On Choosing a Morality1

1975 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 357-374 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. B. Thomas

John Rawls’ use of a contractarian strategy for justifying basic principles of justice has raised the hope that a similar strategy might work for a theory of right and moral principles generally. I want to show that this hope cannot be fulfilled.In what follows I interpret contractarianism in a Rawlsian way on the grounds that his is the most plausible version of the doctrine we are likely to get. I am not however concerned with the details of Rawls’ argument for justice but instead with an idea that appears to underlie the contractarian strategy. In order to avoid the complications of Rawlsian exegesis, I choose to discuss the doctrine as it might be used to justify a moral principle of mutual assistance and not as Rawls in fact uses it to justify principles of justice.

1988 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gilbert Harman

Gauthier's title is potentially misleading. The phrase “morals by agreement” suggests a social contract theory of morality according to which basic moral principles arise out of an actual or hypothetical agreement. John Rawls defends a hypothetical agreement version, arguing that the basic principles of justice are those that would be agreed to in an initial position of fair equality. I myself defend an actual agreement version, arguing that the moral principles that apply to a person derive from implicit conventions the person has accepted in dealing with other people. Gauthier's view is different from either of these sorts of contract theory. Instead, he holds that certain basic principles of impartiality are prior to actual agreements.


1997 ◽  
Vol 91 (3) ◽  
pp. 635-646 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Klosko

In Political Liberalism, John Rawls employs a distinctive method of “political constructivism” to establish his well-known principles of justice, arguing that his principles are suited to bridge the ineradicable pluralism of liberal societies and so to ground an “overlapping consensus.” Setting aside the question of whether Rawls's method supports his principles, I argue that he does not adequately defend reliance on this particular method rather than alternatives. If the goal of Rawls's “political” philosophy is to derive principles that are able to overcome liberal pluralism, then another and simpler method should be employed. The “method of convergence” would develop liberal principles directly from the convergence of comprehensive views in existing societies, and so give rise to quite different moral principles.


Dialogue ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-154
Author(s):  
Colin Farrelly

Recent advances in genetic research pose many complex problems for moral and political philosophers. On the one hand, these advances promise great things. Genetic enhancement techniques might allow us to prevent or cure a variety of debilitating diseases. But on the other hand, talk about intervening in people's genetic make-up conjures up memories of the sinister episodes of past eugenic movements. Such movements violated the most basic principles of justice. How can society capitalize on the benefits of genetic intervention and yet avoid the injustices of past eugenic movements? What basic moral principles should guide public policy and individual choice concerning the use of genetic interventions? These important questions are tackled by Allen Buchanan, Dan Brock, Norman Daniels, and Daniel Wikler in From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice. This book brings together the thoughts of leading scholars in the field and is likely to set the agenda for serious debate on this topic.


1977 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 438-461 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Amdur

In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls seeks to derive principles of justice from the agreement of rational, hypothetical individuals, each concerned to further his own interests. From a carefully defined initial situation of choice, Rawls derives two basic principles: one demanding equal liberties for all, the other permitting inequalities in wealth and authority only when they serve to maximize the expectations of those who are left worst off. This article explores the political and social implications of Rawls' theory. It is argued (1) that the theory requires a constitutional democracy, offering very strong protection to political and intellectual liberties; and (2) that it also requires a highly egalitarian distribution of wealth and income. Although Rawls does not discuss international distributive justice, there are good reasons for concluding that his distributive principles ought to apply globally.


2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 138-151
Author(s):  
Andi Fajar Awaluddin

AbstractDa'wah activities in a plurality society not only have a strong basic principles of faith but can also realize basic principles of moral and social ethics. Their existence must receive guidance so that the community has the character of loving kindness, opposing evil, and not recognizing violence in accordance with Islamic teachings. Under these conditions, a strong foundation of faith will be able to realize a life  that is in harmony with everyday life such as a sense of social justice, security, mutual assistance to help, respect, and others. The values of da'wah mentioned above must be implemented in everyday life in a plurality society with reference to the principles, namely : (1) Islamic civilization stand son the basis of monotheism,(2) civilization that is humane, transcendental, and has international insight, (3) always hold moral principles. Keywords :  The values of da’wah, Proverb, Mahfudzat


2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 27-54
Author(s):  
M. Nasor

Da'wah activities in plurality communities not only have strong basic principles of faith but also can realize basic moral principles and social ethics. Their existence must get guidance so that the community has the character of loving kindness, opposing evil, and not knowing violence in accordance with Islamic teachings. In such conditions the basis of a strong faith will be able to create a life that is in harmony with everyday life such as a sense of social justice, security, mutual help, respect, and others. The values of da'wah mentioned above must be implemented in daily life in a plurality society by referring to the principles, namely: (1) Islamic civilization stands on the basis of monotheism, (2) civilizations that are human, transcendental, and have international insight, (3) always hold moral principles, (4) believe in the right knowledge, and (5) have religious tolerance. Universal values of da'wah regulate relationships based on aspects of mutual respect, non-coercion, principles of justice, humanity, togetherness, brotherhood, freedom, unity and democracy.


2020 ◽  
Vol - (5) ◽  
pp. 73-86
Author(s):  
Denys Kiryukhin

The development of the theory of deliberative democracy is connected to the completion of two tasks. The first is to combine broad political participation with the rationality of the political process. The second is to ensure the political unity of modern societies, which are characterized by a pluralism of often incompatible values, norms, and lifestyles. Within the framework of this theory, the key democratic procedure is rational deliberation open to all interested parties. The purpose of this procedure is to reach an agreement, as stated in the theory of Jurgen Habermas. However, experimental studies of deliberative practices show that they may result not in agreement but in the radicalization of positions. Unlike Habermas, John Rawls believes that a consensus on values and norms is unattainable. His theory of political liberalism attempts to answer the question of how political unity is possible in practically insoluble conflict, that is, in a situation of disagreement. He proposes the ideal of a well-ordered society with the assumption that a just society is one in which there is no agreement on comprehensive doctrines, but there is a consensus on the basic principles of justice. However, Rawls’s theory, in turn, faces a number of significant problems. For example, he was forced to admit that the democratic culture of society is a prerequisite for the formation of basic principles of justice in a well-ordered society. Rawls’s idea about the connections among disagreement, political freedom, and democracy influenced the further development of the theory of democracy, stimulating the search for different models of decision-making and the formation of political will without rational agreement. After all, the possibility of democracy lies in the conflict of ideas about justice and good.


John Rawls ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 15-20

John Rawls advances an ideal of democratic political discourse that he calls “public reason.” When it comes to public discussions of basic principles of justice and constitutional essentials, Rawls contends citizens have a duty of civility to offer arguments that they believe will be found reasonable by other citizens. He holds that arguments for the foundational principles of shared society ought not depend on specific religious doctrines or controversial moral theories that one cannot reasonably expect other citizens to find acceptable. Instead, public discussions of issues of justice ought to use shared standards of reasoning, uncontroversial empirical claims, and values that can be the subject of an overlapping consensus among diverse reasonable views. Rawls calls this form of reasoning “public reason.” By appealing to public reasons, one shows respect for others’ views. As Charles Larmore puts it, “We respect others as ends in themselves, [Rawls] holds, when in regard to their claims and interests we act on reasons that we are prepared to explain to them in light of mutually acceptable principles.”...


1993 ◽  
Vol 87 (2) ◽  
pp. 348-359 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Klosko

John Rawls has recently argued that political philosophy can significantly contribute to making democratic societies stable. He seeks moral principles that can ground what he calls an overlapping consensus and argues that his well-known principles of justice can serve in this capacity. I criticize both Rawls's general claims about the role of political philosophy and his particular defense of the principles of justice. Both arguments commit Rawls to specific empirical claims about existing liberal societies that are highly questionable. In particular, the Kantian moral views that Rawls believes to be central to liberal culture are controverted by extensive empirical research on the actual beliefs of liberal citizens. Despite the problems with Rawls's arguments, I suggest that a rather different overlapping consensus appears to contribute to stable democracies. This centers on support of the political system rather than more substantive moral principles.


Author(s):  
Michael Moehler

This chapter discusses contractualist theories of justice that, although they rely explicitly on moral assumptions in the traditional understanding of morality, employ rational choice theory for the justification of principles of justice. In particular, the chapter focuses on the dispute between Rawls and Harsanyi about the correct choice of principles of justice in the original position. The chapter shows that there is no winner in the Rawls–Harsanyi dispute and, ultimately, formal methods alone cannot justify moral principles. This finding is significant for the development of the rational decision situation that serves for the derivation of the weak principle of universalization for the domain of pure instrumental morality.


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