The Carter administration and the "communist question" in Italy. The political development and action, 1976-1978

Jimmy Carter was elected President of the United States in November 1976. A few months earlier, the Italian elections marked an extraordinary result for the Italian Communist Party (PCI), and some of its members obtained institutional roles. During the electoral campaign, members of Carter's entourage released declarations that seemed to prelude to abandoning the anti-communist veto posed by previous governments. For a year after the inauguration, the US administration maintained an ambiguous position. Nonetheless, on 12 January 1978, the United States reiterated its opposition to any forms of participation of communists in the Italian government. Drawing on a varied set of sources and analysing the role of non-state actors, including think tanks and university centres, this article examines the debate on the Italian "communist question" within the Carter administration and among its advisers. Such discussion will be placed within a wider debate that crossed America's liberal culture.

Inclusion and Exclusion: Image and Perceptions of Turkish Migrants in Bulgaria and Turkey

This paper deals with the image and perceptions that Turkish migrants from Bulgaria had about the Turks in Turkey, the Turkish state, Bulgarians, and the Bulgarian state both before and after 1989. Perceptions of the Turkish minority among the Bulgarian communist elite are analysed according to published reports and statements made by Bulgarian Communist Party members. The perceptions that Turkish migrants had about Bulgaria and Turkey are the main focus of this study which is based on field research and interviews conducted with Turkish migrants from Bulgaria now living in Turkey. This article shows that these migrants held both positive and negative perceptions of Bulgaria and Turkey, largely depending on the context. The Turkish minority in Bulgaria was regarded as a problem for the Communist government and as an in-ternal enemy to the Bulgarian state. Moreover, the locals in Turkey regarded the Turkish migrants from Bulgaria as “Bulgarian migrants” who possessed a non-Muslim or “liberal” culture. In this way, they experienced exclusionary attitudes from their neighbours both in Bulgaria and in Turkey. The Turks of Bulgaria perceived the Communist regime as oppressive and as a threat to their Turkish identity. Despite their dislike of the regime, prior to the period of forced assimilation that began in 1984, they still possessed a relatively positive perception about the Bulgarian people. Interestingly, while they perceive Turkey as their homeland, they nonetheless held certain prejudices against the local population in Turkey. All of these various interaction helped to strengthen their group identity as migrants from Bulgaria.This paper deals with the image and perceptions that Turkish migrants from Bulgaria had about the Turks in Turkey, the Turkish state, Bulgarians, and the Bulgarian state both before and after 1989. Perceptions of the Turkish minority among the Bulgarian communist elite are analysed according to published reports and statements made by Bulgarian Communist Party members. The perceptions that Turkish migrants had about Bulgaria and Turkey are the main focus of this study which is based on field research and interviews conducted with Turkish migrants from Bulgaria now living in Turkey. This article shows that these migrants held both positive and negative perceptions of Bulgaria and Turkey, largely depending on the context. The Turkish minority in Bulgaria was regarded as a problem for the Communist government and as an internal enemy to the Bulgarian state. Moreover, the locals in Turkey regarded the Turkish migrants from Bulgaria as “Bulgarian migrants” who possessed a non-Muslim or “liberal” culture. In this way, they experienced exclusionary attitudes from their neighbours both in Bulgaria and in Turkey. The Turks of Bulgaria perceived the Communist regime as oppressive and as a threat to their Turkish identity. Despite their dislike of the regime, prior to the period of forced assimilation that began in 1984, they still possessed a relatively positive perception about the Bulgarian people. Interestingly, while they perceive Turkey as their homeland, they nonetheless held certain prejudices against the local population in Turkey. All of these various interaction helped to strengthen their group identity as migrants from Bulgaria.

Mijn God trouwt ook homo’s

My God also weds gays The Remonstrantse Broederschap, a small liberal church, was the first church in the world that opened the wedding blessing for not-wedded couples. At the time they did so, in November 1986, that also meant: for homosexual and heterosexual couples. The process that led to this decision took a long time and was carefully structured and monitored. It went along two tracks: a discussion project in the local church communities and the realization of a new church order. This decision to give a blessing ‘to all couples that promised in the midst of the congregation to share their lives in love and faithfulness’, fits into the liberal tradition of the Remonstrant faith. This is inspired by the humanist and the protestant Christian tradition, and characterizes itself by the appreciation of openness (to contemporary society, culture, science), freedom, tolerance and responsibility. The search for collective responsibility and active tolerance, including taking a stand against discrimination (for instance of homosexuals) in public, as a church, caused internal disagreement. This disagreement seems to have its roots in a classic bourgeois decency culture on the one side and a more plural, progressive liberal culture on the other side.

IMMIGRATION, OTHERNESS, ECONOMIC MOBILITY AND SOCIAL INCLUSION IN THE HOMELAND

This research focuses on the impact of migration on the Cultural identity of Francophones in the diaspora. It explores the fascinating role of Culture and identity in national and regional integration. Examining the experiences of francophone immigrants from the diaspora, the study shows how ‘otherness’ affects immigrants’ capability to self-assert and adapt to reclaim their Africaness in the homeland. Two sets of immigrants are presented; the forced immigrant (Slavery), with a forced culture and the liberal immigrant, with liberal culture. Drawing from interviews, and individual experiences, the study emphasises the role of the immigrant, the community and the institutions in successful cultural integration in the homeland.

Problematic (Post)Sarmatism: On the Possibility of Adapting Sarmatian Heritage in a Demo-liberal Culture

The article shows (post)Sarmatism as an element of the Polish identity discourse in its community dimension, which mainly takes account of its civilisation and cultural aspect, defined by relations with (post)modernity. Although this discourse includes (post)Sarmatism in reflection on the key determinants of collective identity, such as community, Polishness and so on, it generally does so in a simplified manner, not free from prejudices and excessive bias. Liberal thought, which should have the greatest share in shaping the sphere of self-ideas of (post)modern society, shows a clear reluctance towards Sarmatian heritage, which is hardly surprising given its Enlightenment origin. However, one should understand the reasons for this reluctance, taking into account its stricter context, which is determined by the mechanism of programming Polish cultural projects in essentialist codes. Meanwhile, according to the author, the ‘post-mortem’ history of Sarmatism (nineteenth–twenty–first centuries) is part of the pan-European struggle of Tradition and modernity. When set on this plane, (post)Sarmatism can be considered in terms of lack (discontinuation of a specific tradition) and compensation (attempts to work through modernising deficits). The Sarmatian heritage, torn out of the vicious circle of stereotypes, myths and silences, should now be included in the debate on the foundations of Polish civic culture, because it belongs to the contingent (in the liberal sense) history of the Polish habitus, and it is also characterised by the syndrome of un-working (not being discussed in contexts important from the point of view of the struggle of Polish consciousness with what is broadly understood as modernity). It also needs to be made real by being located in the circle of geopolitical discourse. The perspective of the recontextualisation of Sarmatism, which neo-Sarmatism with its essentialist-nostalgic poetics has created in contemporary identity discourse and postcolonial thought with its binary schemas, seems insufficient.

“Democracy Is Not for Everyone”

The authors of the article show manifestations of homophobia in a range of Eastern European countries. They use the example of Poland to compare the current situation of LGBT people with that in the communist period. The article defends the thesis that homophobia, which goes hand in hand with Islamophobia, anti-Semitism, and widespread dislike for any cultural minority, is a cultural compensation for economic disappointment and an expression of the Eastern European opposition to the economic and political expansion of the West. From this perspective, the dominant nationalist orientation requires treating not only LGBT communities, but also their defenders, supporters of a more liberal culture and civic organizations, as representatives of “foreign centers” who intend to meet “the interests of the core European Union (EU) countries.” Thus, messianic nationalism and homophobia are a compensation for economic marginalization and a form of defense moved from the sphere of economic problems to the sphere of identity.

Disenchantment with Democracy

The main theme of the book is the resurgence in the countries of liberal democracy, the political movements that express an approval for violence as a mean of attaining group goals. From ancient time, violence was a commonly accepted, dominant way of gaining wealth, prestige, and fame, as well as a means of social control and socialization of young generations. Human communities attempted to regulate and curtail violence, primarily in intragroup relations. A major change in attitude toward violence was brought about by the development of liberal culture and liberal institutions that saw individual freedom and individual rights as fundamental values. The role of violence was to be limited by two main institutions: the free market and liberal democracy, both of which regard individual freedom as a cardinal principle. However, they have both turned out to be fallible. Conflicts of interests, ideological or world views contradictions, and identity differences are sources of destructive conflicts that trigger various forms of violence: political, economic, symbolic, and physical. This book focuses on two issues. One refers to the psychological nature of the main conflicts and the question of whether those conflicts are intractable and must necessarily lead to destructive consequences. The other, concerns the imperfections of liberal institutions, which render them unable to perform sufficiently well one of their basic functions, that is, removing violence from the sphere of human relations. This analysis is carried out from a specific perspective, focusing on psychological sources and consequences of the phenomena discussed in the book.

Violence as a Mean of Attaining Group Goals*

For a very long period of human history, direct physical violence used to be one of the main means of obtaining power, wealth, and prestige, as well as social control, socialization of children, and regulation of social relations. Human societies were also developing various ways of controlling and curtailing direct violence, primarily in-group violence. Major changes in the social functions of violence were associated with the development of liberal thought and liberal institutions—the free market and the democratic political system. Liberal culture and liberal mentality have delegitimized all kinds of physical violence, except in defense of human rights and freedoms. Nevertheless, the tendency to use violence, as a means of attaining political, economic, or ideological goals has not disappeared. It is being fostered by ideologies that grew out of the transformation of traditional (conservative) thought into Right-Wing Authoritarianism and/or Social Dominance Orientation, but also the transformation of liberal thought into Libertarianism (egocentric individualism). These ideologies facilitate the change of competitions and disagreements between social groups into destructive conflicts.

On some Actual Aspects of the Interpretation of the Liberal Tradition in Russia

On some Actual Aspects of the Interpretation of the Liberal Tradition in Russia The article examines the key moments of the transformation of liberal tradition in Russia in the context of analysis of the main directions of the transformation of liberal ideological discourse and liberal culture in Western Europe and the United States. The need for such an analysis is primarily determined by the fact that since the early 1990s Western liberal stereotypes have become an ideological basis of the new Russian political elite and the dominant trend in state propaganda. However, the following main fact is often overlooked: in the 20th century,Russian liberalism was compromised twice, so in the short-term the hopes for the revival of the liberal ideas are gone. In the West, the liberal tradition has also been in the state of crisis: Western liberalism has been undergoing a very significant transformation that has far-reaching cultural and political implications. In particular, at the turn of the 21st c., a more active role in Western public discourse was taken by the radical neo-conservative versions of an ideology that combined a conservative program of political reforms with a strong libertarian (neoliberal) rhetoric. This ideology is actively used by the ruling circles of the US and Western Europe to influence ideologically the political elites of Russia – as it happened in Central and Eastern Europe during the so-called “velvet revolutions”. At the same time, what increasingly clearly and sharply came to the fore in the late twentieth century is anti-liberal thought and criticism that has always evolved in parallel with liberalism itself and that almost never ceases to exist.