The Supreme Court, the Voting Rights Act and Competing National Imaginaries of the USA

2014 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 94-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Rennie Short
1994 ◽  
Vol 14 ◽  
pp. 565-575
Author(s):  
Howard A. Scarrow

The weakening of American political parties has been a theme featured in the writings of political scientists for the past several decades. This essay is addressed to developments which may further that decline-developments which have undermined the very purpose which American political parties are said to serve. I refer to legal standards which were established by the Supreme Court in 1964, and which have since been expanded by the Court and then incorporated into the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and its amendment in 1982.


2000 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 443-450
Author(s):  
J. Morgan Kousser

The often kind and always interesting comments of Larry Griffin, David James, and Bradley Palmquist touch different aspects of Colorblind Injustice. Let me respond to them, in effect, in chronological order, according to which periods of history illuminate the comments the most. Palmquist points out that institutions like the Supreme Court may suddenly reverse their decisions, as the Court did in the !“switch in time that saved nine” after FDR had proposed to pack the body in 1937, or as it over-turned Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) in Brown v. Board of Education (1954). But as the Brown example suggests, it often takes a long time to overturn precedents, and that is the case with minority voting rights, as well. It was 25 years after Richard Nixon’s “southern strategy,” 24 years after Earl Warren ceased to be Chief Justice, and 23 years after Nixon proposed to water down the Voting Rights Act before the overwhelmingly Republican Supreme Court dared to seriously undermine African American and Latino political rights. Even then, they hesitated to attack the Voting Rights Act itself directly. Major institutions are tough in two senses: their policies often have large impacts, and the institutions, including those as tiny as the nine-member Supreme Court, are difficult to change.


The Forum ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 289-312
Author(s):  
M. Adrienne Jones

Abstract This article investigates the relationship between Congressional GOP roll call votes on the Voting Rights Act reauthorization (VRARA) in 2006 and the GOP response to Shelby v. Holder in 2013. Why did the GOP support the VRARA in 2006 and the Shelby decision in 2013 that effectively nullified the VRA? The analysis presented here will demonstrate that the ideological position of the GOP – opposition to the VRA – was the same in both situations. Because Congress was a politically dangerous place for the GOP to oppose the VRA in 2006, it widened the scope of the conflict and helped facilitate the evisceration of Section 5 by the Supreme Court, instead of attempting to achieve that goal in Congress.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-4 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco Paolo Busardò ◽  
Stefania Bello ◽  
Matteo Gulino ◽  
Simona Zaami ◽  
Paola Frati

Advance health care decisions animate an intense debate in several European countries, which started more than 20 years ago in the USA and led to the adoption of different rules, based on the diverse legal, sociocultural and philosophical traditions of each society. In Italy, the controversial issue of advance directives and end of life’s rights, in the absence of a clear and comprehensive legislation, has been over time a subject of interest of the Supreme Court. Since 2004 a law introduced the “Public Guardian,” aiming to provide an instrument of assistance to the person lacking in autonomy because of an illness or incapacity. Recently, this critical issue has once again been brought to the interest of the Supreme Court, which passed a judgment trying to clarify the legislative application of the appointment of the Guardian in the field of advance directives.


Author(s):  
J. Morgan Kousser

The development of the voting rights of three American groups—white males, women, and African Americans—is described in this essay in order to account for differences in the patterns of enfranchisement, disfranchisement, and, in the case of African Americans, reenfranchisement. Despite property qualifications, white male suffrage was much broader during the colonial and early national period than is often realized. Black suffrage has always been inextricably intertwined with partisan advantage. Women’s suffrage took so long to attain and the movement had to narrow its goals so much to win that female votes made little impact on politics until many years after 1920. The Voting Rights Act, which reenfranchised many African Americans after 1965, has always depended for its impact on Supreme Court decisions, which have passed through repeated cycles of support and restriction and have recently severely undermined protections, leaving minority voting rights at the mercy of “voter suppression” laws passed by their partisan enemies.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-53
Author(s):  
Desmond Ang

In 2013, the Supreme Court struck down parts of the Voting Rights Act that mandated federal oversight of election laws in discriminatory jurisdictions, prompting a spate of controversial new voting rules. Utilizing difference-in-differences to examine the act’s 1975 revision, I provide the first estimates of the effects of “preclearance” oversight. I find that preclearance increased long-run voter turnout by 4–8 percentage points, due to lasting gains in minority participation. Surprisingly, Democratic support dropped sharply in areas subject to oversight. Using historical survey and newspaper data, I provide evidence that this was the result of political backlash among racially conservative whites. (JEL D72, J15, K16)


1994 ◽  
Vol 56 (3) ◽  
pp. 503-523 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark E. Rush

The Supreme Court's approach to representation and redistricting has been grounded on a vision of fairness which extends only as far as the electoral process itself. Accordingly, the doctrine of one-person one-vote, as well as the Court's advocacy of remedial redistricting measures, has focused on ensuring that the electoral routes to legislative representation remained open. Recently, a new wave of challenges to this approach has arisen in legal scholarship and the lower federal courts because its focus on maintaining an open and pluralist political process overlooks the political realities of governing: gaining representation means little if one remains an impotent minority. This article assesses the merits of this new “neopluralist” challenge and the extent to which the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have already begun to incorporate some of its elements. The article concludes by pointing out that this incorporation has led to the establishment of two lines of precedent which are based on irreconcilable notions of representation.


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