The dog that is not a dog: a rejoinder to Stanton Marlan

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 42-57
Author(s):  
Greg Mogenson

ABSTRACTThis paper is a rejoinder to Stanton Marlan’s article, ‘The absolute that is not absolute: an alchemical reflection on the caput mortuum, the dark other of logical light.’ It challenges mischaracterizations by Marlan of Giegerich’s contribution to analytical psychology, not on the usual level of debate and counter-argument, but through psychological ‘seeing-through’. Marlan’s assertion that Giegerich’s psychology as the discipline of interiority approach is ‘too pure [a psychology] to treat ordinary human beings in the consulting room’ is responded to by turning the tables and using Marlan’s account of having had to euthanize his dog as ordinary case material with which to demonstrate the merit and analytic acuity of Giegerich’s mode of interpretation.

2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 56-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nora S. Eggen

In the Qur'an we find different concepts of trust situated within different ethical discourses. A rather unambiguous ethico-religious discourse of the trust relationship between the believer and God can be seen embodied in conceptions of tawakkul. God is the absolute wakīl, the guardian, trustee or protector. Consequently He is the only holder of an all-encompassing trusteeship, and the normative claim upon the human being is to trust God unconditionally. There are however other, more polyvalent, conceptions of trust. The main discussion in this article evolves around the conceptions of trust as expressed in the polysemic notion of amāna, involving both trust relationships between God and man and inter-human trust relationships. This concept of trust involves both trusting and being trusted, although the strongest and most explicit normative claim put forward is on being trustworthy in terms of social ethics as well as in ethico-religious discourse. However, ‘trusting’ when it comes to fellow human beings is, as we shall see, framed in the Qur'an in less absolute terms, and conditioned by circumstantial factors; the Qur'anic antithesis to social trust is primarily betrayal, ‘khiyāna’, rather than mistrust.


2004 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 653-675 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eben Scheffler

This article reflects on the contribution  that can  be made to the interpretation of the Bible by employing the analytical psychology of Carl Jung. After some relevant biographical considerations on Jung, his view of religion and the Bible is briefly considered, followed by a look into Genesis 1-3 in terms of his distinction of archetypes. It is suggested in the conclusion that Jungian psychological Biblical criticism can lead to a changed, but fresh view on the ‘authority’ or influence of the Bible in the lives of (post)modern human beings and their (ethical) behaviour.


2009 ◽  
Vol 30 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 67-81
Author(s):  
Julia Peters

In his essay What is living and what is dead of the philosophy of Hegel?, Benedetto Croce praises Hegel for bestowing the highest value on beauty, in particular artistic beauty. He emphasises Hegel's ‘tendency to make art a primary element in human life, a mode of knowledge and of spiritual elevation’, and the ‘constant contact of Hegelian speculation with taste and with works of art, and the dignity which it assigned to the artistic activity’ (Croce 1985: 121). This tendency, Croce writes, is what makes Hegelian speculation congenial to the great aesthetic theories of the Romantic period. In this paper, I shall put forward some considerations which render support to Croce's observation that there is a strand of unreserved and absolute appreciation of beauty, in particular artistic beauty, in Hegelian philosophy. My focus will be in particular on the question of why Hegel thinks that the experience of beauty — which I will be referring to, in short, as aesthetic experience — is of special, even absolute value for human beings. This will involve, in the first part of the paper, an analysis of what Hegel takes to be the content of such experience; hence an analysis of Hegel's notion of beauty.Such emphasis on the absolute value of beauty invites of course the question of how beauty relates, in Hegel's system, to what Hegel regards as the highest value of all: reconciliation. Hegel believes that both philosophical speculation — which culminates in knowledge of the absolute truth — and the achievement of the highest practical good, the participation in civic life, are ways of reconciling the human individual with the world they live in. Does the same apply to beauty, or aesthetic experience? I will briefly touch on the relation between aesthetic experience and reconciliation in the second part of the paper. In this context, we will also consider an objection to the view that Hegel's appreciation of aesthetic experience is unrestricted or absolute, which arises from consideration of Hegel's famous claim that philosophy is higher than art.


2015 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Chibuikem C. Nnaeme

This article is concerned with how we can know about the existence of God. In attempting to do this, the article will single out two medieval thinkers, Anselm and Aquinas, and will examine their stances on the subject. The former holds, as exemplified in his ontological proof,that human beings can rationally know the existence of God, whilst the latter objects to theformer�s claim by proffering that human beings can know God�s existence through effects of God�s creation. Over the years these positions have appealed to people who defend eitherstr and of the argument. Such a followership makes worthwhile my efforts to contribute to the ongoing debate. It is my intention to show the argument of each of these positions and indicate which is more plausible to human beings. It is vital to note that Anselm and Aquinas both accept the existence of God; therefore, the existence of God is not in question for them.The article will only concentrate on where the two thinkers differ in terms of how human beings can know God�s existence.Intradisciplinary and/or interdisciplinary implications: This article challenges idealists�philosophy that human beings can prove God�s existence from the concept, God, as epitomisedby Anselm�s ontological argument. The critique of the argument through the application of Aquinas�s realism exposes the limitedness of the human beings in epistemological conception of the absolute metaphysical reality.


2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 66-73
Author(s):  
Agapov Oleg D. ◽  

The joy of being is connected with one’s activities aimed at responding to the challenges of the elemental forces and the boundlessness of being, which are independent of human subjectivity. In the context of rising to the challenges of being, one settles to acquire a certain power of being in themselves and in the world. Thus, the joy of being is tied to achieving the level of the “miraculous fecundity” (E. Levinas), “an internal necessity of one’s life” (F. Vasilyuk), magnanimity (M. Mamardashvili). The ontological duty of any human being is to succeed at being human. The joy of being is closely connected to experiencing one’s involvement in the endless/eternity and realizing one’s subjective temporality/finitude, which attunes him to the absolute seriousness in relation to one’s complete realization in life. Joy is a foundational anthropological phenomenon in the structure of ways of experiencing the human condition. The joy of being as an anthropological practice can appear as a constantly expanding sphere of human subjectivity where the transfiguration of the powers of being occurs under the sign of the Height (Levinas) / the Good. Without the possibility of transfiguration human beings get tired of living, immerse themselves in the dejected state of laziness and the hopelessness of vanity. The joy of being is connected to unity, gathering the multiplicity of human life under the aegis of meaning that allows us to see the other and the alien in heteronomous being, and understand the nature of co-participation and responsibility before the forces of being, and also act in synergy with them.The joy of being stands before a human being as the joy of fatherhood/ motherhood, the joy of being a witness to the world in creative acts (the subject as a means to retreat before the world and let the world shine), the joy of every day that was saved from absurdity, darkness and the impersonal existence of the total. Keywords: joy, higher reality, anthropological practices, “the height”, subject, transcendence, practice of coping


Author(s):  
Sergi Avaliani

Since human knowledge is relative, human beings consciously (or often unconsciously) dismiss the relative by creating the absolute. The absolute thus created is the psuedoabsolute which, by virtue of its human origins, is relative. However, it functions in both the practical and theoretical life of homo sapien as a genuine absolute. Hence, the psuedoabsolute is relatively absolutized by the human person. The psuedoabsolute is a dialectical unity of the absolute and relative and, as a "third reality," plays a great role in the spiritual life of humankind.


2012 ◽  
Vol 6 (1-3) ◽  
pp. 7-22
Author(s):  
William A. Graham

We consider first some difficulties of facilely differentiating “religious” from “cultural” phenomena, and similarly “scriptures” from (“religious” or “cultural”) “classics.” Texts in the latter three categories can be identified by their “iconic” status within a given tradition or context, but only on the basis of their social function, not by their form or content. We then consider how it may be possible to study “scriptural” texts constructively in shared discourse with scholars of differing religious backgrounds. Such a common discourse would be facilitated by a heuristic model of scripture as a text extending functionally in two directions, towards the human through interpretation and towards an Absolute or Transcendent ontologically (allowing it to participate in or mediate something of the Absolute to contingent human beings). Finally, we consider whether this model is applicable to “classics” as well as “scriptures” and conclude that on balance it is not. The model thus confirms one of the differences between classics and scriptures.


Chôra ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 17 ◽  
pp. 127-144
Author(s):  
Annick Jaulin ◽  

Given the necessary connection between pleasure and energeia, the value of an aristotelian pleasure depends on the value of its correlative activity. Since the absolute pleasures the philokalos takes in his virtuous activities might go hand in hand with pains, the definition of absolute pleasure cannot rely on the distinction between mixed pleasure (pleasure with pain) versus pure pleasure (pleasure without pain). So, how can we characterize the pleasures of the temperate man (sophron) ? My thesis is that the right way to define the pleasures of the temperate man is to describe them as pleasures derived from differences. A pleasure derived from differences is involved in the pleasure human beings get from the formal use of their senses. It then belongs to the kind of pleasure they take in knowing. This formal use of the senses helps understanding how the pleasures of the temperate man can be separated from the pleasures enjoyed by children and animals.


1992 ◽  
Vol 13 (02) ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary K Browning

The philosophical understanding of nature is a key concern of both Plato and Hegel. Their elaborations of the identity and status of nature within their respective philosophies exhibit significant affinities to which Hegel himself draws attention in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy. Hegel and Plato, indeed, are fundamentally at one in theorizing nature as both displaying and obscuring the principles of reason which they take as providing the foundations of a coherent explanation of reality. In his lectures on the History of Philosophy Hegel takes great pains to emphasize the profundity of Plato's idealism as residing in its identification of the objectively real with the rational. Plato, according to Hegel, is to be revered, above all, for having “… grasped in all its truth Socrates' great principle that ultimate reality lies in consciousness, since according to him the absolute is in thought and all reality is thought.” The Timaeus, for Hegel, articulates how the world of nature is necessarily structured by reason, just as the Republic is seen by Hegel as providing a philosophical explanation of the rationality of the traditional, organic community of the Greek polis. Hegel's recognition of the Platonic foundations of his own version of “absolute” idealism in which the universality of thought assumes an explanatory priority over the material phenomena of nature as well as informing the spiritual activities of human beings has been noted, rightly, by a number of subsequent commentators. Michael Rosen, for instance, in his book, Hegel's Dialectic and Its Criticism, while carefully distinguishing between aspects of Hegel's and Plato's conceptions of nature, intimates the continuity of Hegel's idealism with Plato's by observing how Hegel's language in effecting a transition from the categories of pure thought in the Logic to the material world of nature constitutes an “… echo of Plato's Timaeus.” Certainly, Hegel's cryptic account of the transition from the Absolute Idea, the categorial terminus of the Logic's interrogation of the determinations of pure thought, to the externality and materiality of nature evokes Plato's construal of the construction of the world in the Timaeus, both by the indeterminate character of the God which is invoked, as well as by the clear subordination of material phenomena to a separately articulable order of reason. In the account of the construction of the world developed in the Timaeus, Plato deploys the image of the divine demiurge imparting order to the world by referring to a pre-existing pattern of ideas. Hegel conceives of the Absolute Idea which at the outset of the Philosophy of Nature he likens to God, as, “… freely releasing itself…” into the externality of space and time, in which movement the Idea is seen as suffering neither a transition within nor a deepening of its character such as the mediated categories of the Logic incur in the process of their integration within the Absolute Idea.


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