scholarly journals Preventing Civil War Recurrence: Do Military Victories Really Perform Better than Peace Agreements? Causal Claim and Underpinning Assumptions Revisited

Civil Wars ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
Thorsten Gromes ◽  
Florian Ranft
2015 ◽  
Vol 69 (3) ◽  
pp. 519-556 ◽  
Author(s):  
Virginia Page Fortna

AbstractHow effective is terrorism? This question has generated lively scholarly debate and is of obvious importance to policy-makers. However, most existing studies of terrorism are not well equipped to answer this question because they lack an appropriate comparison. This article compares the outcomes of civil wars to assess whether rebel groups that use terrorism fare better than those who eschew this tactic. I evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of terrorism relative to other tactics used in civil war. Because terrorism is not a tactic employed at random, I first briefly explore empirically which groups use terrorism. Controlling for factors that may affect both the use of terrorism and war outcomes, I find that although civil wars involving terrorism last longer than other wars, terrorist rebel groups are generally less likely to achieve their larger political objectives than are nonterrorist groups. Terrorism may be less ineffective against democracies, but even in this context, terrorists do not win.


2009 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
pp. 41-62 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna K. Jarstad

Why are some elections followed by armed conflict, while others are not? This article begins to explore this question by mapping the prevalence of power-sharing agreements and patterns of post-election peace in states shattered by civil war. While democracy builds on the notion of free political competition and uncertain electoral outcomes, power-sharing reduces the uncertainty by ensuring political power for certain groups. Nevertheless, new data presented in this article – the Post-Accord Elections (PAE) data collection – shows that the issues of peace, power-sharing and democracy have become intertwined as the vast majority of contemporary peace agreements provide for both power-sharing and elections. First, in contrast to previous research which has suggested that power-sharing is a tool for ending violence, this study shows that conflict often continues after an agreement has been signed, even if it includes provisions for power-sharing. Second, this investigation shows no evidence of power-sharing facilitating the holding of elections. On the contrary, it is more common that elections are held following a peace process without power-sharing. Third, a period of power-sharing ahead of the elections does not seem to provide for postelection peace. Rather, such elections are similarly dangerous as post-accord elections held without a period of power-sharing. The good news is that power-sharing does not seem to have a negative effect on post-election peace.


2020 ◽  
Vol 64 (2) ◽  
pp. 329-342
Author(s):  
Deniz Cil ◽  
Alyssa K Prorok

Abstract When do rebel leaders “sell out” their constituents in the terms of peace by signing agreements that benefit group elites over the rebel constituency, and when do they instead “stand firm,” pushing for settlement terms that benefit the public they claim to represent? This article examines variation in the design of civil war settlement agreements. It argues that constituents, fighters, and rebel elites have different preferences over the terms of peace, and that rebel leaders will push for settlements that reflect the preferences of whichever audience they are most reliant on and accountable to. In particular, leaders of groups that are more civilian-reliant for their military and political power are more likely to sign agreements that favor broad benefits for civilian constituents, while leaders who do not depend on civilian support for their political and military power will sign agreements with fewer public benefits. We test this argument using original data on the design of all final peace agreements reached between 1989 and 2009, and several proxies for the group's level of reliance on civilian supporters. Using a variety of statistical tests and accounting for nonrandom selection into peace agreements, we find strong support for our hypothesis.


Civil Wars ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 311-337 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marie Olson Lounsbery ◽  
Karl DeRouen
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Krista Wiegand ◽  
Erin Rowland ◽  
Eric Keels

Within this article, we explore how third-party knowledge of ongoing conflicts shapes the ability of mediators to successfully end conflicts through negotiated settlements. Since the primary role of mediators is to share information, and combatants have incentives to misrepresent information, contextual knowledge about the conflict and actors is critical. We argue that experienced diplomats with greater knowledge of the civil war state, close knowledge of the combatants, and connections with civil society are less vulnerable and more effective in mediation efforts. We propose that third parties seeking a diplomatic solution to ongoing conflicts may be more successful when they maintain strong diplomatic knowledge of the disputants as well as knowledge of the processes by which previous mediation efforts have attempted to resolve the dispute. Using a seemingly unrelated bivariate probit model on peace agreements from 1989 to 2005, we find strong support that diplomatic knowledge matters significantly.


2021 ◽  
pp. 002234332110371
Author(s):  
Alyssa K Prorok ◽  
Deniz Cil

This article examines how leaders affect the implementation of peace agreements. It argues that implementation is more likely when leaders have publicly committed to peace because public commitments tie leaders’ hands, making it costly to back down from peaceful promises. This effect is hypothesized to hold even under conditions that make implementation costly: when implementing difficult provisions, when spoiler risk is high, and when implementation is unreciprocated. These expectations are tested using novel data from the IPAD dataset on the implementation of peace agreements between 1989 and 2014 and on public statements by state and rebel leaders. Results show that governments and rebel groups whose leaders have publicly committed to peace are significantly more likely to make progress toward implementation. This effect holds for difficult provisions, when spoiler risk is high, and when implementation is unreciprocated. These findings highlight the importance of leaders’ political will for successful implementation of peace agreements and sustainable peace.


1995 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 182-201 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kathryn E. Welch

The creation of a political image based at best on a tenuous reality is a fragile and delicate process. None knew it better than Gaius Julius Caesar. Early in his career, he had fostered the belief that he was the heir of the ‘true’ Marian/popularis tradition with some credibility and lasting success. He presented himself as the great general in the Gallic commentaries and for good reasons this image too gained widespread popularity. There were other important but sometimes less convincing messages to follow. The commentarii on the civil war sought passionately to justify his part in the outbreak of hostilities: this was the published form of a process his intermediaries had begun in the first months of hostilities whereby they stressed his respect for peace and the traditional order, even when he himself was busy ignoring both. In an effort to reinforce this ‘constitutional’ regard, Caesar returned to Rome from Spain in 49 to establish a ‘properly elected’ government with himself and P. Servilius Isauricus as consuls; the correct number of praetors (all eligible to hold the office), aediles, and quaestors. The dictatorship was cast aside after a mere eleven days; Rome was to function as it always had. The uprising of Marcus Caelius Rufus and Titus Annius Milo in 48 B.C. ruined this admirable picture and brought home to Caesar the realities of attempting to dominate Rome by leaving the constitution in its traditional form and hoping for the best from the supporters he had entrusted with office. Moreover, the chaos of civil war and urban disorder combined to allow others to project their own policies and power struggles.


2020 ◽  
Vol 82 (1) ◽  
pp. 104-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter B. White
Keyword(s):  

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Jonathan A. Noyalas

The book’s introduction stresses that while a handful of historians have examined various aspects of the African American experience in the Shenandoah Valley during the Civil War era, the topic has been largely ignored or inaccurately portrayed. The introduction’s cornerstone is a historiographical discussion of how authors such as Joseph Waddell, John Walter Wayland, and Julia Davis—who minimized slavery’s role in the Valley, promulgated the myth that slavery was not important to the Valley’s agrarian economy, and wrote that enslaved people in the Shenandoah Valley were treated better than in other parts of the slaveholding South—influenced various authors. Finally, the introduction highlights the various primary source material, including freedom narratives, never before utilized by historians who investigated any aspect of the Shenandoah Valley’s African American story.


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