Pursuing Change or Pursuing Credit? Litigation and Credit Claiming on Social Media

Social media provides an inexpensive way for interest groups to inform and mobilize large audiences, but it is puzzling why organizations would spend time posting about activities like litigation that do not depend on public opinion or mobilization. We argue there are two reasons interest groups post about judicial advocacy on social media. First, organizations provide information about the courts on social media to build credibility and recognition as a trusted source of information. We hypothesize that membership groups will be less likely to use social media in this way than non-membership public interest organizations. Second, organizations use social media to claim credit for activity in the courts in order to increase their public and financial support. We expect that this strategy will be used most frequently by legal organizations. Using an original dataset of millions of tweets and Facebook posts by interest groups, we find support for these expectations.

Pandering Politicians? Targeted Economic Development Incentives and Voter Response

Empirical evidence largely suggests that the billions of dollars state and local governments spend on targeted economic development incentive (EDI) programs are typically ineffective at stimulating broad economic activity. The continued use of EDIs by public officials has thus led scholars to investigate the role of these programs in political pandering. In this paper, we explore the relationship between EDIs and gubernatorial elections in Arkansas. Specifically, we investigate whether officials strategically allocate discretionary EDIs based on previous county-level gubernatorial election outcomes. We subsequently explore the impact of discretionary EDIs on an incumbent party’s bid for gubernatorial reelection at the county level. Our results largely suggest that public officials do not allocate EDIs based on previous election outcomes. Moreover, our results indicate that voters are unresponsive to both the quantity and magnitude of credit claiming messages.

#SorryNotSorry: Why states neither confirm nor deny responsibility for cyber operations

States accused of perpetrating cyber operations typically do not confirm or deny responsibility. They issue ‘non-denial denials’ or refuse to comment on the accusations. These ambiguous signals are prevalent, but they are largely ignored in the existing cyber literature, which tends to treat credit claiming as a binary choice. The ambiguity of non-denial denials and ‘non-comments’ allows states to accomplish two seemingly opposed goals: maintaining crisis stability and leaving open the possibility of their involvement in the attack. By deliberately remaining a suspect, a state can manipulate rivals’ perceptions of its cyber capability and resolve. Refusing to deny responsibility can also shape rivals’ perceptions of allies’ capabilities, enhancing the credibility of deterrence. All of this can be accomplished without the escalatory risks that would come with an explicit admission of responsibility. Where previous research has focused on the dangers of escalation and the limitations of costly signalling with cyber, we show that non-denial denials and non-comments make cyber operations considerably more useful than the literature appreciates.

Pronoun Usage as a Measure of Power Personalization: A General Theory with Evidence from the Chinese-Speaking World

How can the growing personalization of power be identified and measured ex ante? Extant measures in the authoritarian literature have traditionally focused on institutional constraints and more recently on individual behaviour – such as purging opposition members from (and packing allies into) government bodies. This article offers a different strategy that examines leaders’ individual rhetoric. It focuses on patterns of pronoun usage for the first person. The author argues that as leaders personalize power, they are less likely to use ‘I’ (a pronoun linked to credit claiming and blame minimizing) and more likely to use ‘we’ (the leader speaks for – or with – the populace). To test this argument, the study focuses on all major, scheduled speeches by all chief executives in the entire Chinese-speaking world – that is, China, Singapore and Taiwan – since independence. It finds a robust pattern between first-person pronouns and political constraints. To ensure the results are not driven by the Chinese sample, the rhetoric of four other political leaders is considered: Albania's Hoxha, North Korea's Kim Il Sung, Hungary's Orbán and Ecuador's Correa. The implications of this project suggest that how leaders talk can provide insights into how they perceive their rule.

Invitations to the Dance

In this chapter, I argue that the impact of the Obama presidency is best gauged not by examining shortfalls in Obama’s overt advocacy for race conscious policies but, rather, by examining what Obama did to assert that Black representatives should be more concerned about the enactment of legislation that advances Black progress than about credit claiming via overt advocacy. To illustrate, I examine select public speeches by Obama, White House documents, and press accounts to outline the Obama administration’s engagement with the Congressional Black Caucus and other elites over Black unemployment. Subsequent political clashes showcased Black dismay that a Black executive had not delivered tangible race-specific benefits, White fear that a Black president would practice racial favoritism, and an intergovernmental struggle between the executive and legislative branches over who should control employment policy. These clashes best illustrate how the “inclusionary dilemma” required Obama to utilize a complex engagement strategy with Black Americans to navigate Black dismay about job creation and to outline his socio-cultural-economic policy agenda. In the conclusion, I discuss how Obama used his final days in office to prepare the Obama coalition for the Trump presidency and to warn Black voters and Black elites about privileging style over substance.

Why don’t citizens give governments credit when they deliver on electoral pledges?

Why don’t citizens give governments credit when they deliver on electoral pledges? This article develops an original analytical framework that addresses this important but under-researched question. It focuses on the concept of ‘credit claiming’, which is the opposite of ‘blame shifting’, and draws together existing research to identify a number of significant hurdles that governments must overcome in order to gain recognition for achievements. It highlights the challenges which policymakers face in communicating with citizens in an increasingly mediatised public sphere, and the extent to which their credit claiming efforts rely on the media as a ‘transmission belt’. It concludes that in liberal democracies governments are fighting an uphill battle to gain citizens’ support and secure trust in broader democratic institutions and the political system as a whole.

Political actors’ access to the media agenda

This article explores to what extent the euro crisis brought about unprecedented attention to the European Union (EU) and if so with what consequences on the media visibility of different political actors in Spain. Drawing on a database of more than 27,000 stories published in the most read Spanish newspaper from 2004 to 2012, we demonstrate that following the outbreak of the crisis, executive elites receive more media coverage than social movements, trade unions, and challenger parties critical with EU policies and decisions. The media coverage of EU affairs, however, is not business as usual. Executive elites receive disproportionate media attention but they are no longer presented using the EU following credit-claiming strategies. Our results also indicate that the media are not passive actors that respond to institutional determinants but might be actively involved in the process of giving some actors more visibility in public debates on EU affairs.

How Have Members of Congress Reacted to President Trump’s Trade Policy?

While a number of studies in recent years explore the particularistic tendencies of presidents – targeting various benefits to districts and states that will help their and their party’s electoral prospects – little work has explored how members of Congress react to such behavior. We take some initial steps in this regard by examining how members have responded to President Donald Trump’s trade initiatives. We analyze congressional newsletter mentions of tariffs or trade as a means of exploring congressional reaction. We find a positive relationship between tariff/trade mentions and partisanship, as Republican members and members from states that Trump won in 2016 are more likely to refer to tariffs/trade in their newsletters. This represents, we argue, a different kind of credit claiming. These basic empirical patterns set the stage for more systematic analysis in the future.