Time and Regime Change

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Wilson
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Regime Change ◽  
Historical Context ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Authoritarian Rule ◽  
Insufficient Attention ◽  
Temporal Aspects ◽  
Nondemocratic Regimes ◽  
Combining Information

This chapter summarizes conclusions about the timing of regime change and focuses on transitions from authoritarian rule. After discussing the ways in which legislatures and parties are thought to extend the life of nondemocratic regimes, it argues that scholars have paid insufficient attention to the specific role of legislatures in authoritarian regimes in historical context. Conceptualizing regimes by combining information on electoral practices and legislatures, it explores temporal aspects of regime change and demonstrates the staying power of legislative authoritarian regimes. Contributions include providing an overview of the ways in which scholars have described temporal processes involving regime change and expanding our knowledge of the complementarity of political institutions in autocracies.

Relational Rules and Communist Single-Party Regimes

2021 ◽  
pp. 90-142
Author(s):  
Graeme Gill
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Major Focus ◽  
Symbolic Function ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Relational Rules ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Relationship

Relational rules structure the relationship between the oligarchs and the elite, and the oligarchs and the institutions of the regime. The chapter analyses how the 11 relational rules functioned in the Soviet Union and China over the life of the respective regimes. It explains how the oligarchs sought to insulate themselves from below and, in looking at the role of political institutions, tackles the idea that institutions serve little more than a symbolic function in authoritarian regimes. A major focus is also the power of the individual leader, its nature and bases and how this related to those institutions.

Political Opposition in Civil Society: An Analysis of the Interactions of Secular and Religious Associations in Algeria and Jordan

2008 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 561-578 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco Cavatorta ◽  
Azzam Elananza
Keyword(s):  
Civil Society ◽  
Political Parties ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Civil Society Organizations ◽  
Coalition Building ◽  
Political Opposition ◽  
Authoritarian Rule ◽  
Religious Associations

AbstractThe lack of effective political parties is one of the dominant characteristics of modern Arab polities. The role of opposition to the authoritarian regimes is therefore left to a number of civil society organizations. This study examines the interactions among such groups in the context of the traditional transition paradigm and it analyses specifically how religious and secular organizations operate and interact. The empirical evidence shows that such groups, far from attempting any serious coalition-building to make common demands for democracy on the regime, have a competitive relationship because of their ideological differences and conflicting policy preferences. This strengthens authoritarian rule even in the absence of popular legitimacy. The article focuses its attention on Algeria and Jordan.

scholarly journals The Role of Political Institutions in Africa In Building Democratic Governments

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 436-451
Author(s):  
Idris Mahmoud Idris ◽  
Elfatih Abdullahi Abdelsalam ◽  
Abdulhamid Mohamed Ali Zaroum
Keyword(s):  
Civil Society ◽  
Political Parties ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Ivory Coast ◽  
Good Governance ◽  
Transition Process ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Third Wave ◽  
The Third

The “third wave” of democratization, which saw the fall of old authoritarian regimes across Africa, as well as the introduction of multiparty elections and other significant new changes, has faded. Today, we are witnessing a reversal of democratic gains in favour of dictatorship, resulting in political instability and severe outbreaks of violence in Ethiopia, Mozambique, Kenya, the Ivory Coast, Nigeria, and elsewhere. This article seeks explanation for the failures of the democratization process in Africa, focusing on the challenging role of political institutions in determining the nature of transition trajectories, reviewing its significance, and justifying why this factor is important when analyzing the success or failure of democratization. The paper sought to provide a more robust understanding of Africa's democratization failure and the thorny issue of a transitional path toward good governance. The study found that the progress of the democratic transition process at any given point in history is dependent on the existence of powerful and capable political institutions equipped to face and respond to the challenges of the transition process, and that the more integrated and independent government and civil society institutions are, the more likely democratic practices will thrive. Furthermore, the study showed that under authoritarianism, institutions like elections, political parties, and legislatures are often referred to as "pseudo-democratic" because they are copied, imitated, and mocked to manipulate the concept of democracy and serve the continuation of autocratic rule.

Does High Income Promote Democracy?

1996 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
John B. Londregan ◽  
Keith T. Poole
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Historical Context ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
High Income ◽  
European Countries ◽  
Institutional Setting ◽  
Promoting Effect ◽  
Leadership Change ◽  
Trading Partners ◽  
Southern European Countries

The authors construct a statistical model with which to test whether the regularity that democracy is more commonly found among wealthy countries stems from a democratizing effect of high income or is due entirely to other factors, such as the historical context, various features of the institutional setting, and simultaneity with the process of leadership change. Even after correcting for these many other influences, the democratizing effect of income remains as a statistically significant factor promoting the emergence of democratic political institutions. The authors go on to find that leaders' risks of losing power rise during their time in office and that these risks are higher in more democratic countries.The authors confirm the finding by Burkhart and Lewis-Beck that the democracy-promoting effect of income is stronger among the European countries. They suggest that high income has a more powerful democratizing effect among the Southern European countries because it interacts with pressure from major trading partners to democratize. This suggests a revaluation of policies designed to foster the replacement of authoritarian regimes by democratic ones through free trade.

scholarly journals The European Court of Human Rights, Transitional Justice and Historical Abuse in Consolidated Democracies

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 675-704
Author(s):  
James Gallen
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Transitional Justice ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Authoritarian Rule ◽  
Human Rights Abuses ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Relationship

Abstract In recent years, both transitional justice and the role of the European Court of Human Rights in dealing with historical abuses have evolved. Transitional justice has begun to address widespread or systemic human rights abuses outside of the contexts of armed conflict and authoritarian regimes. In three key recent judgments, El-Masri v Macedonia, Janowiec v Russia and O’Keeffe v Ireland, the Court has clarified and expanded its approach to addressing historical human rights violations relevant to transitional justice in significant, if inconsistent, ways. To date, there is no exploration of the relationship between transitional justice, historical abuse outside the contexts of armed conflict or authoritarian rule and the European Convention of Human Rights. This article seeks to address that gap by considering the potential opportunities and obstacles for the use of the Convention to address historical abuse in consolidated democracies as a part of transitional justice.

All Power to the Party! The Sources of Ruling Party Strength in Authoritarian Regimes

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
Qingjie Zeng
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
External Environment ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Authoritarian Rule ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
Party Building ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Party Strength ◽  
Ruling Party

Abstract The role of political parties in facilitating authoritarian rule has been the subject of extensive research, but parties vary widely in their institutional strength to perform regime-bolstering functions. This article synthesizes existing literature to develop a general theory that explains the sources of ruling party strength in autocracies. We argue that party strength stems from a strategic calculation by political actors who weigh the benefits of building a strong party against its costs. The relative benefits of strong parties depend on the stage of the authoritarian life cycle and factors specific to the strategic environment. The observable implications of the theory are tested using a dataset that includes all autocratic ruling parties that were in power between 1940 and 2015. Consistent with our argument, parties that originated from revolutions tend to be the strongest, whereas those created to support an incumbent dictator tend to be the weakest. A country's resource endowments and external environment also shape the dynamics for party building.

scholarly journals Anti-regime Uprisings and the Emergence of Electoral Authoritarianism

2016 ◽  
Vol 70 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nam Kyu Kim
Keyword(s):  
Regime Change ◽  
Political Reform ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Survival Strategy ◽  
Democratic Regime ◽  
Electoral Authoritarianism

This paper explores the role of threats from below in the emergence of electoral authoritarianism. Mass uprisings for democratic regime change undermine closed authoritarian regimes by making it difficult for autocrats to maintain their regimes through repression and co-optation. Anti-regime uprisings also promote the establishment of electoral authoritarianism by toppling the existing closed regime or by compelling autocrats to offer political reform as a survival strategy. Looking at closed authoritarian regimes from 1961 to 2006, my analysis reveals that anti-regime mass uprisings are significantly associated with transitions to electoral authoritarianism. I also find that nonviolent uprisings are more likely than violent uprisings to result in the establishment of electoral authoritarianism and that the effect of anti-regime uprisings on transitions to electoral authoritarianism is greater when a country is surrounded by more democracies or is ethnically or religiously homogeneous.

The Art of Coercion: Repressions and Repressiveness in Putin’s Russia

2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 151-174
Author(s):  
Kirill Rogov
Keyword(s):  
Case Studies ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Authoritarian Rule ◽  
Reverse Transition ◽  
Electoral Authoritarianism ◽  
Electoral Regime ◽  
And Function

While repressions are seen to be a backbone of authoritarian rule, there is a lack of case studies of repressions and repressive policies in different kinds of authoritarian regimes and their interaction with other mechanisms of authoritarian sustainability. As Russia has demonstrated a transition from ‘soft’ electoral authoritarianism to its more ‘hard’ version during Putin’s third term in office, the role of repressions has increased. What are their scope and functions in Russia during this reverse transition? This article offers an analysis of the causes, types and mechanisms of repressions, and presents various ways of measuring their scale as well as the sources and means of their legitimation within the framework of an electoral regime. It shows that the regime prefers to demonstrate its high repressiveness—its willingness and propensity to repress—but in a limited number of cases; it also describes the role of repressive populism, namely presenting repressions as a necessary response to multiplying threats, as well as the scope and function of counter-elite repressions. The latter are seen as no less important than political repressions in the regime’s reverse transition, and as the main leverage of redistribution of power and institutional rearrangement in its course.

Sources of Post-communist Democratization: Economic Structure, Political Culture, War, and Political Institutions

2003 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 119-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shale Horowitz
Keyword(s):  
Political Culture ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Regime Change ◽  
Economic Structure ◽  
Political Organization ◽  
Culture War ◽  
New Democracies ◽  
Authoritarian Rule ◽  
The Press ◽  
Survival And Development

The fall of communist regimes and the breakup of the multinational Soviet and Yugoslav states produced a remarkable experiment in regime change. Twenty-eight old, new and revived states emerged. While most adopted democratic institutions, many others evolved new variants of authoritarian rule. Some new democracies maintained much higher standards in upholding formal democratic rules and complementary freedoms of the press and political organization. How is this variation in initial democratization to be explained? Among countries that initially adopted democracy, how is variation in the survival and development of democratic freedoms to be explained?

Introduction: Paradoxes of Democratization in Africa

1994 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catharine Newbury
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Authoritarian Regimes ◽  
Sub Saharan Africa ◽  
Authoritarian Rule ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Lively Debate ◽  
Democratic Rule ◽  
Sub Saharan ◽  
Practical Implications

As demands for democracy have swept across the continent since 1989, dramatic change has affected states in sub-Saharan Africa. Frustrated by declining economies and the failures of incumbent governments, people from many different social strata have called for an end to authoritarian rule. Events in Eastern Europe have served as a catalyst, and donor pressures have sometimes acted to facilitate such movements; but the real impetus for change arises from internal struggles which have been incubating for several decades. In response, authoritarian states have moved to liberalize repressive structures, allow multiparty competition and move towards competitive elections. To many analysts such trends represent an important new departure that holds out promise for a more hopeful future. But others are less optimistic, noting the legacies of authoritarian systems and other structural obstacles to sustainable democratic rule. Whatever the outcome, the struggle for the future is now hotly contested.Meanwhile, these processes present a potent challenge for political and social analysis. Why are these demands for change occurring now? What is the role of institutional arrangements and groups in “civil society” in transitions from single-party authoritarian regimes towards multiparty systems? Who are the key actors and which groups are excluded? Do multiparty elections lead to greater tolerance, expanded participation, respect for the rule of law and more accountability? What is required to sustain democratic rule? These and other questions have spawned a lively debate among Africanists, a debate with important theoretical and practical implications.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document