuration, utilization, investments, demographics, and outcomes. A total of twenty measurements are used for assessment from the World Bank databank website. The findings are that the Asian economies grew faster while the EU economies had a higher per capita income. The workforces of the Asia economies are also younger and more flexible whereas the workforces of the EU economies are older, but more educated. Discussions include the links between effective governments and economic development and the links between democracy and economic levels.


2003 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ngaire Woods

How can governments and peoples better hold to account international economic institutions, such as the WTO, the World Bank, and the IMF? This article proposes an approach based on public accountability, advocating improvements in four areas: constitutional, political, financial, and internal accountability.The argument for more accountability is made with two caveats: more accountability is not always good–it can be distorting and costly; and, enhancing the accountability of international institutions should not justify increasing their jurisdiction for the sake of reducing the role of national governments. Constitutional accountability poses limits on how the institutions expand their activities, requiring the active consent of all members and particularly those most affected by their activities. Political accountability requires that those who make decisions in the organizations are directly answerable to all member governments and not just to the most powerful ones. The institutions' uneven record and structure of financial accountability is addressed through a model of mutual restraint. Finally, the internal accountability should ensure that technical decisions are distinguishable from political decisions. A better matching of the right kinds of accountability to the activities of the organizations would improve both their effectiveness and legitimacy.


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