Third-party knowledge and success in civil war mediation

Author(s):  
Krista Wiegand ◽  
Erin Rowland ◽  
Eric Keels

Within this article, we explore how third-party knowledge of ongoing conflicts shapes the ability of mediators to successfully end conflicts through negotiated settlements. Since the primary role of mediators is to share information, and combatants have incentives to misrepresent information, contextual knowledge about the conflict and actors is critical. We argue that experienced diplomats with greater knowledge of the civil war state, close knowledge of the combatants, and connections with civil society are less vulnerable and more effective in mediation efforts. We propose that third parties seeking a diplomatic solution to ongoing conflicts may be more successful when they maintain strong diplomatic knowledge of the disputants as well as knowledge of the processes by which previous mediation efforts have attempted to resolve the dispute. Using a seemingly unrelated bivariate probit model on peace agreements from 1989 to 2005, we find strong support that diplomatic knowledge matters significantly.

Author(s):  
Lidija Georgieva

This article will focus on theoretical and practical dilemmas related to the concept of peace governance, and within this context on the possible transformative role of peace education trough facilitation of contact between communities in conflict. The basic assumption is that violent conflicts in the Balkans have been resolved trough negotiated settlements and peace agreements. Yet, education strategy including peace education and its impact on post-conflict peacebuilding and reconciliation are underestimated. Peace governance is recognized as a dynamic but challenging process often based on institutional and policy arrangements aimed to at least settle conflict dynamics or in some cases even to provide more sustainable peace after signing of negotiated settlement in multicultural societies. We will argue that education in general is one of the critical issues of peace governance arrangements that could facilitate peacebuilding and create a contact platform between communities. The first question addressed in this article is to what extend peace agreements refer to education as an issue and the second one relate to the question if education is included in peace agreement to what extent it contributes for contact between different conflicting communities. Although it is widely accepted that contacts between former adversaries contributes for multicultural dialogue it is less known or explained if and in what way peace agreements provisions on education facilitate contact and transformation of conflicting relations.


2010 ◽  
Vol 64 (2) ◽  
pp. 339-356 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caroline A. Hartzell ◽  
Matthew Hoddie ◽  
Molly Bauer

AbstractPrevious studies that have explored the effects of economic liberalization on civil war have employed aggregate measures of openness and have failed to account for potential endogeneity bias. In this research note, we suggest two improvements to the study of the relationship between liberalization and civil war. First, emphasizing that it is processes that systematically create new economic winners and losers rather than particular levels of economic openness that have the potential to generate conflict, we consider the effects of one oft-used means of liberalizing economies: the adoption by countries of International Monetary Fund (IMF) structural adjustment programs. Second, we use a bivariate probit model to address issues of endogeneity bias. Analyzing all data available for the period between 1970 and 1999, we identify an association between the adoption of IMF programs and the onset of civil war. This finding suggests that IMF programs to promote economic openness unintentionally may be creating an environment conducive to domestic conflict.


2020 ◽  
Vol 64 (2) ◽  
pp. 329-342
Author(s):  
Deniz Cil ◽  
Alyssa K Prorok

Abstract When do rebel leaders “sell out” their constituents in the terms of peace by signing agreements that benefit group elites over the rebel constituency, and when do they instead “stand firm,” pushing for settlement terms that benefit the public they claim to represent? This article examines variation in the design of civil war settlement agreements. It argues that constituents, fighters, and rebel elites have different preferences over the terms of peace, and that rebel leaders will push for settlements that reflect the preferences of whichever audience they are most reliant on and accountable to. In particular, leaders of groups that are more civilian-reliant for their military and political power are more likely to sign agreements that favor broad benefits for civilian constituents, while leaders who do not depend on civilian support for their political and military power will sign agreements with fewer public benefits. We test this argument using original data on the design of all final peace agreements reached between 1989 and 2009, and several proxies for the group's level of reliance on civilian supporters. Using a variety of statistical tests and accounting for nonrandom selection into peace agreements, we find strong support for our hypothesis.


2009 ◽  
Vol 61 (3) ◽  
pp. 403-437 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lars-Erik Cederman ◽  
Luc Girardin ◽  
Kristian Skrede Gleditsch

Although the case-based literature suggests that kin groups are prominent in ethnonationalist conflicts, quantitative studies of civil war onset have both overaggregated and underaggregated the role of ethnicity, by looking at civil war at the country level instead of among specific groups and by treating individual countries as closed units, ignoring groups' transnational links. In this article the authors integrate transnational links into a dyadic perspective on conflict between marginalized ethnic groups and governments. They argue that transnational links can increase the risk of conflict as transnational kin support can facilitate insurgencies and are difficult for governments to target or deter. The empirical analysis, using new geocoded data on ethnic groups on a transnational basis, indicates that the risk of conflict is high when large, excluded ethnic groups have transnational kin in neighboring countries, and it provides strong support for the authors' propositions on the importance of transnational ties in ethnonationalist conflict.


2002 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 363-377
Author(s):  
Patrick M. Regan

In this article, I discuss the implications of thinking about conflict management in terms of long and short-term outcomes. In particular, I focus on the role of third-party interventions in civil conflicts and how military interventions can affect the terms of negotiated settlements. I argue that military interventions can be effective if you judge success in terms of short-term outcomes, but even then, there are more or less-effective strategies. After articulating different metrics for considering short-term success, I outline a framework for thinking about how the intervention strategy will influence the duration of a civil conflict, in part by linking battlefield conditions to negotiated outcomes. I conclude by discussing some of the implications of linking military interventions to diplomatic efforts when negotiating a settlement.


2017 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kirssa Cline Ryckman ◽  
Jessica Maves Braithwaite

We examine the impact of governmental leadership changes on the civil war peace process. In line with the literature on leadership changes and interstate war, we argue that transitions can help overcome lags in the rational updating process, leading to negotiations and termination through negotiated settlements. However, while studies of interstate relations emphasize the role of “outsider” changes that produce new winning coalitions, we argue that owing to the critical nature of credible commitment problems within the civil war peace process, only “insider” changes can generate the benefits of leadership change while mitigating uncertainty generated by leadership turnover. Using existing and original data on changes in governmental leadership, we find support for our expectations. Leadership changes can produce conditions favorable to negotiations and settlements, but only changes from inside the existing regime should be encouraged to avoid prolonging the conflict.


2018 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Keels ◽  
T David Mason

Land reform has been depicted by some as an effective element of counterinsurgency strategy in nations experiencing peasant-based civil conflict. While some studies have argued that land reform reduces civilian support for insurgency, other research has demonstrated that these reforms are often undermined by brutal state repression. The study of land reform has also been driven largely by qualitative case study research, which has limited what we know about the cross-national efficacy of these reforms. This study contributes to the current literature by looking at the efficacy of land reform as part of the post-civil war peace process. Specifically, we examine whether land reform provisions included in comprehensive peace agreements reduce the risk of renewed civil war. Measuring the risk of civil war recurrence in all comprehensive peace agreements from 1989–2012, we find that the inclusion of land reform provisions in the post-war peace process substantially reduces the risk of renewed fighting.


1997 ◽  
Vol 51 (3) ◽  
pp. 335-364 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barbara F. Walter

Unlike interstate wars, civil wars rarely end in negotiated settlements. Between 1940 and 1990 55 percent of interstate wars were resolved at the bargaining table, whereas only 20 percent of civil wars reached similar solutions. Instead, most internal wars ended with the extermination, expulsion, or capitulation of the losing side. In fact, groups fighting civil wars almost always chose to fight to the finish unless an outside power stepped in to guarantee a peace agreement. If a third party agreed to enforce the terms of a peace treaty, negotiations always succeeded regardless of the initial goals, ideology, or ethnicity of the participants. If a third party did not intervene, these talks usually failed.


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