A Theory of Defiant Courts in Nondemocratic Regimes

2021 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-144
Author(s):  
Nuno Garoupa ◽  
Leyla D. Karakas

Author(s):  
Ekrem Karakoç

This chapter opens by providing empirical evidence that income inequality persists or increases in many new democracies after their transition. Then it gives a brief overview of studies that expect reduced inequality because of democratization and questions their three assumptions regarding median voters, party system stability, and the authoritarian legacy on citizen–party linkage. It offers a revision to the median voter theory, emphasizes high electoral volatility in new democracies, and reexamines the legacy of previous nondemocratic regimes on citizen–party linkage. Having offered its argument in a nutshell, it turns to research methodology and case selection. It offers the rationale behind employing a multimethod approach to test its arguments. It tests its argument through large-N analysis in new and longstanding democracies in Europe as well as two paired case studies: Poland and the Czech Republic in postcommunist Europe and Turkey and Spain in Southern Europe.





2019 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 148-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin Koehler ◽  
Holger Albrecht

This article presents a systematic analysis of military coups following popular mass uprisings in nondemocratic regimes, conceptualized as endgame coups. Drawing on our original, medium- n data set of revolutionary situations, we find that such endgame coups form a distinct type of military intervention in politics. Compared to regular coups, episodes of popular mass contestation prompt conservative interventions in politics of the military’s leadership aimed at preserving the regime’s authoritarian infrastructure. A systematic test of factors characterizing postcoup political trajectories is based on Cox proportional hazard models and provides empirical evidence in contrast to the widely held notion of “democratic coups.” Our findings reveal that endgame coups are conservative rollback coups, executed by military leaderships, that result in continued political instability and illiberal politics.



2017 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 495-520 ◽  
Author(s):  
Max Rånge ◽  
Mikael Sandberg

A new data set provides vital information about the world’s political institutions, from 1789 on a monthly and yearly basis and from 1600 on a yearly basis. The yearly data set from 1600 has more than 90,000 country–year observations, and the monthly data set from 1789 more than 600,000 observations—by far the most comprehensive to date, offering several advantages over other available ones. The data set aggregates specific attributes to create nominal and ordinal rankings of political regimes on a scale of 1 to 1,000. In addition to supporting a rigorous classification of democratic and nondemocratic regimes, it allows researchers to trace institutional variations and to explore alternative ways of aggregating political institutions. As a research instrument, the MaxRange data set permits historically minded scholars to address a number of issues related to the dynamics of political institutions in an unprecedented manner.



2006 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 447-473 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vladimir Shlapentokh

The attitudes of leaders toward their personal future are very important to domestic and international politics. These views are particularly vital in the case of leaders of nondemocratic regimes who could face legal prosecution for their corrupt acts or violations of human rights in their own country and abroad. In spite of these fears, however, the leaders in many authoritarian societies trespass laws, both domestic and international, in order to preserve their power and enrich their families. They expose themselves to the danger of the prosecution after they leave office or lose control of the regime. In this context, the author pays special attention to Vladimir Putin’s political future and to the developments in Russia, which favor and disfavor his continued stay in power after 2008.



2013 ◽  
Vol 46 (02) ◽  
pp. 262-270 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sheena Chestnut Greitens

What kind of Internet data is generated in authoritarian political environments? And how can political scientists use that data to better understand the dynamics of nondemocratic regimes?



Author(s):  
Matthew Wilson

This chapter summarizes conclusions about the timing of regime change and focuses on transitions from authoritarian rule. After discussing the ways in which legislatures and parties are thought to extend the life of nondemocratic regimes, it argues that scholars have paid insufficient attention to the specific role of legislatures in authoritarian regimes in historical context. Conceptualizing regimes by combining information on electoral practices and legislatures, it explores temporal aspects of regime change and demonstrates the staying power of legislative authoritarian regimes. Contributions include providing an overview of the ways in which scholars have described temporal processes involving regime change and expanding our knowledge of the complementarity of political institutions in autocracies.



2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 315-332
Author(s):  
Rachel Beatty Riedl ◽  
Dan Slater ◽  
Joseph Wong ◽  
Daniel Ziblatt

Authoritarian regimes become more likely to democratize when they face little choice or little risk. In some cases, the risk of democratization to authoritarian incumbents is so low that ending authoritarianism might not mean exiting power at all. This article develops a unified theory of authoritarian-led democratization under conditions of relatively low incumbent risk. We argue that the party strength of the authoritarian incumbent is the most pivotal factor in authoritarian-led democratization. When incumbent party strength has been substantial enough to give incumbent authoritarian politicians significant electoral victory confidence, nondemocratic regimes have pursued reversible democratic experiments that eventually culminated in stable, thriving democracies. Evidence from Europe's first wave of democratization and more recent democratic transitions in Taiwan and Ghana illustrate how party strength has underpinned authoritarian-led democratization across the world and across modern history.



Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document