Amnesties and developments of international law: re-evaluating the validity of amnesties purportedly granted by Bangladesh to the alleged Pakistani war criminals

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-43
Author(s):  
Md. Pizuar Hossain ◽  
Esrat Jahan Siddiki
2002 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-117 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jessica Gavron

Amnesties presuppose a breach of law and provide immunity or protection from punishment. Historically amnesties were invoked in relation to breaches of the laws of war and were reciprocally implemented by opposing sides in an international armed conflict. The impact of the two world wars in the first half of the twentieth century, however, had considerable implications not only for the use of amnesties, but also for their legality under international law. The scale of the First World War precipitated a new phase of unilateral amnesty for the victors and prosecutions of war criminals for the defeated aggressor states.1 This precedent was followed after the Second World War,2 with the establishment of the first ‘international’3 criminal court, the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. However, the horrors perpetrated during the Second World War also prompted the development of a branch of international law aimed at recognising and protecting human rights in an attempt to prevent such atrocities being repeated.


2014 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 257-284 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Michael Greig ◽  
James D. Meernik

The International Criminal Court (icc) came into force in July 2002 with the potential to drastically alter both the war fighting and peacemaking behavior of states. Theiccis designed to try and subsequently punish those found guilty of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Supporters of theicchave argued that its establishment will erode the norm of impunity that state and military leaders have historically enjoyed. Yet, another logic suggests that the initiation of aniccinvestigation or the issuance of an arrest warrant for individuals embroiled in an ongoing dispute may make matters worse. Such individuals may see little reason to stop fighting and reach a settlement if conflict resolution results in their detention in The Hague. Indeed, suspected war criminals and their patrons may wish to escalate their violence in order to avoid showing any sign of weakness or possibility of capitulation lest their enemies press the fight or their rivals seek to undermine their authority. In this article, we explore the potential impact of theiccon the likelihood of peace by examining the impact of actions by theicc– the initiation of investigations into conflict situations and the issuance of arrest warrants for those suspected of committing violations of international law – on the likelihood of mediation. Our findings suggest that whileiccarrest warrants can encourage mediation, the initiation of investigations by theicccan actually undermine the occurrence of mediation.


Author(s):  
Dean Aszkielowicz

Long before the Second World War ended, the Allies were planning to prosecute Axis war criminals, including both those in positions of leadership and the perpetrators of individual crimes. There was no standing war crimes court at the end of the Second World War, however, and the post-war trials were a watershed in international law. For the trials at Nuremberg and Tokyo, Allied planners drew on the development of international humanitarian law and international agreements signed by the combatants over the decades preceding the war. The vast majority of war criminals who were prosecuted did not face the court at Nuremberg or Tokyo: they appeared before national military tribunals which were conducted according to each prosecuting country’s war crimes law. The Australian War Crimes Act passed through the parliament in October 1945, shortly before trials began.


1986 ◽  
Vol 80 (4) ◽  
pp. 941-946
Author(s):  
Michael H. Cardozo ◽  
Anthony D’Amato ◽  
Samuel W. Bettwy

In the January 1961 issue of this Journal, there appeared, over my name, a Comment entitled When Extradition Fails, Is Abduction the Solution? The Comment dealt with the frustration of efforts to effect the extradition to Yugoslavia of Andrija Artukovic, a leader of the Croation “state” established in Yugoslavia under Nazi sponsorship during World War II. Artukovic had been charged with the kilting of hundreds of thousands of victims guilty only of ethnic diversity. He had fled to the United States in 1948. The Comment remarked that, in view of the atrocities attributed to Artukovic, “[i]t would hardly be incredible if a group of Serbs, inspired by hatred, revenge and patriotism, should try to emulate the ‘volunteers’ who successfully contrived to move Adolph Eichmann from his refuge in Argentina to a prison in Israel.” The Comment concluded that “it must be our position that the only acceptable way to deal with fugitive war criminals is through orderly processes of international law and extradition.”


Author(s):  
Mettraux Guénaël

This chapter explores the underlying offences which can constitute crimes against humanity. Crimes against humanity are composed of two core elements: a chapeau or contextual element and an underlying crime committed in and sufficiently linked to the chapeau. The list of underlying crimes that could, in theory, qualify as crimes against humanity is limited in nature and has not significantly evolved since Nuremberg. The Nuremberg Charter provided for six categories of crimes against humanity: murder; extermination; enslavement; deportation; other inhumane acts; and persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds. Control Council Law No. 10, which regulated the subsequent prosecution of Nazi war criminals in occupied Germany, provided for the same six categories and added three other crimes to the list: imprisonment, rape, and torture. The chapter then assesses which crimes against humanity form part of customary international law.


Author(s):  
Arnaldo Bastos Santos Neto ◽  
Ricardo Martins Spindola Diniz

AS CONDIÇÕES PARA UMA PAZ DURADOURA. UMA LEITURA DE "A PAZ PELO DIREITO", DE HANS KELSEN CONDITIONS FOR A LASTING PEACE. A READING OF HANS KELSEN’S “PEACE THROUGH LAW”                                                            Arnaldo Bastos Santos NetoRicardo Martins Spindola DinizRESUMO: O pensador central da Escola Vienense de Direito, Hans Kelsen, dedicou-se ao exame de questões fundamentais do Direito Internacional, especialmente, após a eclosão da Segunda Guerra Mundial. Entre os seus textos mais interessantes da nova fase internacionalista, destaca-se "A paz pelo Direito", cujas teses mais importantes, como a defesa de um Tribunal Penal Internacional, a punição dos criminosos de guerra tanto dos lados vencidos como dos vencedores e ainda o papel propugnado por ele para os princípios do Direito Internacional, analisamos no presente artigo. PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Tribunal Penal Internacional; Crimes de Guerra; Teoria Pura do Direito.  ABSTRACT: The central thinker of the Viennese School of Law, Hans Kelsen, devoted himself to the examination of the fundamental questions of International Law, especially after the break of the Second World War. Among his most interesting texts of this new internationalist phase, "Peace through Law" stands out, whose most important thesis, such as the defense of an International Criminal Court, the punishment of war criminals both for losers and winners, and also the role advocated by him to the principles of International Law, are analyzed in this article.KEYWORDS: International Criminal Court; War Crimes; Pure Theory of Law.SUMÁRIO: Introdução 1. O pacifismo jurídico kelseniano. 2. Além da soberania dos estados nacionais. 3. Por um tribunal penal internacional. 4. A questão da soberania. 5. O papel dos princípios. Considerações finais. Referências.


Author(s):  
Monique Cormier ◽  
Gerry Simpson

International law, it might be argued, is a legal system directed toward the defeat or suppression of a category of violators known as “enemies of mankind,” or hosti humanis generis. Sometimes these are war criminals, sometimes they are terrorists or slave traders. The original enemy of mankind was the “pirate.” Piracy gave rise to a highly specialized form of international jurisdiction known as universal jurisdiction. Because pirates were a threat to the global order (particularly global sea trade), or because they committed particularly heinous acts, or because their acts were committed in a place beyond the territorial jurisdiction or sovereignty of any state (different reasons have been adduced at different times), they were subject to the jurisdiction of any state that happened to identify them, engage with them, and capture them. Thus, a pirate could be prosecuted in every state’s courts. The contemporary law of piracy, embodied in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, has defined piracy as an act of violence or depredation committed on the high seas by a private actor acting for private ends. This distinguishes piracy from naval warfare or recognized belligerency on the high seas, but it has complicated efforts to apply the law of piracy to terrorists (who, after all, act for political ends, and most commonly in the territory of sovereign states) and it has meant that acts of piracy committed in the territorial waters of states are not subject to the international law of piracy (and the expansive forms of jurisdiction that accompany it). Therefore, attempts to assimilate terrorism to piracy have fallen foul of the technical rules governing traditional piracy. Likewise, these same rules frustrated initial efforts to confront the growing problem of traditional piracy carried out in places other than the high seas. The “international terrorist” and the Somali pirate, then, pose different problems for international law. In the case of terrorists, states have adopted ad hoc and controversial methods comparable to those used against pirates on the high seas. In the case of Somalia, the UN Security Council has authorized an international naval response to pirate attacks that permits foreign naval vessels to use force against pirates within Somali territorial waters.


Peace Review ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 199-205
Author(s):  
Cynthia Boaz ◽  
Cheryl Schoenberg

2006 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 511-526 ◽  
Author(s):  

AbstractIn July 2001, a few years after my first encounter with the intersection of criminal law and international law at the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and for Rwanda (ICTR), I asked the following question at a lecture at Melbourne University:While the political will to pursue war criminals was first lacking, is there, as some seem to fear, a danger that it will become relentless? If so, what effect will that have on the integrity of the complex aspirations and methodologies of criminal law as an instrument of social control in a democracy?After 11 September of the same year, the question acquired added acuity as I assumed that it would be not just war criminals but also international terrorists that the criminal law framework, domestic and international, would now be pursuing. I obviously was gravely mistaken in my concerns. The pursuit of terrorist suspects seems to have little to do with criminal or international law as we know it. Hence the real questions: What is it then about? Under what legal framework, if any, does it purport to operate and who is accountable to whom?


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