Bakketo the future: affirmative action and the US Supreme Court

2013 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 602-607
Author(s):  
Barbara A. Perry
Author(s):  
Charles Wise

Abstract This article reviews and analyzes the federalism theories and principles that the US Supreme Court has employed during various eras and compares and contrasts them. It does this by specifying the major theoretical frameworks that have been proposed for Supreme Court federalism decision making and then examines how the Supreme Court has employed their components during various eras. It then draws implications for public policy and administration and poses research questions for the future.


1981 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 341-356 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. A. Maidment

If reports are to be believed, “waiting for Bakke” was the main preoccupation of the Washington press corps in the Spring of 1978. The case had been argued before the United States Supreme Court in a blaze of publicity, and, while the nine judges were considering the arguments, there was no shortage of commentators to “advise” the Court. As one of these “advisers,” Ronald Dworkin, noted “No lawsuit has ever been more widely watched or more thoroughly debated in the national and international press before the Court's decision.” Thus when Mr. Justice Powell began to read the opinion of the Court in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, a “hush enveloped the courtroom.” The audience was hushed but expectant because it believed that it was about to witness a judgement of momentous historical importance. The pre-decision coverage suggested that the Court was either going to give or deny its constitutional imprimatur to the principle of affirmative action or preferential treatment. But unfortunately the judgement did not live up to its advance publicity. It did not definitively decide the issue, in fact it decided remarkably little. True, Allan Bakke did win and the University of California lost. However, the fate of affirmative action programmes was not resolved, and indeed despite the Supreme Court's pronouncements in two further cases, United Steelworkers of America v. Weber and Fullilove v. Klutznick, continues to hang in the constitutional balance.


Author(s):  
Christoph Bezemek

This chapter assesses public insult, looking at the closely related question of ‘fighting words’ and the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in Chaplinsky v New Hampshire. While Chaplinsky’s ‘fighting words’ exception has withered in the United States, it had found a home in Europe where insult laws are widely accepted both by the European Court of Human Rights and in domestic jurisdictions. However, the approach of the European Court is structurally different, turning not on a narrowly defined categorical exception but upon case-by-case proportionality analysis of a kind that the US Supreme Court would eschew. Considering the question of insult to public officials, the chapter focuses again on structural differences in doctrine. Expanding the focus to include the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR), it shows that each proceeds on a rather different conception of ‘public figure’.


2015 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
András Koltay

The issue of the use of religious symbols by the State, the Government, the Municipalities and Courts has emerged as a practical constitutional problem during the last quarter of a century. Contradictory examples of us Supreme Court jurisprudence prove that this issue is among the constitutional ‘hard cases’. The relatively recent appearance of the problem clearly indicates the ways in which American social conditions have changed and the transformation of us society’s attitude to religion.


ICL Journal ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonios E. Kouroutakis

AbstractInstitutions such as the US Supreme Court and the European Court of Justice in due time have developed a status of supremacy through judicial activism. The main target of the article is to identify the judicial activism exercised by these Courts and to reason its need in the legal order. In the first part the US Supreme Court and the European Court of Justice are placed in the overall polity that they belong to and the development of their status and their characteristics are analyzed. The major concern of the first part is to examine how those declared their supremacy and focus on major cases and their reason­ing.In the second part the extent of the judicial supremacy in each legal order is discussed and its effects in the decision making process are examined. The assumption that judicial activ­ism is acceptable only if it expresses consensus in the legal order is tested and it is argued that up to an extent, Judicial Activism does not distort the political agenda when it ex­presses the consensus of the legal system. Finally, it is argued that when such activism exceeds the boundaries of the consensus, the other actors in the legal system would even­tually react and would limit such activism.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document