Measuring foundation school effectiveness using English administrative data, survey data and a regression discontinuity design

2013 ◽  
Vol 21 (5) ◽  
pp. 431-446 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rebecca Allen
2018 ◽  
Vol 60 (2) ◽  
pp. 41-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rodrigo Schneider ◽  
Kelly N. Senters

AbstractScholars concur that free and fair elections are essential for proper democratic functioning, but our understanding of the political effects of democratic voting systems is incomplete. This article mitigates the gap by exploiting the gradual transformation of voting systems and ballot structures in Brazil’s 1998 executive elections to study the relationship between voting systems and viable and nonviable candidates’ vote shares, using regression discontinuity design. It finds that the introduction of electronic voting concentrated vote shares among viable candidates and thus exhibited electoral bias. We posit that this result occurred because viable candidates were better able to communicate the information that electronic voters needed to cast valid ballots than were their nonviable counterparts. The article uses survey data to demonstrate that electronic voters responded to changes in ballot design and internalized the information viable candidates made available to them.


2017 ◽  
Vol 51 (3) ◽  
pp. 304-340 ◽  
Author(s):  
Natália S. Bueno

How do incumbents prevent the opposition from claiming credit for government programs? The received scholarly wisdom is that central government authorities favor copartisans in lower tiers of government to reward allies and punish opponents. Yet this depiction ignores the range of strategies available to incumbents at the center. I argue that another effective strategy is to channel resources through nonstate organizations, thus bypassing the opposition and reducing “credit hijacking.” Using a regression-discontinuity design with data from Brazil, I show that mayors from the president’s party receive more resources, but that the election of an opposition mayor induces the central government to shift resources to nonstate organizations that operate in the locality. Original survey data, fieldwork, and data on organizations’ leaders support the claim that opposition mayors do not hijack credit from government spending through nonstate organizations.


Author(s):  
Libor Dusek ◽  
Christian Traxler

Abstract This paper studies how punishment affects future compliance behavior and isolates deterrence effects mediated by learning. Using administrative data from speed cameras that capture the full driving histories of more than a million cars over several years, we evaluate responses to punishment at the extensive (receiving a speeding ticket) and intensive margin (tickets with higher fines). Two complementary empirical strategies a regression discontinuity design and an event study coherently document strong responses to receiving a ticket: the speeding rate drops by a third and reoffense rates fall by 70% Higher fines produce a small but imprecisely estimated additional effect. All responses occur immediately and are persistent over time, with no backsliding towards speeding even two years after receiving a ticket. Our evidence rejects unlearning and temporary salience effects. Instead, it supports a learning model in which agents update their priors on the expected punishment in a coarse manner.


2018 ◽  
Vol 91 (3) ◽  
pp. 242-262 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kelley Fong ◽  
Sarah Faude

School choice policies necessarily impose registration timelines, constraining access to schools of choice for students who register late. Drawing on administrative data, survey data, and interviews with 33 parents in Boston, we find that late registration is common and highly stratified: Nearly half of black kindergarteners miss the first registration deadline, a rate almost three times higher than their white peers, consigning them to the least preferred schools. Contexts of instability and bureaucratic complexity serve as barriers to registering months in advance, and parents describe disengagement from the school system following their late registration. These findings show how despite equal access in theory, bureaucratic structures such as timeline-based lotteries hinder many families, particularly those disadvantaged already, from full participation. Inequality in school choice outcomes and experiences thus results not only from families’ selections, the focus of previous research, but also the misalignment of district bureaucratic processes with family situations.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-55
Author(s):  
Manasi Deshpande ◽  
Itzik Fadlon ◽  
Colin Gray

Abstract We study how increases in the U.S. Social Security full retirement age (FRA) affect benefit claiming behavior and retirement behavior separately. Using long panels of Social Security administrative data, we implement complementary research designs of a traditional cohort analysis and a regression-discontinuity design. We find that while claiming ages strongly and immediately shift in response to increases in the FRA, retirement ages exhibit persistent “stickiness” at the old FRA of 65. We use several strategies to explore the likely mechanisms behind the stickiness in retirement and find suggestive evidence that employers play a role in workers' responses to the FRA.


2018 ◽  
Vol 112 (3) ◽  
pp. 509-524 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANDREW B. HALL ◽  
DANIEL M. THOMPSON

Political observers, campaign experts, and academics alike argue bitterly over whether it is more important for a party to capture ideologically moderate swing voters or to encourage turnout among hardcore partisans. The behavioral literature in American politics suggests that voters are not informed enough, and are too partisan, to be swing voters, while the institutional literature suggests that moderate candidates tend to perform better. We speak to this debate by examining the link between the ideology of congressional candidates and the turnout of their parties’ bases in US House races, 2006–2014. Combining a regression discontinuity design in close primary races with survey and administrative data on individual voter turnout, we find that extremist nominees—as measured by the mix of campaign contributions they receive—suffer electorally, largely because theydecreasetheir party’s share of turnout in the general election, skewing the electorate towards their opponent’s party. The results help show how the behavioral and institutional literatures can be connected. For our sample of elections, turnout appears to be the dominant force in determining election outcomes, but it advantages ideologically moderate candidates because extremists appear to activate the opposing party’s base more than their own.


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