Alfred Schutz and the Austrian School of Economics

1986 ◽  
Vol 92 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Prendergast
Author(s):  
Daniela Griselda López

El tema de la prioridad conceptual del mundo de la vida con relación a cualquier especulación científica abstracta es el tema recurrente en los escritos tempranos de Alfred Schutz. En ellos, la reflexión en torno al mundo de la vida se constituye como la base y el fundamento para la posterior formación de conceptos en ciencias sociales. Particularmente inten-tamos recuperar lo puede denominarse como “reivindicación epistémica” (epistemic claim) de una sociología del mundo de la vida. Esa reivindicación se enmarca en el proyecto schutziano de fundamentación fenomenológica de las ciencias sociales, cuyos orígenes pueden rastrearse en las discusiones entabladas en el marco de la Escuela Austríaca de Economía. La reconstrucción de este debate nos permitió pensar el vínculo entre mundo de la vida y razón científica, de modo tal de evitar la sustitución de la realidad social por las idealidades y abstraccio-nes creadas por la ciencia.The question of conceptual priority of the life-world in relation to any abstract scientific speculation is a recurrent topic in Alfred Schutz´s early writings. There, the reflection on the life- world is constituted as the basis and the foundation for the posterior formation of concepts in social sciences. In particular, we will try to regain something that we could name “an epistemic claim” of a sociology of the life-world. This claim is part of Schutz’s project of phenomenological foundation of social sciences, which origins can be found in discussions among the members of Austrian School of Economics. The reconstruction of this debate has enabled us to think the link between the life-world and the scientific reason, in order to avoid the substitution of social reality by idealizations and abstractions created by the science.


Fachsprache ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 40 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 63-78
Author(s):  
Margarete Flöter-Durr ◽  
Thierry Grass

Despite the work of Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson (1989), the concept of relevance has not enjoyed the popularity it deserved among translators as it appears to be more productive in information science and sociology than in translation studies. The theory of relevance provides underpinnings of a unified account of translation proposed by Ernst-August Gutt. However, if the concept of relevance should take into account all parameters of legal translation, the approach should be pragmatic and not cognitive: The aim of a relevant translation is to produce a legal text in the target language which appears relevant to the lawyer in the target legal system, namely a text that can be used in the same way as the original source text. The legal translator works as a facilitator from one legal system into another and relevance is the core of this pragmatic approach which requires translation techniques like adaptation rather than through-translation or calque (in the terminology of Delisle/Lee-Jahnk/Cormier 1999). This contribution tries to show that relevance theory, which was developed in the field of sociology by Alfred Schütz, could also be applied to translation theory with the aim of producing a correct translation in a concrete situation. Some examples extracted from one year of the practice of an expert law translator (German-French) at the Court of Appeal in the Alsace region illustrate our claim and underpin an approach of legal translation and its heuristics that is both pragmatic and reflexive.


Author(s):  
Eviatar Zerubavel

Following in the rich intellectual footsteps of Emile Durkheim, Karl Mannheim, Alfred Schutz, and Ludwik Fleck, this chapter lays out the foundations for the sociology of thinking, or “cognitive sociology.” Focusing on the impersonal, normative, and conventional dimensions of the way we think (and, as such, on its distinctness from both cognitive individualism and universalism), it highlights the distinctly sociological concern with intersubjectivity as well as epistemic commitment to the study of thought communities, cognitive traditions, cognitive norms, cognitive socialization, cognitive conventions, and the politics of cognition.


2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 493-511
Author(s):  
Tim Christiaens

In his lectures on neoliberalism, Michel Foucault argues that neoliberalism produces subjects as ‘entrepreneurs of themselves’. He bases this claim on Gary Becker’s conception of the utility-maximizing agent who solely acts upon cost/benefit-calculations. Not all neoliberalized subjects, however, are encouraged to maximize their utility through mere calculation. This article argues that Foucault’s description of neoliberal subjectivity obscures a non-calculative, more audacious side to neoliberal subjectivity. Precarious workers in the creative industries, for example, are encouraged not merely to rationally manage their human capital, but also to take a leap of faith to acquire unpredictable successes. It is this latter risk-loving, extra-calculative side to neoliberal subjectivity that economists usually designate as ‘entrepreneurial’. By confronting Foucault with the theories of entrepreneurship of the Austrian School of Economics, Frank Knight, and Joseph Schumpeter, the Foucauldian analytical framework is enriched. Neoliberal subjectivation is not the monolithic promotion of utility-maximizing agents, but the generation of a multiplicity of modes for entrepreneurs to relate to oneself and the market.


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