Radical right and radical left party ideologies: a pan-European mapping of necessary attributes, differences and similarities

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (5) ◽  
pp. 540-557
Author(s):  
Andreas Fagerholm
2019 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 15-28
Author(s):  
Jonathan Olsen

The story of Die Linke (Left Party, or LP) over the past thirty years reflects the incomplete project of politically unifying the two halves of Germany. Over the course of its history, the LP has been transformed from a desperate holdover from the communist era, to a populist representative of eastern identity in the decade after unification, and finally to a modern, all-German radical left party. Since 2015, however, the LP has found itself threatened in its eastern German heartland by the radical right Alternative for Germany (AfD), which is attempting to supplant the LP as the voice of eastern German protest.


Teknokultura ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
Josep Lobera

The emergence of inclusive populist parties disputes the social construction of the ‘people’ to the exclusive populism, recently generating new academic debates. Do the new radical left parties have a nationalist character? Are populism and nationalism two inseparable dimensions? Drawing on an original dataset in Spain, this article shows that Podemos’ supporters are significantly less nationalist, expressing more open attitudes towards cultural diversity and immigration, and lower levels of Spanishness than voters from other parties. Arguably, Podemos operates as an antagonistic political option to the traditional positions of the populist radical right (PRR), building an inclusive imagined community around a type of constitutional patriotism or republican populism. These findings contribute to the scholar debate on the relationship of nationalism and populism, bringing to discussion the core values of the supporters of a populist party as a complementary element to its categorization.


2017 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 145-166 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manès Weisskircher

Recently, scholars have shown a growing interest in radical left parties (RLPs). In terms of electoral success, the rise of the KPÖ Graz, the Communist Party in Austria’s second biggest city, represents perhaps the most counterintuitive case in Western Europe. Adding to previous studies, the rise of the KPÖ Graz contradicts many of the claims made and patterns found about the conditions for the electoral success of RLPs. While the national KPÖ was voted out of parliament in 1959, the Graz branch has been a member of local government since 1998. Since then, the party has managed to gain 20 per cent of the vote in three out of four elections. In 2017, the KPÖ defended its place as the second largest party in local legislature and stayed ahead of the radical right FPÖ, on the rise at the national level. In stark contrast to the Communists’ current strength, however, they did not gain even 2 per cent of the vote in 1983. This analysis shows how the party has managed to ‘own’ the issue of housing and to exploit local political opportunities in order to be electorally successful. The findings point to the importance of agency and the subnational level for RLPs, and highlight more general questions in the study of this party family.


1989 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 215-223 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lenard R. Berlanstein
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Philip Manow ◽  
Hanna Schwander ◽  
Bruno Palier

The Conclusion summarizes the most important findings of the book. It states a homogenization of European party systems, the emergence of a new combination of leftist socio-economic and rightist socio-cultural positions in many parties, and the rise of the radical right in the north of Europe and the radical left in the south. The contributions of this book also indicate a confluence toward renewed welfare state support among both parties and voters. Finally, center-right parties in power in continental and northern European countries, being under pressure from their rising radical right competitors, push for tougher austerity measures throughout the EU. These measures, or even just the rhetoric, further fuel the success of the radical left in the southern periphery. Hence, the Europeanization of political dynamics, combined with incompatible growth models, has created pronounced European cleavages.


2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (6) ◽  
pp. 744-759
Author(s):  
Anna Brigevich

This article analyses the extent to which radical left parties (RLPs) and radical right parties (RRPs) invoke fear of the EU in their voters by cueing on the economic, immigration and integration dimensions. In the West, mainstream theories of party cueing hold, although not in the predicted direction. RLPs cue on the economic dimension, with more protectionist cues resulting in less EU fear. RRPs are cueing on immigration, although respondents who vote for a more xenophobic party are less Eurosceptic. In the East, RLPs cue on immigration, with the anticipated outcome that a more xenophobic cue conditions greater EU fear. At the same time, RRPs cue on integration directly, with respondents who vote for a more Eurosceptic party exhibiting less fear. Overall, the most Eurosceptic respondents in the West are those who vote for a RRP, while the same is true for RLP voters in the East.


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